This paper studies the evolution of China's production and trade patterns during its integration into the global economy. We document and explain new facts concerning changes in production and exports at the industry and firm levels using microdata and a quantitative Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms. Counterfactual simulations reveal that capital deepening made China's production and exports more capital-intensive, although labor-biased productivity growth acted as a counterforce. Consistent with the data, our model demonstrates that China's trade openness peaked around the mid-2000s and fell until the 2020s, while the world's exposure to Chinese exports rose continuously.

Chinese enterprises are currently facing unprecedented economic transformations accompanied by a diverse array of challenges. This article delves into these challenges and provides management recommendations to assist companies in addressing these pressing issues. First, China's economic growth is gradually slowing, prompting companies to explore new avenues for growth, such as diversifying their products and markets, enhancing research and development, and expanding into emerging markets. Second, the uncertain global trade landscape has impacted exports and supply chains, necessitating diversified supply chains, new trade partnerships, and proactive strategies to navigate potential trade policy changes. Additionally, the pressure of technological innovation cannot be underestimated, urging companies to increase R&D investment, collaborate with other enterprises on research, and recruit and nurture high-quality tech talent. Furthermore, with the Chinese government's growing focus on environmental concerns, companies need to invest in clean production technologies, build sustainable supply chains, and actively fulfill their social responsibilities. Other challenges including rising labor costs, intellectual property protection, financial risks, regulatory compliance, talent recruitment and retention, and digital transformation all require proactive responses. By adopting proactive management strategies, Chinese enterprises can thrive in this era filled with both opportunities and risks, achieving sustainable growth and enhanced competitiveness.

We study the consequences of market uncertainty on international trade. An increase in foreign market uncertainty dampens China's aggregate exports on both the extensive and intensive margins. The adverse effects are more pronounced in industries facing tighter financial constraints than in others. We propose a dynamic trade model to explain the facts. Greater uncertainty depresses a firm's expected value of exporting and borrowing capacity, leading to fewer exporters and a smaller average size of exports. Under calibrated parameters, the uncertainty shock accounts for a sizable fraction of China's trade collapse in the 2008 financial crisis and the recent trade war.

We examine the impact of renminbi revaluation on foreign firm valuations, considering two surprise announcements of changes in China’s exchange rate policy in 2005 and 2010 and employing data on some 6,000 firms in 44 economies. Stock returns rise with renminbi revaluation expectations. This reaction appears to reflect a combination of improvements in general market sentiment and specific trade effects. Expected renminbi appreciation has a positive effect on firms exporting to China but a negative impact on those providing inputs for the country’s processing exports. Stock prices rise for firms competing with China in their home market but fall for firms importing Chinese products with large imported-input content. There is also some evidence that expected renminbi appreciation reduces the valuation of financially-constrained firms, presumably because appreciation implies reduced Chinese purchases of foreign securities. The results carry over when we consider ten instances of market-perceived changes in prospective Chinese currency policy.

This paper examines the impact of renminbi revaluation on foreign firm valuation and, by implication, firm prospects. To deal with the potential endogeneity of exchange rate movements, we consider not just official announcements of exchange rate policy but also 27 instances of market-perceived changes in China’s currency policy driven by domestic or foreign political pressure. Using information on 12,300 firms in 44 countries, we find that stock returns increased with renminbi revaluation expectations. This reaction was related as much to improved market sentiment as to specific trade channels, however. In terms of trade channels, we find that expectations of renminbi appreciation reduce the relative stock returns of firms providing components and raw materials to China as inputs for the country’s exports. There is also some evidence that expectations of renminbi appreciation reduce the stock prices of financiallyconstrained firms.

