Partially convertible economies face a market-design problem: trade integration, cross-border investment, and domestic balance-sheet exposure increase the demand for currency hedging before full financial integration is complete. China adopted a distinctive architecture for this problem by fostering a deliverable offshore Renminbi market (CNH) alongside the segmented onshore market (CNY), rather than relying only on non-deliverable forwards. This creates two venues for closely related claims on the same currency. Spot prices are tightly linked, yet CNY and CNH forwards display a persistent and economically large discrepancy. We study that discrepancy in a joint equilibrium model for spot and forward trading with transaction costs and segmented supply. In the benchmark case with common constant supply and deterministic costs, spot parity implies a forward differential with the wrong sign relative to the data. Random offshore stress, modeled as a jump in trading costs, overturns this benchmark while preserving tight spot parity. The model yields a semi-explicit representation in the CNY/CNH application and a calibration of the observed forward discrepancy in terms of the market-implied likelihood and severity of offshore liquidity stress.

The global AI inference market—reaching approximately $90–100 billion annually and growing at 18% CAGR—operates without organized exchange infrastructure. We document three market failures: resource misallocation (80% of China’s newly built compute capacity sits idle), price opacity (100-fold price dispersion across providers of equivalent quality), and unhedged risk exposure (85% of enterprises miss AI cost forecasts by more than 10%). Following the market design tradition of Roth [2002] and Budish et al. [2015], we propose the AI Service Right (ASR) as a transferable property right on AI compute and the AI Service Unit (ASU) as a quality-adjusted, cross-platform unit of account grounded in hedonic price theory [Rosen, 1974]. The ASU is modality-neutral: billing prices across text, image, video, and speech modalities are unified via eq-token conversion factors (κimg ≈ 2,667 eq-tokens per image; κvid ≈ 2,667 per second of video; κspc ≈ 7 per second of audio), and modality-appropriate benchmark sets (MMLU/HumanEval for language; FID/CLIP Score for image; FVD/CLIPSIM for video; MMBench for multimodal) supply the quality in dex via PCA. We design a hybrid secondary market architecture synthesizing mechanisms from four orthogonal market traditions: foreign exchange markets (cross-platform exchange rates and PPP-analog arbitrage via the ASU); equity markets (Central Limit Order Book, market making, clearing); electricity markets (Compute Locational Marginal Pricing for spatial scarcity signals); and decentralized finance (Automated Market Maker for long-tail liquidity). We establish nine formal propositions: bilateral trading is generically inefficient; Compute Locational Marginal Pricing decomposes nodal prices into system marginal cost, capacity congestion, and bandwidth premia; no-arbitrage equi librium holds with capital constraints (extending Shleifer and Vishny 1997); the ASR market Pareto-improves over bilateral trading; market prices are more in formative under ASR; the hybrid CLOB-AMM architecture weakly dominates either mechanism alone; platform adoption admits multiple equilibria with a coordination trap; financialization may improve or reduce price informativeness depending on speculator-hedger composition; and a hedonic micro-foundation justifies the ASU definition. Calibrated agent-based simulation (500 steps, 30 Monte Carlo runs) provides computational validation: the hybrid architecture reduces price dispersion by 90% relative to bilateral trading, and order-of-magnitude welfare estimates suggest enterprise procurement cost savings of 0.2–20% (net of ASR transaction costs; see Table 7) and potential TFP gains from compute reallocation of up to $29.9 billion annually. We propose a phased implementation roadmap from shadow ledger to full financialization, and we engage critically with the concern that financialization may not reduce intermediation costs [Philippon, 2015].

How do market-design reforms affect secondary-market liquidity in an emerging equity market? We examine China’s ChiNext reform, which combined registration-based IPO issuance with changes in secondary-market trading rules. Using firm-month observations and high-frequency order-book data, we compare incumbent ChiNext firms with Main Board firms in a difference-in-differences framework. The results show that the reform significantly improves secondary-market liquidity, with consistent evidence across alternative DID estimators and liquidity measures. Dynamic estimates show comparable pre-reform movements and increasingly favorable liquidity outcomes after implementation. Cross-sectional analysis indicates stronger liquidity improvements among larger and more profitable firms. Microstructure results show narrower quoted spreads, broadly stable displayed depth, and a shift in order flow toward buyer-initiated trading. Overall, the findings demonstrate that the integrated ChiNext reform package improved secondary-market liquidity and reshaped the cross-sectional distribution of liquidity gains, highlighting the market-quality consequences of institutional reform in emerging equity markets.

Why do fertility subsidies consistently fail in China? Why do consumptionand fertility collapse globally despite intact household book wealth? This paper proposes the Family Long Cycle Hypothesis (FLCH), extending thedecision-making unit of the life cycle hypothesis from an individual to an intergenerational family network, and expanding the budget constraint from a singlelifetime resource constraint to a dual constraint of “total resources + liquiditystructure”. The core mechanism is: intergenerational “blood-transfusion” homepurchase locks in network liquidity without changing household net assets, completing a balance sheet morph of “book wealth unharmed, decision-making paralyzed” at the moment of purchase. This liquidity depletion spikes effective riskaversion, forming a multiplier effect with income uncertainty, causing fertility—the irreversible commitment with the longest duration—to enter the corner solution region first. Within this region, the elasticity of fertility decisions to costsubsidies is strictly zero, but they remain highly sensitive to liquidity repairand uncertainty reduction. Consequently, this paper proves the fundamentalmechanism difference between consumption subsidies (cash rewards, childcarefee waivers) and capital transfers (mortgage principal write-down, unconditionalcash transfers), and proposes three effective policy directions: reducing incomeuncertainty, repairing family liquidity, and raising the reference income of thebottom 90% of the population. The model nests the standard life cycle hypothesis as a special case and is distinguishable from the competitive saving hypothesis on six pairs of opposing predictions. The theory also explains theasymmetric “fast-falling, slow-rising” adjustment of housing prices: the drop isdriven by defensive behavior (business cycle scale), while the recovery is constrained by intergenerational liquidity reconstruction (intergenerational scale of10–20 years).

