Following the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the central government elevated the construction of ecological civilization to a central position within national strategy and introduced environmental governance indicators as mandatory criteria for evaluating officials, alongside GDP. These indicators served as an additional "threshold" for performance assessments. In the context of changes in the central government's development ideology and policies, this study utilizes matched data on the turnover of municipal party secretaries and local enterprise carbon emissions from 293 prefecture-level cities in China between 1990 and 2021. The research finds that turnovers of municipal party secretaries after the 18th National Congress have led to a significant reduction in carbon emissions from local enterprises, a trend that was not evident prior to the congress. This effect is more pronounced in situations where official turnover is primarily driven by promotion incentives, and less influenced by collusive behavior between the government and enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the decline in carbon emissions is more significant for private enterprises, non-heavy polluting enterprises, those located in the eastern region, and those in general prefecture-level cities, before and after municipal party secretary turnovers. This study enhances understanding of the relationship between the promotion incentives of Chinese officials and the carbon emissions of local enterprises, offering valuable insights for improving the official promotion assessment system and advancing local carbon reduction efforts.

We empirically examine how institutional investors react to adjustments in environmental policies in China. We observe a seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon: when environmental policies intensify, fund managers do not increase their holdings in high ESG-rated firms as might typically be expected; instead, they significantly divest from these firms. This behavior stems from the fact that, under stringent environmental policies, maintaining a high level of ESG investing leads to financial losses and fund outflows, especially in the short term, which impair fund managers’ compensation and raise career concerns. Further, within the context of environmental policy adjustments, our heterogeneity analysis tries to disentangle the true motivations behind institutional investors' ESG adoptions. We demonstrate that both pro-social preferences and financial incentives play pivotal roles, and that fund managers do not tolerate unlimited financial losses when ESG investing underperform. Our findings reveal the economic impact of environmental policies on institutional investors and shed light on the contentious and complex nature of the ESG concepts.

We examine how organizational learning and organizational disruption jointly arise when Chinese audit firms have U.S. cross-listed clients and which effect dominates. Among public companies listed only in China, we define the treatment group as companies audited by Chinese audit firms serving at least one U.S. client, similar companies audited by firms without U.S. clients as the control group. Survey evidence indicates strong incentives and opportunities to learn from U.S. engagements and frequent learning activities in treatment audit firms. The archival evidence however shows that their domestic audit quality declines relative to the control group. The effect is more pronounced when U.S. clients demand more audit resources, when domestic clients are more sensitive to limited audit attention, and when U.S. and domestic clients are more similar. Overall, our findings indicate a negative externality of U.S. cross-listing audit when resource constraints hinder an effective firm-wide learning.

Public emergencies reduce social welfare but may paradoxically stimulate corporate innovation through crisis-driven technological adoption. This study establishes a theoretical framework demonstrating that exogenous shocks create asymmetric innovation incentives, with digitally disadvantaged firms exhibiting stronger technological upgrading responses. Empirically, we construct a firm-level digital transformation index through textual analysis using a multi-source media database in China to show that digital transformation can endow firm resilience by boosting capital market performance during public emergencies, especially for those medium-sized enterprises due to the costs and need for digital transformation. This research adds to the evidence that public emergencies can leverage advanced technology adoption.

We combine a new collection of microdata from China with a natural policy experiment to investigate the extent to which reductions in rural-urban migration barriers affect flows of trade and investments between cities and the countryside. We find that increases in worker eligibility for urban residence registration (Hukou) across origin-destination pairs increase rural-urban exports, imports, capital inflows and outflows, both in terms of bilateral transaction values and the number of unique buyer-seller matches. To quantify the implications at the regional level, we interpret these estimates through the lens of a spatial equilibrium model in which migrants can reduce buyer- seller matching frictions. We find that a 10% increase in a rural county’s migration market access on average leads to a 1.5% increase in the county’s trade market access and a 2% increase in investment market access. In the context of China’s recent Hukou reforms, we find that these knock-on effects on market integration were on average larger among the urban destinations compared to the rural origins, reinforcing incentives for rural-urban migration.

The discussion on the innovative effects of intellectual property pledge financing is a mainstream trend. In this context, this study has improved the existing research from several aspects, such as broadening the dimensions of innovation, adding dynamic analysis, refining multidimensional mediation mechanisms, and employing unique samples. Ultimately, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Intellectual property pledge financing suppresses enterprise innovation, especially innovation quality, but this pattern will be broken by raising the threshold of innovation conditions. The reason is that strict innovation conditions can lead to a poor innovation foundation for enterprises, which are rarely affected by the fluctuation of funds obtained from intellectual property pledge financing. (2) Intellectual property pledge financing has a non-linear effect on firm innovation, characterized by an increase followed by a decrease, suggesting that intellectual property pledge financing in current China can only provide a temporary stimulus for firm innovation. (3) The relationship between intellectual property pledge financing and enterprise innovation is strongly moderated by the ownership, type, and size of the enterprise, with the inhibitory effect of intellectual property pledge financing on enterprise innovation occurring mainly in state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and small enterprises, while its positive effects are more pronounced in private enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, and medium-sized enterprises. (4) Financing constraints, internal incentives, external supervision, and signaling mechanisms are indeed key pathways through which intellectual property pledge financing affects firm innovation, especially when we analyse these mechanisms using dynamic models.

This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.

Recent research highlights the significant impact of managerial industry tournament incentives on internal firm decisions. However, their potential impact on external stakeholders-in the context of evolving product market relationships-has received scant attention. To address this gap, we examine the effect of customer aspiration, incentivized by CEO industry tournaments (CITIs), on supplier innovation. Utilizing customer-supplier pair-level data from 1992 to 2018, we establish that customer CITIs enhance supplier innovation, both in quantity and quality. Additionally, we identify that CITIs positively impact the relationship-specific innovation and market valuation for suppliers. The effect of CITIs is more pronounced when customers are larger, geographically closer, socially connected, and have long-standing relationships with their suppliers. The results remain robust to alternative specifications and considering potential endogeneity issues. Our study highlights the bright side of executives’ industry tournament incentives, which not only drive innovation within the sector but can also positively influence related sectors within the supply chain.

We develop a model economy with active financial markets in which a policymaker's adoption of a gradualistic approach constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In our model, the ex ante policy proposal influences the supply side of the economy, while the ex post policy action affects the demand side and shapes market equilibrium. When choosing policies, the policymaker internalizes the impact of her decisions on the precision of the firm-value signal. Moreover, financial markets provide a price signal that informs the government. The policymaker learns about the productivity shocks not only from firm-value performance signals but also from financial market prices. Access to information through both channels creates strong incentives for the policymaker to adopt a gradualistic approach in a time-consistent manner. Smaller policy steps yield more precise information about the productivity shock. These results hold robustly for both exogenous and endogenous information models.

We study the influence of investor attention on mutual fund investors' fund selection and fund managers' portfolio choice. Using the Google Search Volume Index to measure investor attention on individual stocks, we find fund investors tend to direct more capital to mutual funds holding more high-attention stocks; fund managers tend to perform window-dressing trading to increase the portfolio holdings of high-attention stocks displayed to investors. Our results suggest that funds, particularly those with strong incentives, strategically trade on stock attention to attract investor flows. This strategic trading behaviour is also associated with fund underperformance and leads to larger non-fundamental volatility of holding stocks.