This paper examines the impact of renminbi revaluation on foreign firm valuation and, by implication, firm prospects. To deal with the potential endogeneity of exchange rate movements, we consider not just official announcements of exchange rate policy but also 27 instances of market-perceived changes in China’s currency policy driven by domestic or foreign political pressure. Using information on 12,300 firms in 44 countries, we find that stock returns increased with renminbi revaluation expectations. This reaction was related as much to improved market sentiment as to specific trade channels, however. In terms of trade channels, we find that expectations of renminbi appreciation reduce the relative stock returns of firms providing components and raw materials to China as inputs for the country’s exports. There is also some evidence that expectations of renminbi appreciation reduce the stock prices of financiallyconstrained firms.

he paper assesses the vulnerability of China to external shocks via the indirect negative effect of a slow-down in exports on domestic demand for investment. In the last decade China has increased its dependence on external demand, particularly from the advanced countries; at the same time it has become a primary destination market for goods produced in the rest of emerging Asia. Since 2001 investment expenditures have represented a key driver of Chinese GDP growth; as a very large share of activity in the manufacturing sector is export oriented, we expect fixed capital investment in this sector to be highly related to exports. Overcoming serious shortcomings in available data, we estimate an investment equation for the period 1993-2006 and find an elasticity of investment to exports in the manufacturing sector in the range between 0.9 and 1. Taking into account the dominant contribution of capital accumulation to Chinese GDP growth, we conclude that the growth effects of an external demand shock could become significant when taking into account the domestic investment channel.

Vertical fragmentation of product value chain across borders is the driving force of growing economic interdependency in East Asia. A common currency, not flexible exchange rates between national currencies, would reduce flexibility in relative prices within East Asia. Its impact would be far greater for exports that have stronger production network linkage. In order to test the hypothesis, the paper estimates the effect of a common currency on China's processing and ordinary exports separately. The distinction is necessary because the processing exports, unlike the ordinary exports, are produced along the regional production networks, with final stages of assembly and exporting being increasingly concentrated in China. The short-run dynamics indicate that the effect on China's processing exports is more than double the corresponding effect on China's ordinary exports. The long-run effect on the processing exports of intra-regional RER flexibility, which is otherwise the lack of a regional currency, is almost nine times as large as the long-run effect of a unilateral RMB appreciation. By contrast, the corresponding long-run effect is statistically insignificant for the case of ordinary exports that are produced primarily by using local inputs. The long-run coefficient of this intra-regional RER flexibility implies that the actual volume of processing exports is 20 percent below the potential. The magnitudes of these effects are consistent with the hypothesis that a common currency would further integrate East Asian production networks and promote regional economic integration.

We examine whether the Chinese exchange rate is misaligned and how Chinese trade flows respond to the exchange rate and to economic activity. We find, first, that the Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), is substantially below the value predicted by estimates based upon a cross-country sample, when using the 2006 vintage of the World Development Indicators. The economic magnitude of the mis-alignment is substantial -- on the order of 50 percent in log terms. However, the misalignment is typically not statistically significant, in the sense of being more than two standard errors away from the conditional mean. Moreover, this finding disappears completely when using the most recent 2008 vintage of data; then the estimated undervaluation is on the order of 10 percent. Second, we find that Chinese multilateral trade flows respond to relative prices -- as represented by a trade weighted exchange rate -- but the relationship is not always precisely estimated. In addition, the direction of the effects is sometimes different from what is expected a priori. For instance, Chinese ordinary imports actually rise in response to a RMB depreciation; however, Chinese exports appear to respond to RMB depreciation in the expected manner, as long as a supply variable is included. In that sense, Chinese trade is not exceptional. Furthermore, Chinese trade with the United States appears to behave in a standard manner -- especially after the expansion in the Chinese manufacturing capital stock is accounted for. Thus, the China-US trade balance should respond to real exchange rate and relative income movements in the anticipated manner. However, in neither the case of multilateral nor bilateral trade flows should one expect quantitatively large effects arising from exchange rate changes. And, of course, these results are not informative with regard to the question of how a change in the RMB/USD exchange rate would affect the overall US trade deficit.