This paper investigates whether and how managers of highly polluting firms adjust their earnings forecast behaviors in response to the introduction of environmental legal institutions. Using the establishment of environmental courts in China as a quasi-natural experiment, our triple difference-in-differences (DID) estimation shows that environmental courts significantly increase the likelihood of management earnings forecasts for highly polluting firms compared to non-highly polluting firms. This association becomes more pronounced for firms with stronger monitoring power, higher environmental litigation risk, and greater earnings uncertainty. Additionally, we show that highly polluting firms improve the precision and accuracy of earnings forecasts following the establishment of environmental courts. Furthermore, we provide evidence that our results do not support the opportunistic perspective that managers strategically issue more positive earnings forecasts to inflate stakeholders‘ expectations subsequent to the implementation of environmental courts. Overall, our research indicates that environmental legal institutions make firms with greater environmental concerns to provide more forward-looking information, thereby alleviating stakeholders’ apprehensions regarding future profitability prospects.

We find evidence that firms engage in earnings management to potentially diminish environmental regulatory attention after the implementation of an automatic air pollutant monitoring system in China. Polluting firms increase their use of discretionary accruals and reduce the informativeness of earnings, compared to non-polluting firms. Polluting firms that are larger, more profitable, located near monitoring stations, and situated in less market-oriented regions exhibit heightened earnings management, consistent with the greater environmental regulatory exposure these firms face. The behavior is moderated by stronger customer-supplier relationships and lower market competition, when the cost of earnings management is higher. Our findings highlight the conflict between environmental and governance issues.

We study how financial markets integrate news about pollution abatement costs into firm values. Using China’s automation of pollution monitoring, we find that firms with factories in bad-news cities---cities that used to report much lower pollution than the automated reading---see significant declines in stock prices. This is consistent with the view that investors expect firms in high-pollution cities to pay significant adjustment and abatement costs to become “greener.” However, the efficiency with which such information is incorporated into prices varies widely---while the market reaction is quick in the Hong Kong stock market, it is considerably delayed in the mainland ones, resulting in a drift. The equity markets expect most of these abatement costs to be paid by private firms and not by state-owned enterprises, and by brown firms and not by green firms.

This paper investigates the price overreaction during the initial continuous trading period of the Chinese corn futures market. Using a dynamic modeling algorithm, we identify the overreaction behavior of intraday high-frequency (1 min and 3 min) prices during the first session of daytime trading. The results indicate that the overreaction hypothesis is confirmed for the daytime prices of the Chinese corn futures market. We also find a noticeable reduction in overreaction following the introduction of night trading and this decline appears to diminish over time. Furthermore, this paper conducts an overreaction trading strategy to assess traders’ returns, revealing a slight decline in average return after the introduction of night trading. This study provides valuable insights and recommendations for exchanges and regulators in monitoring overreaction and formulating effective policies to address it.

This paper revisits the default-crash risk relation in the context of China. We find that firms with higher default risk have lower stock price crash risk both in monthly and yearly frequencies. To identify the causal effect, we use the first-ever default event in China’s onshore bond market in 2014 as an exogenous shock to the strength of implicit guarantees. The negative relation arises from the active involvement of the government before 2014 and creditors after 2014 in corporate governance. Consistent with the external scrutiny mechanism, the impact of default risk on stock price crashes is stronger in situations in which creditors are more likely to engage in active monitoring (i.e., firms with higher liquidation costs, lower liquidation value, and higher levels of information asymmetry), with these effects primarily observed in the post-2014 period. Overall, our study highlights the role of the “invisible hand” in the absence of the “visible hand.”

