This study investigates how the interaction of political accountability and local officials’ career incentives shapes the market for Municipal Corporate Bonds (MCBs) in China, taking the 2017 local government debt personal responsibility rule as a quasinatural experiment. We develop a stylized incomplete-information bargaining model to analyze how the rule reshapes the bargaining equilibrium by rendering officials’ observable characteristics credible signals of bailout incentives. Using a dataset of prefecture-level MCBs from 2008 to 2020, we empirically test the model’s predictions and focus on separating officials’ incentive effects from their inherent ability. Our core findings show that post-announcement of the rule, each additional year of a local party secretary’s remaining time to retirement, a proxy for bailout incentives, reduces MCB spreads by approximately 2.5 basis points and increases issuance volume by about 2.0%. These effects are significantly amplified in fiscally stressed cities. Notably, under the 2017 rule, cities led by party secretaries with stronger bailout incentives can expand MCB issuance, which is contrary to the rule’s original intent to rein in local borrowing.

We examine the unintended consequences of bankruptcy court establishment on corporate behavior. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2019 and a staggered difference-in-differences model, we find that the establishment of bankruptcy courts increases accrual earnings management by about 17% among high bankruptcy risk firms relative to low-risk firms. While bankruptcy courts improve bankruptcy efficiency and justice, reduce local government intervention, and accelerate the exit of zombie firms, they also induce greater earnings management. This effect is driven mainly by survival pressure and managerial reputation concerns, rather than by efforts to correct external evaluations. Consistent with this interpretation, we do not observe improvements in long-term operations, governance, performance, or real earnings management. Overall, this paper enriches the literature on earnings management from the perspective of judicial governance and on the economic consequences of creditor-friendly bankruptcy institutions.

This paper examines the use of finance leases in China’s local government debt. Using a unique dataset of government finance lease transactions, we document that local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) rapidly adopted finance leases, with the outstanding amount growing from virtually nothing in 2013 to a cumulative total of 1.02 trillion RMB by 2018. Our difference-in-differences (DID) analysis reveals that the central government’s restrictive financial policies account for a substantial portion of this surge. Because these restrictive policies confined LGFVs’access to conventional borrowing channels, finance leases emerged as a key alternative, particularly through bank-affiliated leasing firms. While LGFVs' use of finance leases offers low-cost financing for local governments, the low quality of the underlying assets poses significant risks to the leasing firms.

The low-altitude economy (LAE) refers to economic activities conducted within airspace below 1,000 meters. Drawing on related theories on socio-technical transitions, LAE can be understood as a future regime challenging the dominant urban mobility paradigm. As an emerging field, it has yet to be systematically examined through an empirical study, especially about local response. In this paper, we construct an Integrated Local Support Index (ILSI) based on the number of relevant local policies and the level of public interest measured by the Baidu search index. Private sector readiness is measured by the LAE Development Scale (DS) based on the registered capital of relevant enterprises locally. Focusing on the top 50 cities in China’s LAE sector, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study to explore the relationships between DS, ILSI, and other natural and socio-economic factors between 2012 and 2023. The dynamic interactions of key stakeholders (local government, foreign capital, and talents) are analysed by game theory. The findings suggest that the ILSI, education level, and foreign investment have significant positive impacts. Wind speed is identified as a negative factor for LAE development. The game theory analysis further reveals that the three positive factors tend to foster efficient and stable growth when working synergistically. This implies that enhancing local government support could trigger chain reactions that attract more investment and talents, thereby accelerating LAE development. Projecting to the future, local LAE DS in 2026 is predicted via a panel time-series model with random effects. This study provides both empirical evidence and governance strategies for decision-makers navigating the socio-technical transition of the LAE.

Understanding the impact of local government debt on economic development has emerged as a focal issue for both academic research and policymakers. This study adopts a financing structure perspective and utilizes panel data from 214 cities and 3,228 A-share listed companies in China (2017–2023) to empirically investigate the impact of local government debt on corporate “shift from virtual to real economy” and its underlying mechanisms. The expansion of local government debt significantly promotes enterprises “shift from virtual to real economy”. The positive impact of local government debt on enterprises” transition from financialization to the real economy is more pronounced among firms in first tier and new first-tier cities, non-state-owned enterprises, and labor-intensive industries. Further analysis indicates that local government debt drives capital reallocation from financial investments to real investments by alleviating corporate financing constraints. This study proposes policy recommendations including optimizing debt fund allocation, further optimizing the financing environment, implementing differentiated regulatory measures. These suggestions provide both a theoretical foundation and practical references for synergistically advancing debt governance and real economy revitalization.

