government procurement

  • 详情 The Hidden Cost of a Government Contract in China: How VAT Cuts Squeeze Local Fiscal Capacity and Erode Firm Value
    This paper investigates how government fiscal constraints transmit to the private sector through procurement. We exploit three rounds of VAT rate cuts in China (2017–2019) as exogenous shocks to local government revenues. Combining city-level fiscal pressure measures with 9,189 procurement contracts from A-share listed firms, we construct a firm-year exposure index weighted by procurement volumes across cities. We find that exposure to fiscally stressed government buyers significantly depresses firm valuation: a one-standard-deviation increase reduces Tobin's Q and price-to-sales ratios by 5.3% and 4.3%, respectively. This effect concentrates among private firms, those lacking industrial policy support, and firms with lower rent-seeking expenditures—precisely those with weaker bargaining power against government counterparties. Beyond valuation, such exposure leads to a subsequent deterioration in firm fundamentals, characterized by tightened liquidity constraints, reduced investment and financing, and worse information disclosure over a three-year horizon. Land finance partially buffers these effects. Our findings highlight an unintended micro-level consequence of macro fiscal policy: expansionary tax cuts designed to stimulate the private sector may inadvertently harm firms by weakening the government's capacity to fulfill procurement payments.
  • 详情 Government Deleveraging and Corporate Distress
    We show that government deleveraging causes corporate distress in a distorted financial market. Our difference-in-differences analysis exploits China’s top-down deleveraging policy in 2017, which reduces local governments’ borrowing capacity through shadow bank financing. Private firms with government procurement contracts experience larger accounts receivable increases, larger cash holdings reductions, and higher external financing costs. These firms also experienced greater likelihoods of ownership changes and deteriorated performance. Effects are muted for state-owned enterprises, which enjoy funding privileges in China’s financial system. Our paper thus reveals a novel channel of allocation inefficiencies where government deleveraging amplifies adverse impacts of financial distortions.