This study examines the role of negative peer events, specifically initial bond defaults, in driving leverage manipulation of non-defaulting firms within the same region. Controlling for firm-specific time-varying characteristics, we find that initial bond defaults within a province are associated with an increase in leverage manipulation among non-defaulting firms. Two potential mechanisms underlying this relationship include increased financial constraints for these firms and elevated investor risk perception of the local bond market. The positive impact of bond defaults on leverage manipulation is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms with severe information asymmetry, and those affected by high-rated bond and principal defaults. We further show that companies that manipulate their debt ratios experience higher default risk. Our findings have important implications for transparent disclosure and highlight the negative effect of regional bond defaults on corporate financial reporting practices.

Do investors respond to what fund managers say, or how they look saying it? Using 2,000 live-streamed sessions by Chinese ETF managers and multimodal machine learning, we show that managers’ facial expressions, not their words, drive fund flows. A one-standard-deviation increase in positive facial affect raises next-day flows by 0.17pp (260% of mean). Vocal tone shows weak effects; textual sentiment shows none. Critically, facial expressions predict flows but not returns, indicating pure persuasion rather than information transmission. Effects strengthen when investors are emotionally vulnerable (down markets, retail-heavy funds) and persist 2-3 weeks before dissipating. Our findings challenge the emphasis on textual disclosure in finance and raise questions about investor protection as video communication proliferates.

This paper examines whether mandatory ownership disclosure aligns incentives or distorts in-vestor beliefs. Using a sample of 1,436 Chinese equity-oriented mutual funds from 2012 to 2023,we find that higher managerial and senior ownership are significantly associated with larger in-flows, suggesting that investors treat ownership as a quality signal. However, we find no evidencethat ownership forecasts superior future returns or risk-adjusted alphas. Mechanism tests showthat the ownership-flow effect is much stronger in low-marketing funds and that managers increaseownership after weak flows, a countercyclical pattern inconsistent with overconfidence and consis-tent with strategic remedial signaling. Overall, ownership disclosure appears to operate primarilythrough investor perception rather than information about managerial ability, weakening the linkbetween capital allocation and true skill in the mutual fund industry.

This paper examines the impact of Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) ownership on corporate earnings management. We find that ETF ownership is associated with a significant reduction in earnings management, and this result remains robust across a wide range of endogeneity tests and robustness checks. Further analyses reveal that ETFs exert a pronounced mitigating effect on sales manipulation, production manipulation, and expense manipulation. Mechanism tests indicate that ETFs curb earnings management by improving stock liquidity and strengthening external monitoring. We also find that the influence of ETFs is stronger in private firms, in firms with lower information transparency, and in firms with CEO duality, suggesting that ETFs serve as a more prominent external governance force when internal governance mechanisms are relatively weak. Overall, this study enriches the literature on the economic consequences of ETFs and provides new empirical evidence that financial innovation in emerging markets can help alleviate the information risk faced by investors.

We examine the information content of the call-put implied volatility spread (IVS) of Shanghai Stock Exchange 50 ETF options. Empirically, the IVS significantly and negatively predicts future SSE50 ETF returns at both weekly and monthly horizons. This predictability is robust both in-sample and out-of-sample, which stands in contrast to prior evidence from the U.S. options market. We explore several potential explanations and show that the IVS is closely linked to the option-cash basis. Its predictability is consistent with the model of Hazelkorn, Moskowitz, and Vasudevan (2023), where the option-cash basis reflects liquidity demand common to both options and underlying equity markets.

We study asset demand and price formation in a two-asset rational expectations equilibrium with narrow thinking, where traders imperfectly coordinate decisions across assets under non-nested price information. When the price of one asset increases, cross-asset inference from prices reduces expected demand for the other asset, which feeds back into the demand response for the original asset. Narrow thinking weakens internal coordination and amplifies reliance on price-based inference. As a result, more severe narrow thinking leads to higher own-price elasticities. The model delivers sharp implications for market liquidity and price informativeness in the presence of bounded rationality.