This study examines the economic consequences of China’s Three-Red-Lines policy, introduced in 2021 to cap real estate developers' leverage by imposing strict thresholds on debt ratios and liquidity. Developers breaching these thresholds experienced sharp declines in financing, land acquisitions, and financial performance. Privately owned developers(POE) are hit harder than state-owned firms (SOE), with larger drops in sales and higher default risk. Using granular project-level data, we show that the policy reduces developer sales primarily by curtailing new-project supply: breached developers launch fewer projects. On the demand side, homebuyers reallocate purchases from privately owned developers to SOEs, further widening the POE-SOE gap. The policy also reduced local governments’ land-transfer revenues and increased reliance on local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) for land purchases. These LGFV-acquired parcels exhibit very low subsequent development rates, which may increase local governments’off-balance-sheet debt risks.

To better understand the government’s role in corporate social responsibility (CSR), we use the relocation of local governments in China as an exogenous shock to examine how geographic distance from the government affects corporate charitable donations. The Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis indicates that firms reduce charitable donations when local governments move closer. This effect is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises and for firms located in cities with lower fiscal pressure. The results remain consistent to a series of robustness tests, including alternative sample specifications, different measures of donations, and various estimation methods. We do not observe a corresponding increase in donations when governments move farther away. Additional analysis indicates that when the government relocates closer, firms may reallocate resources away from traditional charitable donations toward CSR activities that involve more active engagement.

This paper examines the impact of Chinese local government hidden debt on corporate ESG greenwashing. Extending fraud theory, we reveal that hidden debt shifts the boundary between government and market that drives the factors behind ESG greenwashing. Using the ESG greenwashing indicator of listed firms in the A-share market and the hidden debt-to-GDP ratio of 31 provinces from 2012 to 2023, we find that local government hidden debt is positively correlated with corporate ESG greenwashing. The impact is more significant for firms that are state-owned, without active primary-level Party organizations, or not on China’s key pollution supervisory list. Mechanism analysis indicates that expansion of local government hidden debt brings firms with higher LGFVs’ share-holding for the SOEs, heavier environmental tax burden, and less social responsibility preference, all of which are related with ESG greenwashing. Reducing local government special debt and improving tax compliance can help alleviate this impact. These findings highlight the necessity of fiscal risk management in achieving genuinely sustainable corporate development.

This paper investigates the impact of environmental awareness on local fiscal revenue in China. We exploit the unexpected release of the environmental documentary Under the Dome in early 2015 as an exogenous shock on residents preferences. The generalized difference-in-difference estimation shows that on average, a one standard deviation increase in the exposure to the documentary would reduce the government land sale revenue by 21.45 billion CNY. Consistent with the “vote with feet” mechanism in Tiebout model, after the release of this film, residents increase awareness of air pollution and express higher mobility intention. Local government also raises environmental investment as a response. This indicates the value of market in constraining the behavior of local governments in authoritarian states.

We construct a new geospatial measure using high-resolution river vector data from National Geomatics Center of China (NGCC) to study how urban riparian exposure shapes local government debt financing costs. Our base-line results show that cities with higher riparian exposures have significantly lower credit spreads, with a one-standard-deviation increase in riparian exposure reducing credit spreads by approximately 12 basis points. By comparing cities crossed by natural rivers with those intersected by artificial canals, we disentangle the dual role of riparian zones as sources of natural capital benefits (e.g., enhanced transportation capacity) versus climate risks (e.g., flood vulnerability). We find that climate change has amplified the impact of natural disasters, such as floods and droughts, particularly in riparian zones, thus weakening the cost-reducing effect of riparian exposure on bond financing. In contrast, improved water infrastructure and flood-control facilities strengthen the cost-reduction effect. Our findings contribute to the literature on natural capital and government financing, offering valuable implications for public finance and risk management.