green bond issuance

  • 详情 Peer effect in green bond issuances
    We investigate whether a firm’s decision on green bond issuances is influenced by the green bond issuances by other firms in the same industry. We find that a firm is significantly more likely to issue green bonds after observing that other firms in the same industry have previously issued green bonds. This effect cannot be explained by the issuer’s supplement to their previous issuances, incentive policies, and industry competition. Furthermore, we show that issuing green bonds can bring significant positive stock excess returns, which increases the motivation for institutional investors to learn and drive other firms in the same industry they hold to issue green bonds. Our findings indicate that the peer effect can be driven by social learning of the common ownership among firms and explain the reason for the rapid increase in green bond issuance.
  • 详情 The Power of Compliance Management: Substantive Transformation or Compliance Controls – Perspective of Green Bond Issuance
    Green bonds have emerged as a novel funding mechanism specifically aimed at addressing environmental challenges. Focusing on A-share listed companies in China that went public with bond issues domestically from 2012 to 2021, we reveal that companies with higher energy usage and better environmental disclosure quality are the most inclined to issue green bonds. Such issuance is identified as a pathway towards real green transformation, markedly boosting the green transformation index, green innovation efficiency, and ESG performance. Further analysis indicates that the effect of substantial transformation is particularly pronounced among companies in the eastern regions of China.
  • 详情 The effect of third-party certification for green bonds: Evidence from China
    We investigate the effect of third-party certification for green bonds by analyzing its impact on issuer's future green innovation performances. We find that third-party certification for green bonds can significantly promote issuer's future green innovation performances. Furthermore, the promotion effect is more prominent in non-state-owned issuers, large issuers and heavy polluting issuers, and can be more significantly exerted by professional and reputable third-party certification agencies. Besides, third-party certification for green bonds can play the effect by reducing the issuer's tax expenditure, increasing the issuer's loan financing, and receiving a positive response in stock returns. But unexpectedly, it cannot play the effect by further reducing the credit spread of green bonds. Our findings indicate that independent external supervision can play a positive role in green bond issuance, but there is still a long way to go.