This study investigates the relationship between the number of stock concepts and future returns, as well as the economic mechanisms underlying this association. Using novel collected data, we find that stocks with a greater number of concepts earn significantly higher returns in the subsequent month, generating a six-factor adjusted annualized alpha of approximately 9.6% for a long-short portfolio. Although these stocks exhibit higher turnover, return volatility, and investor attention - features commonly associated with speculative concept-driven trading - an analysis of cross-listed AH twin stocks reveals that concept counts do not widen the AH premium. Moreover, the return premium persists for up to 15 months without significant reversal, whereas firms that engage in opportunistic concept-chasing exhibit pronounced long-run reversals, suggesting that the positive concept-return relation is not driven by speculative motives. The higher returns are primarily attributable to strong industrial policy support and sustained above-expectation operating performance. Firms with more concepts are more likely to receive government subsidies and deliver positive earnings surprises, effects that are amplified when their core concepts receive stronger national policy backing. In contrast, firms that pursue concepts lacking substantive business relevance are significantly less likely to obtain government subsidies and fail to achieve above-expectation growth. Regarding investor composition, institutional ownership of high-concept stocks increases modestly, while ownership by government-guided funds rises substantially - particularly for stocks whose core concepts are strongly supported by national industrial policies. Conversely, concept-chasing behavior by listed firms significantly reduces the ownership ratio of government-guided funds. Overall, our findings indicate that concept stocks in China’s capital market are not purely speculative but signal underlying national policies.

The global financial system is currently navigating a profound transformation driven by digitalization and the rise of decentralized financial innovations. In response, central banks are increasingly exploring or implementing Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) as a sovereign digital evolution of fiat money. This study investigates the dual nature of CBDCs, evaluating whether they represent a strategic opportunity to modernize the economy or a systemic threat to existing financial stability. Employing a qualitative methodology, the research analyzes official policy frameworks from the IMF and BIS alongside diverse real-world case studies, including China’s e-CNY, the Bahamas’ Sand Dollar, Nigeria’s eNaira, and the European Central Bank’s Digital Euro. The findings suggest that while CBDCs offer significant benefits—such as enhanced payment efficiency, reduced transaction costs, and improved financial inclusion—they also introduce critical risks. These include the potential disintermediation of commercial banks, heightened cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and concerns regarding individual data privacy and government surveillance. The study concludes that the successful integration of CBDCs is not merely a technical challenge but a social and strategic one. Adoption is heavily dependent on infrastructure, digital literacy, and public trust. Ultimately, the research highlights that there is no "one-size-fits-all" model; the future of money will be shaped by how effectively individual nations balance technological innovation with the preservation of financial architecture.

Against the backdrop of systemic financial risk prevention and the pursuit of a virtuous cycle in the real economy, whether Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) shareholding alleviates maturity mismatch of corporate investment and financing activities is a question of critical importance, not only for the development of individual firms but also for high-quality macroeconomic growth. Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2021, this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of LGFVs shareholding on corporate maturity mismatch. The empirical results indicate that LGFVs shareholding can significantly alleviate corporate maturity mismatch and the finding is still robust across a series of empirical checks. Mechanism analyses show that LGFVs shareholding improves firms’ long-term financing capacity through a resource provision channel and restrains overinvestment through a governance optimization channel, thereby collectively mitigating corporate maturity mismatch. Further analysis indicates that the mitigating effect of LGFVs shareholding is more pronounced in firms with concentrated LGFVs shareholding, firms controlled by non-state-owned capital and firms under higher economic policy uncertainty. Our findings provide valuable theoretical insights for policy design aimed at optimizing corporate financial behavior and curbing corporate financial risks.

We examine the relationship between government data opening and corporate leverage manipulation. Leveraging the staggered establishment of province-level open government data platforms in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that government data opening significantly reduces corporate leverage manipulation. This policy effect is more pronounced among firms with low capital intensity, firms with limited analyst coverage, and those located in regions with low banking competition. Mechanism analysis suggests that government data opening affects the cost-benefit tradeoff of corporate leverage manipulation by alleviating financing constraints and enhancing corporate governance, thereby mitigating leverage manipulation practices. Our research contributes to the literature on government data opening, highlighting its role in reducing leverage manipulation and offering valuable implications for mitigating significant financial risks.

This study investigates how the interaction of political accountability and local officials’ career incentives shapes the market for Municipal Corporate Bonds (MCBs) in China, taking the 2017 local government debt personal responsibility rule as a quasinatural experiment. We develop a stylized incomplete-information bargaining model to analyze how the rule reshapes the bargaining equilibrium by rendering officials’ observable characteristics credible signals of bailout incentives. Using a dataset of prefecture-level MCBs from 2008 to 2020, we empirically test the model’s predictions and focus on separating officials’ incentive effects from their inherent ability. Our core findings show that post-announcement of the rule, each additional year of a local party secretary’s remaining time to retirement, a proxy for bailout incentives, reduces MCB spreads by approximately 2.5 basis points and increases issuance volume by about 2.0%. These effects are significantly amplified in fiscally stressed cities. Notably, under the 2017 rule, cities led by party secretaries with stronger bailout incentives can expand MCB issuance, which is contrary to the rule’s original intent to rein in local borrowing.