Why do firms appoint expired independent directors? How do expired independent directors affect corporate governance and thus impact investment decisions? By taking advantage of the sharp increase in expired independent directors’ re-employment in China caused by exogenous regulatory shocks, Rule No. 18 and Regulation 11, this paper adopts a PSM-DID design to test the impact of expired independent directors on CSR performance. We find that firms experience a significant decrease in CSR performance after re-hiring expired independent directors and the effect is stronger for CSR components mostly related to internal governance. The results of robustness tests show that the main results are robust to alternative measures of CSR performance, an extended sample period, alternative control groups, year-by-year PSM method, and a staggered DID model regarding Rule No. 18 as a staggered quasi-natural experiment. We address the endogeneity concern that chance drives our DID results by using exogenous regulatory shock, an instrumental variable (the index of regional guanxi culture), and placebo tests. We also find that the negative relation between the re-employment of expired independent directors and CSR performance is more significant for independent directors who have more relations with CEOs and raise less objection to managers’ decisions, and for firms that rely more on expired independent directors’ monitoring roles (e.g., a lower proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, high growth opportunities, and above-median FCF). The mediating-effect test shows that the re-employment of expired independent directors increases CEOs’ myopia and thus reduces CSR performance. In addition, we exclude the alternative explanation that the negative relation is caused by the protective effect brought by expired independent directors’ political backgrounds. Our study shows that managers may build reciprocal relationships with expired independent directors in the Chinese guanxi culture and gain personal interest.

This study examines how classified boards affect workplace safety, an important dimension of employee welfare. Using comprehensive establishment-level injury data from the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration and a novel classified board database, we document that firms with classified boards experience 12-13% lower workplace injury rates. To establish causality, we employ instrumental variable and difference-in-differences approaches exploiting staggered board declassifications. The safety benefits of classified boards operate through increased safety expenditures, reduced employee workloads, and enhanced external monitoring through analyst coverage. These effects are strongest in financially constrained firms and those with weaker monitoring mechanisms. Our findings support the bonding hypothesis that anti-takeover provisions facilitate long-term value creation by protecting stakeholder relationships and provide novel evidence that classified boards benefit rank-and-file employees, not just executives and major customers. The results reveal an important mechanism through which governance structures impact employee welfare and challenge the conventional view that classified boards primarily serve managerial entrenchment.

Using “the Measures for the Administration of Bank Wealth Management (henceforth BWM) Funds Sales” as an exogenous shock in fund distribution channels in Chinese BWM industry, we investigate the impact of non-affiliated distribution on fund performance. We find that the adoption of non-affiliated distribution brokers has a positive effect on BWM fund performance. We further find that the effect is more pronounced when the non-affiliated distribution broker has more market power and when the fund issuer has better governance. We interpret our findings to indicate that non-affiliated distribution brokers alleviate the agency problems of fund managers by introducing both ex-ante and ex-post monitoring, highlighting the role of non-affiliated distribution brokers as an external governance mechanism in wealth management industry.

We construct a daily Chinese Housing Market Sentiment Index by applying GPT-4o to Chinese news articles. Our method outperforms traditional models in several validation tests, including a test based on a suite of machine learning models. Applying this index to household-level data, we find that after monetary easing, an important group of homebuyers (who have a college degree and are aged between 30 and 50) in cities with more optimistic housing sentiment have lower responses in non-housing consumption, whereas for homebuyers in other age-education groups, such a pattern does not exist. This suggests that current monetary easing might be more effective in boosting non-housing consumption than in the past for China due to weaker crowding-out effects from pessimistic housing sentiment. The paper also highlights the need for complementary structural reforms to enhance monetary policy transmission in China, a lesson relevant for other similar countries. Methodologically, it offers a tool for monitoring housing sentiment and lays out some principles for applying generative AI models, adaptable to other studies globally.

Site visits allow visitors to physically inspect productive resources and interact with onsite employees and executives face-to-face. We posit that, by allowing visitors to acquire investmentrelated information and monitor the management team, site visits offer disciplinary benefits for corporate investments. Using mandatory disclosures of site visits in China, we find that corporate investments become more responsive to growth opportunities as the intensity of site visits increases, consistent with the notion that site visits yield disciplinary benefits. We also find that the positive association between site visits and investment efficiency is more pronounced when visitors can glean more investment-related information and when they have stronger incentives and greater power to monitor managers. This positive association is also stronger among firms with more severe agency problems and higher asset tangibility. The overall evidence supports the notion that site visits serve as a unique venue for institutional investors and financial analysts to acquire valuable information and serve a monitoring function, which generates disciplinary benefits for corporate investments.