This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy, introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers' leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance. Privately owned developers(POE) are hit harder than state-owned firms (SOE), with larger drops in sales and higher default risk. Using granular project-level data, we show that the policy reduces developer sales primarily by curtailing new-project supply: breached developers launch fewer projects. On the demand side, homebuyers reallocate purchases from privately owned developers to SOEs, further widening the POE-SOE gap. The policy also reduced local governments’ land-transfer revenues and increased reliance on local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) for land purchases. These LGFV-acquired parcels exhibit very low subsequent development rates, which may increase local governments’off-balance-sheet debt risks.

In the realm of financial stability, accurate credit default discrimination models are crucial for policy-making and risk management. This paper introduces a robust model that enhances credit default discrimination through a sophisticated integration of a filter-wrapper feature selection strategy, instance selection, and an updated version of majority voting. We present a novel approach that combines individual and ensemble classifiers, rigorously tested on datasets from Chinese listed companies and the German credit market. The results highlight significant improvements over traditional models, offering policymakers and financial institutions a more reliable tool for assessing credit risks. The paper not only demonstrates the effectiveness of our model through extensive comparisons but also discusses its implications for regulatory practices and the potential for adoption in broader financial applications.

Using a sample of 501 Chinese non-financial firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2020, we find that both foreign exchange (FX) derivatives and foreign currency (FC) debt significantly reduce firms’ probability of default. We further observe that larger, non-state-owned enterprises (SOEs), Hong Kong-headquartered firms, firms operating after China’s 2015 exchange rate reform and firms under high trade policy uncertainty (TPU) are more likely to use both FX derivatives and FC debt concurrently, thereby diversifying their strategies for managing default risk. Our analysis indicates that these tools reduce firms’ default risk primarily by improving firms’ profitability, raising their likelihood of obtaining credit ratings, and increasing their use of interest rate derivatives. Importantly, we reveal that FX derivatives and FC debt act as substitutes in mitigating firms’ default risk. Notably, this substitution effect is more pronounced for larger, non-SOEs, Hong Kong-headquartered firms, firms operating after exchange rate reform and firms facing high TPU. Finally, we find that using FX derivatives significantly dampens firms’ investment, which may explain why Chinese firms tend to prefer FC debt to manage their default risk.

This study aims to examine the causal effect of carbon regulatory risk on corporate bond yield spreads in emerging markets through empirical analysis. Exploiting China's commitment to peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060 as an exogenous shock to an unexpected increase in carbon regulatory risk, we perform a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy. We find that exposure to carbon regulatory risk leads to an increase in bond yield spreads for carbon-intensive firms located in regions with stricter regulatory enforcement. This positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with financing constraints, belonging to more competitive industries, and located in regions with a high marketization process. We further identify that higher earnings uncertainty and increased investor attention serve as two mechanisms by which carbon regulatory risk influences the yield spreads of corporate bonds. Moreover, the spread decomposition reveals that the rise in bond yield spreads after an increase in carbon regulatory risk is primarily driven by the rise in default risk rather than the rise in liquidity risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of considering carbon regulatory risk exposure in financial markets, especially in developing economies like China.

Trade credit is a vital external source of financing, playing a crucial role in redistributing credit from financially stronger firms to weaker ones, especially during difficult times. However, it is puzzling that the redistribution perspective alone fails to explain the changes in trade credit when firms get involved in major litigation, which can be seen as an external shock for firms. Based on a firm-level dataset of litigations from China, we find that firms involved in major litigation not only exhibit an increased demand for trade credit but also extend more credit to their customers. Our further analysis reveals that whether as plaintiffs or defendants, litigation firms experience an increase in the demand and supply of trade credit. Moreover, compared to plaintiff firms, defendant firms experience a more pronounced increase in the demand for trade credit. Using firms’ market power and liquidity as moderators, we find that the increase in the demand for trade credit is more likely due to firms’ deferred payments rather than voluntary provision by suppliers, and the increase in the supply of trade credit appears to be an expedient measure to maintain market share. Generally, our results provide evidence of credit contagion effect within the supply chain, where the increased demand for trade credit is transferred from firms’ customers to themselves when they get involved in major litigations, while the default risk is simultaneously transferred from litigation firms to upstream firms.

