本文首次对我国 2019 年新证券法生效前的内幕交易案件进行了一个全面和深入的实证研究，并与境外法域进行比较，揭示我国内幕交易法律的执行情况。我国对内幕交易的打击力度持续加大，案件数量显著增长，以行政处罚为主，但 2008 年后刑事处罚逐渐增加。内幕交易变得更为隐蔽，体现在非传统类型的内幕人增多、内幕信息主要与并购相关、选择只交易且利用他人账户交易等。我国的内幕交易处罚类型与境外法域基本接轨，处罚强度甚至居于前列，其主要的影响因素包括违法所得、社会影响、减轻处罚情节、是否使用他人账户等。基于这些发现，本文评价了 2019 年证券法相关修订，提出了相关完善建议，并指出了需要进一步研究的课题。

Using the staggered introduction of regional specialized debt recovery courts as a quasi-natural experiment, we estimate the causal effect of law enforcement on financing cost of corporate bonds in China. With primary market issuing data, we show that the introduction of specialized courts reduces issuers’bond financing cost by 15%. The analysis of secondary market trading data confirms the results that the yield spreads of existing bonds reduce significantly. Exploring regional-, firm- and bond-level heterogeneity, we find the effects to be much stronger when ex-ante default risk is high. Our case-level analyses further support that enforcement cost reduction in debt dispute resolution is a channel for the reduction of cost of bond. Our paper has important policy implications in light of the recent bond default wave in China, suggesting that creditors protection through highly efficient law enforcement is important for bond market development and will eventually benefit bond issuers as well.

This study examines relation between financial development and the cost of equity capital and finds the following main results: (1) stock market development in general reduces cost of equity, consistent with its role in liquidity provision, information asymmetry reduction, and risk diversification helping to reduce systemic risk; (2) banking development only weakly decreases the cost of equity, consistent with the pervasive state-ownership in large banks constraining their efficiency. Further analysis reveals that the relation between stock market development and cost of equity is more pronounced in large firms and in firms with lower growth potentials, suggesting that stock market development fails to support small and/or growth firms. Moreover, the relation is more pronounced in region with low accounting quality, weak law enforcement, or lower market integration, and in period prior to split share structure reform. The evidence suggests that stock market developments and other institutional arrangements substitute each other in reducing cost of equity. This study contributes to literatures on financial development and cost of equity, and also holds immediate policy implications.

We study corporate philanthropy using an original database that includes firm-level data on cash giving, political connection, and institutional environment in corporate contribution after Sichuan Earthquake at 12, May, 2008. Results provide support for the theory that political connection enhances corporate philanthropy, as firms with political connection tend to adopt giving practices to generate insurance-like protection of relational wealth; meanwhile firms that condition high levels of law enforcement environment and low risks of loss political connection give less to charity. However, much of our evidence indicates that mangers adopt corporate philanthropy to maintain personal political connection with governments which mask their personal benefits from philanthropic contribution and philanthropy insurance-like protection theory combined with agency costs play a prominent role in explaining corporate giving. Firms with political connection, larger boards of directors and higher interest conflicts among controlling shareholders and other investors are associated with significantly more cash giving. The empirical work considers the impact of institutional environment as well as risks of loss political connection on corporate giving and the relationship between political connection and corporate social responsibility.