Banks have a significant funding-cost advantage if their liabilities are protected by bailout guarantees. We construct a corporate finance-style model showing that banks can exploit this funding-cost advantage by just intermediating funds between investors and ultimate borrowers, thereby earning the spread between their reduced funding rate and the competitive market rate. This mechanism leads to a crowding-out of direct market finance and real effects for bank borrowers at the intensive margin: banks protected by bailout guarantees induce their borrowers to leverage excessively, to overinvest, and to conduct inferior high-risk projects. We confirm our model predictions using U.S. panel data, exploiting exogenous changes in banks' political connections, which cause variation in bailout expectations. At the bank level, we find that higher bailout probabilities are associated with more wholesale debt funding and lending. Controlling for loan demand, we confirm this effect on bank lending at the bank-firm level and find evidence on loan pricing consistent with a shift towards riskier borrower real investments. Finally, at the firm level, we find that firms linked to banks that experience an expansion in their bailout guarantees show an increase in their leverage, higher investment levels with indications of overinvestment, and lower productivity.

A unique natural experiment in China – the city-level staggered introduction of admin-istrative approval centers (AAC) – reduces bank loan processing times by substantially speeding up the process of registering collateral without affecting credit decisions. Fol-lowing the establishment of an AAC, firms significantly reduce their cash holdings. State-owned enterprises are less affected. Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings de-creases, as does the cash flow sensitivity of investment. The share of short-term debt increases, while inventory holdings and reliance on trade credit decrease. Defaults also decrease. These results suggest that timely access to credit has important implications on firms’ financial management.

This paper examines how the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and big data affects banking operations, emphasizing the crucial role of big data in unlocking the full potential of AI. Leveraging a comprehensive dataset of over 4.5 million loans issued by a leading commercial bank in China and exploiting a policy mandate as an exogenous shock, we document significant improvements in credit rating accuracy and loan performance, particularly for SMEs. Specifically, the adoption of AI and big data reduces the rate of unclassified credit ratings by 40.1% and decreases loan default rates by 29.6%. Analyzing the bank's phased implementation, we find that integrating big data analytics substantially enhances the effectiveness of AI models. We further identify significant heterogeneity: improvements are especially pronounced for unsecured and short-term loans, borrowers with incomplete financial records, first-time borrowers, long-distance borrowers, and firms located in economically underdeveloped or linguistically diverse regions. Our findings underscore the powerful synergy between big data and AI, demonstrating their joint capability to alleviate information frictions and enhance credit allocation efficiency.

Enterprise innovation is a hot topic in current academic research. Taking the demonstration city of social credit system construction implemented in China as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper investigates whether the construction of social credit system can improve enterprise innovation. The study finds that the construction of social credit system effectively enhances enterprise innovation. Mechanism test shows that the construction of social credit system escalates the scale and duration of enterprise loans, thereby fostering enterprise innovation. These findings present insights that the pivotal role of informal institutions, such as the social credit system, in facilitating the upgrading of industrial structures and augmenting the quality of economic development.

We provide a novel explanation for the geographic dispersion of borrower-lender relationships based on information frictions rather than competition. Firms may strategically select distant banks to increase lenders’ information production costs, securing larger loans under information-insensitive contracts. Our model predicts that higher-quality firms prefer distant lenders for information-insensitive contracts, while lower-quality firms use local lenders with information-sensitive terms. Using transaction-level data from a major Chinese bank, we find strong empirical support: higher-rated firms exhibit greater propensity for distant borrowing; local loans show stronger negative correlation between amounts and interest rates; and distant loan pricing demonstrates weaker sensitivity to defaults.

Recently, the Chinese Government has strengthened the enforcement of bankruptcy laws to protect creditors’ rights. This study shed light on the effect of creditor protection on asset-debt maturity mismatch by employing a quasi-natural experiment in China. The results show that creditor protection mitigates maturity mismatch, and the effect is more pronounced among financially constrained firms. Results remain robust after the dynamic effects test, placebo test, propensity score matching approach, entropy balancing method, and controlling for COVID-19 shocks. Mechanism tests show that creditor protection decreases the cost of debt and reduces over-investment. The effect of creditor protection is pronounced in private companies, financially independent companies, and companies with secured loans. Creditor rights can alleviate maturity mismatch in firms with medium ownership concentration and managerial ownership levels. Economic consequences studies suggest that creditor protection reduces corporate default risk. This study reveals the mechanism and effect of creditor protection on asset-debt maturity mismatch in emerging markets, providing recommendations to policymakers for assessing and improving bankruptcy law regimes.

We study the effects of mortgage debt and informal home loans on stock ownership. Mortgage debt is typically originated with licensed financial institutions while informal home loans are obtained from private lending. Using the China Household Finance Survey data, we show that mortgage debt has a positive relationship, while informal home loans have a negative relationship, with a household’s likelihood and degree of subsequent stock market participation. Instrumental variable estimates identify a causal impact of these effects. Further tests demonstrate cross-sectional variations of these effects across urban development, education, financial literacy, loan interest rate, maturity, and funding sources.

为深化利率市场化改革， 提高利率传导效率， 推动降低实体经济融资成本， 2019 年 8 月中国人民银行开始推行贷款市场报价利率（ Loan Prime Rate， 简称 LPR） 改革。 本文基于 LPR 改革这一准自然实验， 采用连续 DID 等方法探究 LPR 改革对实体经济融资的影响及其机制。 结果表明：第一， LPR 改革显著降低企业的融资成本；第二， LPR 改革提升了信贷配置效率， 高成长性企业贷款可得性显著上升；第三， LPR 改革对不同类型企业的融资成本产生异质性影响， 低风险企业、战略新兴产业企业和非国有企业的融资成本下降相对显著；第四， 微观机制结果验证了， LPR 改革不仅通过传统的竞争性机制推动降低实体经济融资成本， 还会通过利率传导机制与贷款定价机制畅通利率传导过程， 提升中小银行贷款定价能力， 降低实体经济融资成本。

This paper provides evidence on the cost of political interference on banks with Chinese Private Enterprise Survey data between 2002 and 2012. Using regional political turnovers as a proxy for political influence, we show that political motivations for future promotions distort the bank lending decisions and crowd out lending to private firms. Besides, firms with business connections are more sensitive to turnover, while political connections are not significantly affected. These lending distortions are more considerable where competition for future promotion is more intense and where incumbents have more influence over banks. Moreover, the effect is especially pronounced for small firms. As a result of reduced bank credit, firms’ total credit availability decreases and they have to cut investments. Overall, our results suggest that preferential lending to politically important sectors has negative spillovers and can lead to costly crowding-out of private sectors.

We study how bank liberalization affects analyst forecast accuracy using two interest rate deregulations in China—the removal of the cap on bank lending rates in 2004 and the removal of the floor in 2013—as quasi-natural experiments. Our results show that the analyst forecast accuracy for high-risk firms decreases significantly after the removal of the lending rate cap, whereas analyst forecast accuracy for low-risk firms increases significantly after the removal of the lending rate floor. Moreover, interest rate liberalization affects forecast accuracy through operational risk and information asymmetry channels. Furthermore, the impact was concentrated on firms whose actual performance fell short of performance expectations and those that received more bank loans. Our findings imply that interest rate liberalization policies may have unintended consequences for analyst forecasts.