How do Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities that limit the impacts of banks’ unrealized capital loss on the regulatory capital measures affect banks’ exposure to deposit run risks when policy rates increase? And how should regulators design policies on classifying securities as HTM jointly with bank capital regulation? To answer these questions, we develop a model of bank runs in which banks classify long-term assets as HTM or Asset-for-Sale (AFS). Banks trade off the current cost of issuing equity to meet the capital requirement when the interest rate increases against increasing future run risks when the interest rate increases further in the future. When banks underestimate interest rate risks or have limited liability to depositors in the event of default, capping held-to-maturity long-term assets and mandating more equity capital issuance may reduce the run risks of moderately capitalized banks. Using bank-quarter-level data from Call Reports, we provide empirical support for the model’s testable implications.

A unique natural experiment in China – the city-level staggered introduction of admin-istrative approval centers (AAC) – reduces bank loan processing times by substantially speeding up the process of registering collateral without affecting credit decisions. Fol-lowing the establishment of an AAC, firms significantly reduce their cash holdings. State-owned enterprises are less affected. Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings de-creases, as does the cash flow sensitivity of investment. The share of short-term debt increases, while inventory holdings and reliance on trade credit decrease. Defaults also decrease. These results suggest that timely access to credit has important implications on firms’ financial management.

This paper revisits the default-crash risk relation in the context of China. We find that firms with higher default risk have lower stock price crash risk both in monthly and yearly frequencies. To identify the causal effect, we use the first-ever default event in China’s onshore bond market in 2014 as an exogenous shock to the strength of implicit guarantees. The negative relation arises from the active involvement of the government before 2014 and creditors after 2014 in corporate governance. Consistent with the external scrutiny mechanism, the impact of default risk on stock price crashes is stronger in situations in which creditors are more likely to engage in active monitoring (i.e., firms with higher liquidation costs, lower liquidation value, and higher levels of information asymmetry), with these effects primarily observed in the post-2014 period. Overall, our study highlights the role of the “invisible hand” in the absence of the “visible hand.”

This paper examines how the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and big data affects banking operations, emphasizing the crucial role of big data in unlocking the full potential of AI. Leveraging a comprehensive dataset of over 4.5 million loans issued by a leading commercial bank in China and exploiting a policy mandate as an exogenous shock, we document significant improvements in credit rating accuracy and loan performance, particularly for SMEs. Specifically, the adoption of AI and big data reduces the rate of unclassified credit ratings by 40.1% and decreases loan default rates by 29.6%. Analyzing the bank's phased implementation, we find that integrating big data analytics substantially enhances the effectiveness of AI models. We further identify significant heterogeneity: improvements are especially pronounced for unsecured and short-term loans, borrowers with incomplete financial records, first-time borrowers, long-distance borrowers, and firms located in economically underdeveloped or linguistically diverse regions. Our findings underscore the powerful synergy between big data and AI, demonstrating their joint capability to alleviate information frictions and enhance credit allocation efficiency.

We conceptually identify and empirically verify the features distinguishing FinTech platforms from non-financial platforms using marketplace lending data. Specifically, we highlight three key features: (i) Long-term contracts introducing default risk at both the individual and platform levels; (ii) Lenders’ investment diversification to mitigate individual default risk; (iii) Platform-level default risk leading to greater asymmetric user stickiness and rendering platform-level cross-side network effects (p-CNEs), a novel metric we introduce, crucial for adoption and market dynamics. We incorporate these features into a model of two-sided FinTech platform with potential failures and endogenous participation and fee structures. Our model predicts lenders’ single-homing, occasional lower fees for borrowers, asymmetric p-CNEs, and the predictive power of lenders’ p-CNEs in forecasting platform failures. Empirical evidence from China’s marketplace lending industry, characterized by frequent market entries, exits, and strong network externalities, corroborates our theoretical predictions. We find that lenders’ p-CNEs are systematically lower on declining or well-established platforms compared to those on emerging or rapidly growing platforms. Furthermore, lenders’ p-CNEs serve as an early indicator of platform survival likelihood, even at the initial stages of market development. Our findings provide novel economic insights into the functioning of multi-sided FinTech platforms, offering valuable implications for both industry practitioners and financial regulators.