This study investigates the link between market arbitrage risk and liquidity risk pricing in a conditional asset pricing framework. We estimate comparative models both at the portfolio and firm level in the Chinese A- and B-shares to test behavioral hypotheses with respect to foreign ownership restrictions and market segmentation. Results show that conditional liquidity premium and risk betas exhibit pronounced asymmetry across share classes which could be attributed to differentiated levels of market mispricing. Specifically, stocks with a greater degree of information asymmetry and retail ownership are more sensitive to liquidity risks when the market arbitrage risk increase. Further policy impact analysis shows that China’s market liberalization efforts, contingent upon its recent stock connect programs, conditionally reduce the price of liquidity risk for connected stocks.

This study highlights asymmetries in liquidity risk pricing from the perspective of heterogeneously informed traders facing changing levels of preference uncertainty. We hypothesize that higher illiquidity premium and liquidity risk betas may arise simultaneously in circumstances where investors are asymmetrically informed about their trading counterparts’ preferences and their financial firms’ timely valuations of assets . We first test the time-varying state transition patterns of IML, a traded liquidity factor of the return premium on illiquid-minus-liquid stocks, using a Markov regime-switching framework. We then investigate how the conditional price of the systematic risk of the IML fluctuate over time subject to changing levels of preference uncertainty. Empirical results from the Chinese stock market support our hypotheses that investors’ sensitivity to the IML systematic risk conditionally increase in times of higher preference uncertainty as proxied by the stock turnover and order imbalance. Further policy impact analyses suggest that China’s market liberalization efforts, contingent upon its recent stock connect and margin trading programs, reduce the conditional price of liquidity risk for affected stocks by helping the incorporation of information into stock prices more efficiently. Tighter macroeconomic funding conditions, on the contrary, conditionally increase the price of liquidity that investors require.