This paper investigates how domestic policy uncertainty stemming from discretionary fiscal policy disrupts the efficient capital allocation across firms. While fiscal policy represents the government’s reaction to economic conditions, its volatility presents firms with considerable uncertainty about conditions affecting their future profitability and consequently disrupts firms’ decisions on investment in the presence of capital adjustment costs. Using firm-level data from Chinese manufacturing industries spanning from 1998 to 2007, we find that reducing fiscal policy volatility leads to a decrease in the dispersion of marginal revenue product of capital, accounting for 8.9 percent of the observed improvement in capital allocation during the sample period. In addition to various fiscal reforms to curb fiscal policy volatility directly, policies contributing to lower capital adjustment costs and lower reliance of firms on government expenditure can alleviate the adverse effects caused by fiscal policy volatility.

China’s household wealth is growing rapidly and has become significant worldwide. While the government played an important role in economic growth and wealth accumulation, few research has explained why and how government expenditure redistributes household wealth in China. This study uses China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) household survey (2010-2018) and prefecture-level data to estimate the impact of government expenditure on household wealth, especially the value of housing asset. We find that the capitalization of government expenditure contributes an important part to housing value appreciation, which accounts for more than 50% of household wealth. Furthermore, the impact mechanism of government expenditure on households’ wealth has a substantial redistributive effect. Government expenditures greatly advance the net worth of households who own their houses, especially for households that own two or more houses, but contribute much less to those comprising rental tenants.

We study the equilibrium effects of introducing competitive bidding in drug procurement. In 2019, China introduced a competitive bidding program in which drug companies bid for a prespecified procurement quantity in nine provinces. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that the program reduced average drug prices by 47.4%. Generic drug firms won most bids and cut prices by 59.4%. We develop a model of demand and supply to quantify the trade-off between lower prices and potential choice distortions. Competitive bidding increases consumer welfare if policymakers consider brand preferences welfare irrelevant. The program also reduced government expenditures on insurance by 27.5%.