This study investigates how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects venture capital (VC) contract terms. Using a unique database of contracts between VCs and entrepreneurial firms in China, we provide evidence that VCs include more investor-friendly covenants in contracts when EPU increases. Our findings hold across a battery of robustness checks, including addressing endogeneity concerns and using alternative EPU measures. Our mechanism analysis shows that higher investment risk and increased VCs’ bargaining power might be plausible reasons why EPU positively affects the presence of investor-friendly covenants in VC contracts.

This study investigates how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects venture capital (VC) contract terms. Using a unique database of contracts between VCs and entrepreneurial firms in China, we provide evidence that VCs include more investor-friendly covenants in contracts when EPU increases. Our findings hold across a battery of robustness checks, including addressing endogeneity concerns and using alternative EPU measures. Our mechanism analysis shows that higher investment risk and increased VCs’ bargaining power might be plausible reasons why EPU positively affects the presence of investor-friendly covenants in VC contracts.

We examine the financial and real implications of bank CEOs’ social minds induced by female socialization on sustainable loans. We find evidence of an economically sizable and statistically significant bank CEO-daughter effect in lending behaviours, controlling for borrower industry as well as bank characteristics. In specific, the “greenness” of a bank is significantly higher, when the lead bank CEO parents a first-born daughter compared to an otherwise lender. Looking at the specific lending contracts written by banks, we find that lead banks whose CEOs parent a first-born daughter provide loans with lower spread, fewer financial covenants, and less likely to require collateral, for borrowers with better Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance. Furthermore, we find that bank CEOs’ parenting experience with first-born daughters would predict borrowing firms’ future CSR performance positively, suggesting banks with CEOs raising a first-born daughter would promote the corporate social activities of borrowers.

Debt covenants are pervasive in debt contracts. To prevent the dilution of existing debt, most creditors set covenants of a maximum debt-to-earnings ratio for borrowing firms. In this paper, we embed debt covenants into a workhorse real business cycle model with defaultable debt to study its macroeconomic implications. In our model, creditors penalize firms when debt covenants are violated. We show such a mechanism that covenants significantly reduce debt dilution and default over the business cycles. Furthermore, reduced debt dilution due to debt covenants also mitigates the debt overhang problem and thus boosts capital accumulation. Compared to counterfactual economies without covenants, the baseline economy with debt covenants experiences endogenous stabilization of macroeconomic shocks and higher levels of capital, output, and consumption.

Using samples of corporate bonds issued by Chinese A-share firms from 2007 to 2019, we examine how the type of local bond underwriting firm, specifically, whether the local underwriter has foreign shareholders or does not have foreign shareholders, affects the number of bond covenants. Our findings suggest that local underwriters with foreign shareholders (UFS) add more covenants to their bonds to protect the interests of bondholders than local underwriters without foreign shareholders (UNFS). Thus, having UFS underwrite bonds in an emerging market generally helps investor protection. Our conclusion remains robust to alternative metrics of bond covenants and foreign shareholders, and after accounting for endogeneity. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of UFS on bond covenants is more salient when: 1) the issuer is opaque, has a dual board chair and CEO, or is a non-state owned firm, 2) the issuer is located in a poor legal environment, in a low marketization area, or a region with poor economic development, or 3) the foreign shareholder of the local underwriter has experience in its home market, is from a country with a better legal environment, or has ample experience in the Chinese underwriting business.

Agency theory posits that debt-like compensation (such as defined-benefit pensions and other deferred compensation) aligns managerial interests more closely with those of debtholders and reduces the agency cost of debt. Consistent with theory, we find that a higher CEO relative leverage, defined as the ratio of the CEO's inside leverage (debt-toequity compensation) to corporate leverage, is associated with lower cost of debt financing and fewer restrictive covenants, for a sample of private loans originated during 2006-2008. These findings persist after accounting for the endogeneity of CEO relative leverage, and are more pronounced for firms with higher default risk. Additional analysis on a sample of new public bond issues also shows a negative relation between CEO relative leverage and bond yield spread. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that debtholders recognize the incentive effects of executive debt-like compensation and adjust the terms of corporate debt contracts accordingly.

This paper studies the optimal contracting problem between shareholders and the agent in a general cash-ow setup, and offers a framework to quantitatively assess the impact of agency problems. Under the structural model of capital structure studied in Leland (1994), we solve the optimal employment contract explicitly, and nd that debt-overhang lowers the optimal leverage. Consistent with the data, our model delivers a negative relation between pay-performance sensitivity and rm size, and the interaction between debt-overhang and agency issue leads smaller rms to take less leverage relative to their larger peers. During nancial distress, a rm’s cash-ow becomes more sensitive to underlying performance shocks due to debt-overhang. We also consider the possibility of debt covenants to alleviate the debt-hang problem.