We examine the impact of state-owned shareholders on fraud within private firms. Utilizing a sample of A-share private listed firms in China observed from 2008 to 2021. We discover a significant negative association between state-owned shareholders and the likelihood of fraud in private firms. State-owned shareholders primarily act as inhibitors of fraud, and their effect on the probability of fraud being detected is not statistically significant. This finding remains robust even after conducting a series of sensitivity tests to mitigate potential selectivity bias and reverse causality endogeneity issues. In the analysis of heterogeneity, we found that state-owned shareholders play a more active role under conditions of imperfect external institutional development, and they also exert a more significant inhibitory effect on enterprises with lower governance levels and higher business risks. Our mechanism test demonstrates that the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on corporate fraud is achieved by improving corporate governance and alleviating financial distress. This study also examines the impact of state-owned shareholders' local characteristics, external supervision mechanisms, and internal governance mechanisms in unique Chinese enterprises on fraudulent behaviour by private enterprises. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence that state-owned shareholder ownership is associated with reducing fraudulent behaviour within private firms.

Based on the sample of Chinese A-listed firms from 2003 to 2020, this paper investigates the effect of common institutional ownership on labor income share. The result shows that common institutional ownership can significantly increase firms’ labor income share. Mechanism tests indicate that common ownership can: 1) alleviate financial constraints by reducing the debt financing costs and increasing the trade credit financing, thus increasing the labor income share; 2) improve corporate innovation and therefore enhances the demand for highly-skilled labor, which eventually boost labor income share. Competitive hypothesis test represents that common institutional ownership can reduce the monopoly power of enterprises and decrease monopoly rent, so as to increase the proportion of labor in the distribution. Further analyses present that the network formed by the common ownership can effectively exert the financing support role of SOEs and the knowledge spillover effect of innovative-advantage firms, which contributes to the labor income share increasing of other related firms in the network connection. This study not only enriches the economic consequences of common institutional ownership, but also provides policy guidance for the government to further optimize the income-distribution pattern by deepening the reform of the financial market.