Community-based natural resource governance is often promoted in the name of sustainability, yet long-term outcomes remain elusive. This study examines the impact of various types of trust as the underpinning factor for the long-term resilience of collaborative resource governance. Using a four-type trust framework, dispositional, affinitive, rational, and procedural, the study compares trust trajectories across the prior to-, during-, and post-project phases of matsutake mushroom management in two communities within the S National Protected Area, Yunnan Province, China. Drawing on qualitative interviews and comparative case analysis, the study finds that while neither community sustained co-management mechanisms in full, X Village retained partial continuity through embedded procedural and rational trust. In contrast, Y village experienced accelerated institutional decline after project withdrawal, as market changes and weak enforcement undermined collective norms and trust in formal structures. These findings underscore that institutional resilience is shaped not only by institutional design but also by the evolution and interaction of trust types over time. By tracing trust trajectories across project stages, this study contributes a micro-level explanation of how trust mediates post-project governance outcomes. It emphasizes the importance of layering trust and embedding it within local social and institutional practices. The findings highlight the need to consider how co-management strategies can support trust continuity after project withdrawal, particularly by acknowledging the underlying structural conditions that shape trust resilience.

Recent technological advancements have enabled the emergence of business organizations fully managed by algorithms, such as decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) or through artificial intelligence (AI), as observed in China’s online food delivery sector. These organizations are collectively referred to as algorithm-managed firms (AMFs). Given machines’ capabilities in data collection and analysis, human directors are increasingly being replaced by algorithms or AI in specific sectors. This article contends that algorithms can effectively take over human directors’ managerial, monitoring, and mediating roles. The diminishing role of human directors raises certain concerns of stakeholder protection. Unlike human directors, algorithm directors or managers would not consider stakeholders’ interests unless clearly instructed to do so. However, the algorithm supplier and the AMFs may lack the incentives to fully consider stakeholders because they do not always internalize the social costs. To address the challenges of AMFs, policymakers need to consider different regulation strategies. First, they must choose between command-and-control regulations and target-based regulations. Command-and-control regulations often do not work well because regulators lack enough information or control over complex algorithms. Instead of setting detailed technical rules, policymakers should adopt target-based regulations that let the algorithm balance various interests and regulate its own operations. Second, policymakers should decide between entity-based and algorithm-based regulations. Algorithm-based regulation is more suitable because it prevents companies from passing costs onto society. The state could consider regulating the composition of the board of directors of the algorithm supplier to ensure that they incorporate the concerns of stakeholders’ interests in the development of the algorithm. Additionally, corporate law doctrines that protect creditors and other stakeholders, such as piercing the corporate veil and limiting liability for corporate torts, must be revisited and modified because their foundational assumptions no longer align with the realities of AMFs.

This study integrates microstructure theory with asset pricing to investigates how the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) puzzle operates through specialized liquidity risk channels in China’s A-shares market. We employ intraday transactions data to perform a novel decomposition of liquidity into its variable (informational) and fixed (transitory) components. We show that the anomalous negative relationship between IVOL and future returns emerges from the intricate interaction of liquidity risk exposure, information and arbitrage constraints, and measurement biases. Specifically, the variable component tied to informed trading and adverse selection exposes high-IVOL stocks to greater arbitrage risk during liquidity shocks, while the fixed component exacerbates their vulnerability to short-term market-making cost fluctuations. Our results reveal that the IVOL puzzle is not a statistical artifact but a rational pricing phenomenon driven by omitted liquidity risk, mediated by the country’s unique institutional environment and monetary conditions.

The essay delves into the impact of environmental uncertainty on asymmetric mispricing utilizing the data from listed firms in China spanning from 2007 to 2023. Our analysis reveals that environmental uncertainty amplifies stock mispricing within capital markets, whether upward or downward. Diverging from prior research, we distinguish between upward and downward mispricing and reveal the black box of environmental uncertainty affecting stock mispricing from dual channels. Specifically, environmental uncertainty intensifies upward mispricing through heightened earnings management and exacerbates downward mispricing by boosting investor irrationality. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneous impact of different media coverage. In the downward mispricing sample, negative media exacerbated the relationship between the two, while positive coverage played a mitigating role. In the upward mispricing sample, only negative reports have a significant impact, and mitigate the impact of uncertainty on mispricing. Our research on media heterogeneity once again proves that it is a double-edged sword. Our research indicates that improving the capacity to recognize different mispricing mechanisms in various market directions can greatly boost decision-making efficiency. Meanwhile, it is vital to strengthen professional ethics in media organizations and encourage more objective reporting. These efforts can jointly contribute to improve he efficiency of emerging capital markets.

