Using data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022, a difference-in-differences model is employed to empirically examine the impact of bankruptcy regimes, marked by the establishment of the bankruptcy court, on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The results show a significant decline in TFP among firms in regions following the establishment of the bankruptcy court. This result remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests reveal that bankruptcy court heightens firms’ risk aversion by endowing excessive rights to creditors. Consequently, firms tend to downwardly adjust capital structure, curtail innovation investment, and accumulate liquid assets as coping measures, ultimately contributing to a decline in TFP. However, well-developed market mechanisms can alleviate the negative impact of bankruptcy court excessively protecting creditors. Specifically, when firms are located in regions with weak government intervention and strong financial development, as well as in market environments with low uncertainty and strong competition, this negative impact can be mitigated. Moreover, we find that under bankruptcy court operations, while a series of risk reduction measures taken by firms triggers a decline in TFP, it mitigates the risk of financial distress. These findings provide fresh insights into the dual nature of creditor protection and offer valuable references for governments to improve the bankruptcy legal system.

Understanding the impacts of new technology and innovations on the banking sector is important and of growing interest. However, there is limited research on the detailed channels of the impacts, and consequently, the evaluations for the aggregate welfare impacts. We contribute both empirically and quantitatively. We construct a new data set for Chinese banks. We ffnd banking innovations can improve efficiency, and mostly reduce non-interest costs but not so much on deposit rates. We show the ffnding is quite robust under a battery of checks. In a new structural, quantitative model, banks have heterogeneous capital, decide innovation investment and also risky lending, face regulations on the capital requirement and have limited liability. When aggregate new technology improves, it can reduce financial intermediation costs and social deadweight loss; however, it will also change the bank’s risk consideration and increases moral hazard when the cost is largely reduced. We also find several other new implications for R&D investment credit policy and Capital Requirement policy (CAR).

This paper documents that ffrms are increasingly financing innovation using their stock of innovation, measured as patents. We refer to this behavior as financing innovation with innovation. Drawing on patent collateral data from both the US and China, we first show that (1) in both countries, the total number and share of patents pledged as collateral have been rising steadily, (2) Chinese firms employ patents as collateral on a smaller scale and with a lower intensity than US firms, (3) firms increase their borrowing and innovation after they start to use patent collateral. We then construct a heterogeneous firm general equilibrium model featuring idiosyncratic productivity risk, innovation capital investment, and borrowing constrained by patent collateral. The model emphasizes two barriers that hinder the use of patent collateral: high inspection costs and low liquidation values of patent assets. We parameterize the model to firm-level panel data in the US and China and find that both barriers are significantly more severe in China than in the US. Finally, counterfactual analyses show that the gains in innovation, output, and welfare from reducing the inspection costs in China to the US level are substantial, moreso than enhancing the liquidation value of patent assets.

Using Chinese data, we investigate the impact of the China Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy that sets an explicit requirement that firms need to distribute at least 20% of their average annual net profits as cash/stock dividends accumulatively in three consecutive years before refinancing via seasoned equity offerings. Firms with the payout level below (above) the cutoff imposed by the Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy are regarded as Treated (Control) group. We find that Treated firms are more likely to cut investment, especially long-term innovation investment, and perform poorly compared to Control group due to lack of money. Treated firms also tend to use earnings management assisting in financing through the debt market as an alternative way to raise money. The negative impact of cutting investment caused by the Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy is more pronounced for firms suffering from severe financial constraints, firms having good corporate governance, and firms located in less financial development areas. We attribute findings to the difficulty of accessing capital that is implicitly increased the China Semi-Mandatory Payout Policy, which alters firms’ behavior leading to insufficient investments and destroys firms’ value.