Serving on the official unsecured creditors' committee (UCC) of a bankrupt firm provides hedge funds with access to material nonpublic information (MNPI), which can facilitate their informed trading across firms and asset markets. We find that hedge funds increase equity turnover and execute more large trades in the quarters following UCC membership. In contrast, hedge funds do not exhibit such trading behavior after accessing public information about bankrupt firms or holding the bankrupt firm's debt without committee involvement. Importantly, these large trades often target firms with close economic ties to the bankrupt entity. Returns from these MNPI-driven trades are substantial.

Can fully agentic AI nowcast stock returns? We deploy a state-of-the-art Large Language Model to evaluate the attractiveness of each Russell 1000 stock each trading day, starting in April 2025 when AI web interfaces enabled real-time search. Our data contribution is unique along three dimensions. First, the nowcasting framework is completely out-of-sample and free of look-ahead bias by construction: predictions are collected at the current edge of time, ensuring the AI has no knowledge of future outcomes. Second, this temporal design is irreproducible once the information environment passes. Third, our framework is fully agentic: we do not feed the model curated news or disclosures; it autonomously searches the web, filters sources, and synthesises information into quantitative predictions. We find that AI possesses genuine stock-selection ability, but that its predictive power is concentrated in identifying future winners. A daily value-weighted portfolio of the 20 highestranked stocks earns a Fama-French five-factor plus momentum alpha of 19.4 basis points and an annualised Sharpe ratio of 2.68 over April 2025–March 2026. The same portfolio accumulates roughly 49.0% cumulative return, versus 21.2% for the Russell 1000 benchmark. The strategy is economically implementable: the average bid-ask spread of the daily Top-20 portfolio is 1.79 basis points, less than 10% of gross daily alpha. However, the signal remains asymmetric. Bottom-ranked portfolios generally exhibit alphas close to zero, while the strongest predictive content sits in the extreme top ranks. Delayed-entry tests further show that predictability does not vanish after a single day; rather, the signal remains positive over a broad window of subsequent entry dates, consistent with slow information diffusion rather than a fleeting overnight anomaly.

I study whether workplace smoking bans change how bond investors assess firm risk. Using staggered state adoption across U.S.\ states from 2002 to 2012 and a heterogeneity-robust difference-in-differences design, I find that smoking bans increase six-month cumulative abnormal bond returns by about 90 basis points. The average effect is only the starting point: the response is much larger for speculative-grade issuers and firms with low interest coverage, indicating that investors reprice the policy where downside operating risk matters most for debt values. Mechanism tests point most clearly to improved operating performance and lower worker turnover, while broader financial-constraint, liquidity, and duration channels remain close to zero. Alternative estimators, placebo diagnostics, and geographic spillover checks all support the interpretation that workplace smoking bans trigger targeted credit-risk reassessment rather than a generic regional shock. My findings connect public-health regulation to capital-market outcomes and show how non-financial policy shocks can reveal economically meaningful information about corporate credit risk.

This paper investigates how government fiscal constraints transmit to the private sector through procurement. We exploit three rounds of VAT rate cuts in China (2017–2019) as exogenous shocks to local government revenues. Combining city-level fiscal pressure measures with 9,189 procurement contracts from A-share listed firms, we construct a firm-year exposure index weighted by procurement volumes across cities. We find that exposure to fiscally stressed government buyers significantly depresses firm valuation: a one-standard-deviation increase reduces Tobin's Q and price-to-sales ratios by 5.3% and 4.3%, respectively. This effect concentrates among private firms, those lacking industrial policy support, and firms with lower rent-seeking expenditures—precisely those with weaker bargaining power against government counterparties. Beyond valuation, such exposure leads to a subsequent deterioration in firm fundamentals, characterized by tightened liquidity constraints, reduced investment and financing, and worse information disclosure over a three-year horizon. Land finance partially buffers these effects. Our findings highlight an unintended micro-level consequence of macro fiscal policy: expansionary tax cuts designed to stimulate the private sector may inadvertently harm firms by weakening the government's capacity to fulfill procurement payments.