We study how bank liberalization affects analyst forecast accuracy using two interest rate deregulations in China—the removal of the cap on bank lending rates in 2004 and the removal of the floor in 2013—as quasi-natural experiments. Our results show that the analyst forecast accuracy for high-risk firms decreases significantly after the removal of the lending rate cap, whereas analyst forecast accuracy for low-risk firms increases significantly after the removal of the lending rate floor. Moreover, interest rate liberalization affects forecast accuracy through operational risk and information asymmetry channels. Furthermore, the impact was concentrated on firms whose actual performance fell short of performance expectations and those that received more bank loans. Our findings imply that interest rate liberalization policies may have unintended consequences for analyst forecasts.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed in 1895 and led to the deregulation of Chinese private enterprise investment in state monopolized industries. Newly founded enterprises necessitated cooperation amongst member-owners for access to primitive capital. A spirit of cooperative behavior thus resulted in the birth of enterprises in China. We used Chinese prefecture-level panel data between 1880 and 1899 to demonstrate that an increase in the number of enterprises brought by the deregulation is more likely to form in regions that culturally nurture cooperative behavior. We also found a persistent influence of cooperative culture on foundation of enterprises today.

Using the staggered intercity but within-province deregulation of local banks in China as exogenous variations, we evaluate the effect of banking integration across geographical segmentation on capital misallocation. Based on an administrative data set comprehensively covering Chinese manufacturing firms, we find that for firms with initially high marginal revenue products of capital (MRPK), the integration increases physical capital by 19.3%, and reduces MRPK by 33.1% relative to low MRPK ffrms. Our findings are more pronounced for non-statedowned firms and firms with higher exposure to integrated banks. Integration also significantly increases the responsiveness of firms’ investments to deposit shock on other cities within the same province.

Utilizing the removal of the bank lending interest rate floor (IRFD) in China as an exogenous shock of banking liberalization, we find that IRFD leads to a significant rise in firms’ cost of equity capital, which is consistent with the prediction from the MM theory. The identified effects are more pronounced among firms with weaker ex-ante corporate governance and more severe ex-ante agency problems. We also find that IRFD witnesses an increase in the amount of acquired bank loans, a decrease in the average interest rate, and an increase in free cash flow. Further evidence also suggests IRFD provokes a drop in firms’ investment quality. Overall, our findings highlight an unexplored role of banking sector deregulation on firms’ cost of equity capital.

Can bank competition help attenuate the prevalence of zombie firms? Motivated by a stylized model, this paper studies the effect of bank competition on the formation of zombie firms in two stages: the formation of distressed firms and distressed firms obtaining zombie lending. Using China’s 2009 bank entry deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment, the paper finds that bank competition lowers the probability of the formation of distressed firms, while it increases the probability of distressed firms obtaining zombie lending. Overall, bank competition decreases the formation of zombie firms. In addition, the findings show that a higher ex ante proportion of bad loans and higher probability of bad loan recovery will lead to a higher probability of distressed firms receiving zombie lending. Both factors encourage banks to sustain lending to distressed firms to keep them alive and to gamble that those firms may recover in the future.

Deregulation may increase bank stability. Employing China’s loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) reform in 2015, we show that the deregulation of the LDR increases the stability of banks. Specifically, the deregulation of the LDR alleviates banks’ deposit competition, and decreases reliance on customer deposit funding. By doing so, it improves the loan structure among banks with a high LDR, which, in turn, increases the on-balance-sheet stability of these banks. Meanwhile, the deregulation of the LDR curbs high-LDR banks’ impulse to issue principal-floating wealth management products, a form of shadow banking, which thus increases their off-balance-sheet stability.

We investigate banks' issuance choices of wealth management products (WMPs), which are both interest rate deregulation vehicles and shadow deposits without explicit government insurance. Support for an inverted-U shape between market share and WMP issuance is found in national market. State-owned banks are reluctant to issue WMPs due to their monopoly power, very small banks do not have the capacity to issue while small and medium banks issue WMPs intensively as a regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, the geographic deregulation in 2009 stimulates the bank competition in the local market, incumbent banks take advantage of WMPs to fight off the new entering banks.

Using proprietary individual level loan data, this paper explores the economic consequences of the 2009 bank entry deregulation in China. Such deregulation leads to higher screening standards, lower interest rates, and lower delinquency rates for corporate loans from entrant banks. Consequently, in deregulated cities, private firms with bank credit access increase asset investments, employment, net income, and ROA. In contrast, the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) does not improve following deregulation. Deregulation also amplifies bank credit from productive private firms to inefficient SOEs due mainly to SOEs’ soft budget constraints. This adverse effect accounts for 0.31% annual GDP losses.

We document the changes in dynamic stochastic structure of the various industrial sectors of the Chinese A, B share markets and the Hong Kong share markets. We utilize a robustly estimated VECM-MV-GARCH model to test for possible co-integrating vectors between the market segmentations pre and post deregulation of the Chinese B share market. Our results suggest that before deregulation there is weak evidence of co-integration between the A and B share markets however, post deregulation the situation changes and the segments appear to be significantly co-integrated. MV-GARCH results suggest that the conditional correlations of market/sector shocks also increase significantly over the sample period.

What might interest rate liberalization do to intermediation and the cost of capital in China? China’s most binding interest rate control is a ceiling on the deposit rate, although lending rates are also regulated. Through case studies and model-based simulations, we find that liberalization will likely result in higher interest rates, discourage marginal investment, improve the effectiveness of intermediation and monetary transmission, and enhance the financial access of underserved sectors. This can occur without any major disruption. International experience suggests, however, that achieving these benefits without unnecessary instability, requires vigilant supervision, governance, and monetary policy, and a flexible policy toolkit.