Data-factor marketization (DFM) serves as a critical driver for cultivating manufacturing-enterprise new-quality productive forces (ME-NQPF), fundamentally supporting China's transition toward high-quality economic development. Integrating matched panel data from A-share listed Chinese manufacturing firms (2011–2022) with the staggered establishment of regional data trading platforms as a quasi-natural experiment, this study employs a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) framework to identify the causal impact of DFM on ME-NQPF. Empirical results demonstrate that DFM significantly enhances ME-NQPF, a finding that remains robust across alternative specifications and endogeneity treatments. Mechanism analysis identifies enterprise digital transformation as a pivotal mediator in this relationship, while competitive intensity is found to positively moderate the productivity gains from data marketization. Heterogeneity analysis further indicates that these effects are most pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, technology-intensive sectors, and firms situated in China's eastern and central regions. These findings suggest that institutionalizing data-factor markets and accelerating digital integration are effective mechanisms for optimizing resource allocation and sustaining advanced industrial productivity.

As China's bond market expands rapidly, the complexity of financial guarantee networks and their implications for credit risk have become critical issues in both academic research and financial practice. Utilizing micro-level data from China's credit bond market spanning 2014 to 2024, this study constructs a multi-layer network incorporating bonds, guarantors, and issuing firms to empirically examine the impact of guarantor network centrality on bond credit spreads. The results reveal a significant U-shaped relationship: moderate centrality reduces spreads by bolstering market confidence, whereas excessive centrality increases them due to heightened systemic risk. Mechanism analyses identify systemic risk and information asymmetry as key mediating channels through which centrality affects credit risk premiums. Heterogeneity tests indicate that this U-shaped pattern is more pronounced among state-owned guarantors, real estate firms, and high-risk clusters within the network. Furthermore, both cross-layer connectivity within the multi-layer structure and regional financial development levels significantly moderate the centrality-spread relationship. These findings offer a structural perspective on credit risk pricing in emerging markets and provide valuable policy insights for credit rating system design, guarantee regulation, and systemic risk prevention. International investors could also leverage these findings to better assess systemic risk in interconnected financial markets across emerging economies.

How do global and domestic investors process institutional signals in emerging markets? We use China’s refined-oil pricing announcements as institutional communications to construct high-frequencymarketization surprises as deviations between actual prices and formula-implied expectations (2013–2025). Three heterogeneous patterns emerge. First, a 1% deviation toward weaker marketization triggers $30m equity and $10m bond outflows internationally while domestic futures appreciate. Second, Kalman filtering extracts latent institutional information differing across markets, with near-zero correlation. Third, international responses amplify quarterly while domestic dissipate immediately. A+H dual-listed firm analysis reveals implicit guarantees and market segmentation jointly drive this divergence.

Robo-advisors have been hailed as financial innovations that combine Artificial Intelligence (AI) and low-cost advisory services, with the potential to democratize stock market participation and improve financial inclusion, especially in less developed countries. However, to date their adoption has been slower than expected and existing research that has attempted to understand this puzzle focuses exclusively on existing users of robo-advisors. In this paper, we study the intention to adopt robo-advisors as an antecedent of actual adoption. Using data from a survey of 1,277 Chinese adults, a country with one of the highest saving rates in the world but also very low stock market participation rate, we find that financial literacy and technology acceptance strongly influence the intention to adopt robo-advisors. A one-unit increase in financial literacy (technology acceptance) is associated with a 5.69% (4.74%) increase in the probability of adopting robo-advisors. Importantly, financial confidence partially mediates the literacy-adoption link, highlighting a key psychological mechanism in improving stock market participation rates. Our results shed light on the underlying drivers that facilitate financial inclusion.

We document “foreign bias” in AI financial predictions, reversing the classic home bias. U.S.-based ChatGPT is systematically more optimistic than China-based DeepSeek about Chinese firms—in price predictions and directional forecasts—yet significantly less accurate. Evidence supports an information-availability mechanism: bias is strongest when U.S. media coverage of Chinese firms is limited and attenuates for cross-listed firms. Crucially, injecting Chinese news eliminates the prediction gap. Both models produce similar forecasts for U.S. firms, consistent with broader worldwide coverage. LLMs trained in different information environments can create divergent signals, with implications for investors and policymakers as AI increasingly intermediates global markets.

We use nearly a decade’s worth of panel data from European Union Chamber of Commerce in China business confidence surveys to analyse the deteriorating outlooks of EU firms in China from 2017 to 2025. All firms in China currently face challenges including slow profit growth and deflation. These circumstances have contributed to a rare drop of foreign direct investment into China over the last two years. However, certain challenges are particularly acute for foreign firms, including those from the EU. According to survey results, business sentiment among EU firms operating in China has never been bleaker. Respondents view their profitability, growth opportunities and competitiveness negatively, while fewer respondents than ever plan to expand their Chinese operations. Moreover, significant shares of respondents report recent increases in political pressure from the Chinese state and media, while nearly a third of respondents say they are siloing their Chinese operations, meaning separating them from other global activities. Disaggregated by size, sector, and years of operation in China, insightful differences emerge between the business strategies of EU firms. We broadly classify these into four categories: doubling-down, hedging, hibernating and ready to exit. EU policymakers should consider how to address the challenges EU firms in China face, such as asset-heavy sectors being ‘stuck’ in China and smaller firms lacking the capacity to operate at a loss in China’s market. The EU might need to facilitate transitions for these companies, helping them to reduce exposure to China and diversify into other emerging markets.