We provide a novel explanation for the geographic dispersion of borrower-lender relationships based on information frictions rather than competition. Firms may strategically select distant banks to increase lenders’ information production costs, securing larger loans under information-insensitive contracts. Our model predicts that higher-quality firms prefer distant lenders for information-insensitive contracts, while lower-quality firms use local lenders with information-sensitive terms. Using transaction-level data from a major Chinese bank, we find strong empirical support: higher-rated firms exhibit greater propensity for distant borrowing; local loans show stronger negative correlation between amounts and interest rates; and distant loan pricing demonstrates weaker sensitivity to defaults.

Recently, the Chinese Government has strengthened the enforcement of bankruptcy laws to protect creditors’ rights. This study shed light on the effect of creditor protection on asset-debt maturity mismatch by employing a quasi-natural experiment in China. The results show that creditor protection mitigates maturity mismatch, and the effect is more pronounced among financially constrained firms. Results remain robust after the dynamic effects test, placebo test, propensity score matching approach, entropy balancing method, and controlling for COVID-19 shocks. Mechanism tests show that creditor protection decreases the cost of debt and reduces over-investment. The effect of creditor protection is pronounced in private companies, financially independent companies, and companies with secured loans. Creditor rights can alleviate maturity mismatch in firms with medium ownership concentration and managerial ownership levels. Economic consequences studies suggest that creditor protection reduces corporate default risk. This study reveals the mechanism and effect of creditor protection on asset-debt maturity mismatch in emerging markets, providing recommendations to policymakers for assessing and improving bankruptcy law regimes.

We study the effects of mortgage debt and informal home loans on stock ownership. Mortgage debt is typically originated with licensed financial institutions while informal home loans are obtained from private lending. Using the China Household Finance Survey data, we show that mortgage debt has a positive relationship, while informal home loans have a negative relationship, with a household’s likelihood and degree of subsequent stock market participation. Instrumental variable estimates identify a causal impact of these effects. Further tests demonstrate cross-sectional variations of these effects across urban development, education, financial literacy, loan interest rate, maturity, and funding sources.

为深化利率市场化改革， 提高利率传导效率， 推动降低实体经济融资成本， 2019 年 8 月中国人民银行开始推行贷款市场报价利率（ Loan Prime Rate， 简称 LPR） 改革。 本文基于 LPR 改革这一准自然实验， 采用连续 DID 等方法探究 LPR 改革对实体经济融资的影响及其机制。 结果表明：第一， LPR 改革显著降低企业的融资成本；第二， LPR 改革提升了信贷配置效率， 高成长性企业贷款可得性显著上升；第三， LPR 改革对不同类型企业的融资成本产生异质性影响， 低风险企业、战略新兴产业企业和非国有企业的融资成本下降相对显著；第四， 微观机制结果验证了， LPR 改革不仅通过传统的竞争性机制推动降低实体经济融资成本， 还会通过利率传导机制与贷款定价机制畅通利率传导过程， 提升中小银行贷款定价能力， 降低实体经济融资成本。

This paper provides evidence on the cost of political interference on banks with Chinese Private Enterprise Survey data between 2002 and 2012. Using regional political turnovers as a proxy for political influence, we show that political motivations for future promotions distort the bank lending decisions and crowd out lending to private firms. Besides, firms with business connections are more sensitive to turnover, while political connections are not significantly affected. These lending distortions are more considerable where competition for future promotion is more intense and where incumbents have more influence over banks. Moreover, the effect is especially pronounced for small firms. As a result of reduced bank credit, firms’ total credit availability decreases and they have to cut investments. Overall, our results suggest that preferential lending to politically important sectors has negative spillovers and can lead to costly crowding-out of private sectors.

We study how bank liberalization affects analyst forecast accuracy using two interest rate deregulations in China—the removal of the cap on bank lending rates in 2004 and the removal of the floor in 2013—as quasi-natural experiments. Our results show that the analyst forecast accuracy for high-risk firms decreases significantly after the removal of the lending rate cap, whereas analyst forecast accuracy for low-risk firms increases significantly after the removal of the lending rate floor. Moreover, interest rate liberalization affects forecast accuracy through operational risk and information asymmetry channels. Furthermore, the impact was concentrated on firms whose actual performance fell short of performance expectations and those that received more bank loans. Our findings imply that interest rate liberalization policies may have unintended consequences for analyst forecasts.

We investigate the causal impact of a company's environmental and social (ES) risk on the borrowing costs of its peer firms (that share lending banks). Using a regression discontinuity design based on the voting outcomes of ES-related shareholder proposals in US public companies' annual meetings from 2005 to 2021, we find that the passage of ES-related proposals leads to an average increase of 38 basis points in the loan costs for peer firms in the subsequent year. The negative spillover is more pronounced for peers with lower bargaining power in their banking relations or having lower ex-ante ES scores, on credit lines rather than term loans, and during the earlier years, validating that banks indeed channel the spillover. Notably, the spillover is particularly significant if the peer firms locate in the same states as the focal firm, or when the proposals reflect a higher degree of disagreement between the proposing shareholders and the managers, or for loans issued by banks lacking prior incentives or expertise in pricing ES risks (``non-ES banks''). We interpret these findings as evidence that the passage of ES-related shareholder proposals releases new information related to peers' ES risks and especially raises the awareness of ES risks among non-ES banks, prompting them to adjust loan rates for their portfolio companies accordingly.

We investigate the effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 2015 disclosure of complaint narratives on reducing racial disparities in financial services. Employing a triple-differences approach that compares the performance of affected and unaffected financial institutions across communities with varying racial compositions, we find that post-disclosure, minority communities experience welfare enhancements. These include higher savings interest rates (amounting to over $50 million annually), reduced maintenance fees, and lower interest rates on auto loans and credit cards. The research emphasizes the broad impact of service quality disclosure in mitigating racial disparities in savings and lending markets.

We examine the financial and real implications of bank CEOs’ social minds induced by female socialization on sustainable loans. We find evidence of an economically sizable and statistically significant bank CEO-daughter effect in lending behaviours, controlling for borrower industry as well as bank characteristics. In specific, the “greenness” of a bank is significantly higher, when the lead bank CEO parents a first-born daughter compared to an otherwise lender. Looking at the specific lending contracts written by banks, we find that lead banks whose CEOs parent a first-born daughter provide loans with lower spread, fewer financial covenants, and less likely to require collateral, for borrowers with better Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance. Furthermore, we find that bank CEOs’ parenting experience with first-born daughters would predict borrowing firms’ future CSR performance positively, suggesting banks with CEOs raising a first-born daughter would promote the corporate social activities of borrowers.

Utilizing the removal of the bank lending interest rate floor (IRFD) in China as an exogenous shock of banking liberalization, we find that IRFD leads to a significant rise in firms’ cost of equity capital, which is consistent with the prediction from the MM theory. The identified effects are more pronounced among firms with weaker ex-ante corporate governance and more severe ex-ante agency problems. We also find that IRFD witnesses an increase in the amount of acquired bank loans, a decrease in the average interest rate, and an increase in free cash flow. Further evidence also suggests IRFD provokes a drop in firms’ investment quality. Overall, our findings highlight an unexplored role of banking sector deregulation on firms’ cost of equity capital.