This study integrates microstructure theory with asset pricing to investigates how the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) puzzle operates through specialized liquidity risk channels in China’s A-shares market. We employ intraday transactions data to perform a novel decomposition of liquidity into its variable (informational) and fixed (transitory) components. We show that the anomalous negative relationship between IVOL and future returns emerges from the intricate interaction of liquidity risk exposure, information and arbitrage constraints, and measurement biases. Specifically, the variable component tied to informed trading and adverse selection exposes high-IVOL stocks to greater arbitrage risk during liquidity shocks, while the fixed component exacerbates their vulnerability to short-term market-making cost fluctuations. Our results reveal that the IVOL puzzle is not a statistical artifact but a rational pricing phenomenon driven by omitted liquidity risk, mediated by the country’s unique institutional environment and monetary conditions.

This study examines the mean-reversion behavior of trading volume in China’s A-share market, with a focus on the speed at which abnormal surges dissipate. We compare two competing hypotheses: the stealth-trading hypothesis, where persistent volume reflects order-splitting by informed traders, and the informational-efficiency hypothesis, which interprets faster reversion as a sign of efficient information absorption. Using the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) model, we estimate the reversion speed for over 3,000 stocks and link it to firm- and industry-level characteristics. We find that trading volume is strongly mean-reverting, with over 98% of stocks classified as stationary. The OU model forecasts reversion speed with less than 7% error. Faster reversion is associated with larger size, higher analyst coverage, lower volatility, and greater liquidity. Notably, reversion speed increased after the 2006 IFRS reform but declined following Stock Connect, suggesting that stock market policies can influence informational efficiency. Our OU-based methodology offers a simple, observable proxy for monitoring how quickly markets process information. These results position trading volume as a core variable in market microstructure research and policy evaluation.

This study investigates the mean-reversion behavior of trading volume, using China’s A-share market as a representative setting characterized by dispersed retail investors, frequent public disclosures, and active policy interventions. We compare two competing interpretations:the stealth-trading hypothesis, in which persistent volume reflects order-splitting by informed investors, and the informational efficiency hypothesis, which links faster volume reversion to more effective information processing. Using the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) model, we estimate reversion speeds for over 3,000 stocks and relate these to firm- and industry-level characteristics. We find that trading volume is broadly mean-reverting, with over 98% of stocks exhibiting stationarity. The OU model forecasts reversion speed with less than 7% error. Faster reversion is associated with larger firm size, greater analyst coverage, lower volatility, and higher liquidity. Notably, reversion speed increased after accounting reforms but declined following capital access liberalization, suggesting that regulatory policy can both enhance and impair informational efficiency. These findings position reversion speed as an observable proxy for market responsiveness and highlight trading volume as a central variable in empirical market microstructure research.

Contrary to the U.S., Chinese stock markets exhibit negative overnight returns, which further decrease with information asymmetry. We demonstrate that China’s "T+1" trading rule, which prohibits same-day selling, exacerbates adverse selection for uninformed buyers by limiting them to react to post-trade information. Prices are hence initially discounted at opening and recovered by the market close, generating negative overnight returns that are inversely related to information asymmetry risks. Consistent with adverse selection, empirical evidence reveals lower overnight returns during market declines and high-volatility periods, with robust negative associations between overnight returns and information asymmetry proxied by ffrm size, analyst coverage, and earnings announcement proximity. A model is introduced to rationalize our findings. The framework also sheds light on China’s "opening return puzzle", the phenomenon that intraday price rises concentrate predominantly in the initial 30 minutes of trading, by showing how reduced adverse selection enables rapid price recovery during opening session.

This paper examines the impact of Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) ownership on corporate earnings management. We find that ETF ownership is associated with a significant reduction in earnings management, and this result remains robust across a wide range of endogeneity tests and robustness checks. Further analyses reveal that ETFs exert a pronounced mitigating effect on sales manipulation, production manipulation, and expense manipulation. Mechanism tests indicate that ETFs curb earnings management by improving stock liquidity and strengthening external monitoring. We also find that the influence of ETFs is stronger in private firms, in firms with lower information transparency, and in firms with CEO duality, suggesting that ETFs serve as a more prominent external governance force when internal governance mechanisms are relatively weak. Overall, this study enriches the literature on the economic consequences of ETFs and provides new empirical evidence that financial innovation in emerging markets can help alleviate the information risk faced by investors.

This paper documents that the physical appearance of CEOs, specifically excess body weight, is priced in the capital market. In the absence of explicit health disclosures,market participants interpret obesity as a proxy for latent health risks and potential managerial disrupts, thereby demanding a compensation premium. Our analysis reveals that (1) IPOs of firms with obese CEOs have lower first-day performance, (2) these firms achieve a lower valuation, (3) the stocks of these firms have lower liquidity and (4) they provide higher stock returns thereafter. A quasi-natural experiment based on the invention of anti-obesity medications provides supporting causal evidence.