We examine the unintended consequences of bankruptcy court establishment on corporate behavior. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2019 and a staggered difference-in-differences model, we find that the establishment of bankruptcy courts increases accrual earnings management by about 17% among high bankruptcy risk firms relative to low-risk firms. While bankruptcy courts improve bankruptcy efficiency and justice, reduce local government intervention, and accelerate the exit of zombie firms, they also induce greater earnings management. This effect is driven mainly by survival pressure and managerial reputation concerns, rather than by efforts to correct external evaluations. Consistent with this interpretation, we do not observe improvements in long-term operations, governance, performance, or real earnings management. Overall, this paper enriches the literature on earnings management from the perspective of judicial governance and on the economic consequences of creditor-friendly bankruptcy institutions.

This paper examines the use of finance leases in China’s local government debt. Using a unique dataset of government finance lease transactions, we document that local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) rapidly adopted finance leases, with the outstanding amount growing from virtually nothing in 2013 to a cumulative total of 1.02 trillion RMB by 2018. Our difference-in-differences (DID) analysis reveals that the central government’s restrictive financial policies account for a substantial portion of this surge. Because these restrictive policies confined LGFVs’access to conventional borrowing channels, finance leases emerged as a key alternative, particularly through bank-affiliated leasing firms. While LGFVs' use of finance leases offers low-cost financing for local governments, the low quality of the underlying assets poses significant risks to the leasing firms.

The Full Guaranteed Purchase System began to replace the subsidy system as the core policy for promoting renewable energy integration, designating grid companies as the sole entity responsible for the physical integration of renewable energy. Meanwhile, the Tradable Green Certificates system provides environmental benefits for renewable power generators through market mechanisms. Therefore, exploring the strategic choices of various entities under the dual policy interventions, and uncovering the mechanisms for realizing electricity energy value and green value under different integration models, is of great significance for advancing China’s renewable energy integration. Based on China’s actual conditions, this study integrates the features of both policies and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model involving government, power generators, and grid enterprises to simulate their interactions and identify key factors influencing strategic choices. The results show that active government regulation effectively encourages positive strategies from both generators and grid companies, and that active power integration by grid companies further promotes green power generation. A “stepwise complementary” relationship exists among reputation gains, reputation losses, and regulatory costs: higher reputation gains can offset decision-making resistance arising from increased regulatory costs. Green power generation costs and innovation costs have significant negative effects on strategic choices, while the guaranteed purchase price has a significant positive effect on generators’ active strategies. The penalty parameter plays a key positive role in grid companies’ active strategies, and the guaranteed purchase price significantly influences their active integration behavior. This paper provides recommendations for motivating all entities actively participate in the consumption process.

Examining a cross section of seven regional Emission Trading System (ETS) and thenational ETS in China, we explore the interplay between firms and governments. We find heterogeneous adaptation among firms. Firms in regions anticipating stringentpolicies reduce emissions and invest in decarbonization technology, whereas expecta-tions of lenient policies lead to increased emissions. Meanwhile, governments set upmore stringent carbon policies when firms decarbonize more proactively. The resultsare robust to allowance allocation policies, such as cap-and-trade or tradable perfor-mance standards. Our findings underscore the importance of strategic interactionsbetween firms and governments in decarbonization.

The low-altitude economy (LAE) refers to economic activities conducted within airspace below 1,000 meters. Drawing on related theories on socio-technical transitions, LAE can be understood as a future regime challenging the dominant urban mobility paradigm. As an emerging field, it has yet to be systematically examined through an empirical study, especially about local response. In this paper, we construct an Integrated Local Support Index (ILSI) based on the number of relevant local policies and the level of public interest measured by the Baidu search index. Private sector readiness is measured by the LAE Development Scale (DS) based on the registered capital of relevant enterprises locally. Focusing on the top 50 cities in China’s LAE sector, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study to explore the relationships between DS, ILSI, and other natural and socio-economic factors between 2012 and 2023. The dynamic interactions of key stakeholders (local government, foreign capital, and talents) are analysed by game theory. The findings suggest that the ILSI, education level, and foreign investment have significant positive impacts. Wind speed is identified as a negative factor for LAE development. The game theory analysis further reveals that the three positive factors tend to foster efficient and stable growth when working synergistically. This implies that enhancing local government support could trigger chain reactions that attract more investment and talents, thereby accelerating LAE development. Projecting to the future, local LAE DS in 2026 is predicted via a panel time-series model with random effects. This study provides both empirical evidence and governance strategies for decision-makers navigating the socio-technical transition of the LAE.