Using a unique dataset from China spanning 2005 to 2023, we investigate how superstitious beliefs influence mutual fund managers’ risk-taking behavior and how this influence evolves over their careers. We find a significant 6.82% reduction in risk-taking during managers’ zodiac years, traditionally considered unlucky in Chinese culture. This effect is particularly pronounced among less experienced managers, those without financial education backgrounds, and those with lower management skills. The impact also intensifies during periods of high market volatility. Our findings challenge the traditional dichotomy between retail and professional investors, showing that even professional fund managers can be influenced by irrational beliefs early in their careers. However, the diminishing effect of superstition with experience and expertise suggests a gradual transition towards more rational decision-making. Our results provide insights into the process by which financial professionals evolve from exhibiting behavior akin to retail investors to becoming the rational actors often assumed in financial theory.

This study explores how Chinese mutual fund managers’ degrees of disagreement (DOD) on stock market returns affect investor capital allocation decisions using a novel textbased measure of expectations in fund disclosures. In the time series, the DOD negatively predicts market returns. Cross-sectional results show that investors correctly perceive the DOD as an overpricing signal and discount fund performance accordingly. Flow-performance sensitivity (FPS) is diminished during high dispersion periods. The effect is stronger for outperforming funds and funds with substantial investments in bubble and high-beta stocks, but weaker for skilled funds. We also discuss ffnancial sophistication of investors and provide evidence that our results are not contingent upon such sophistication.

This paper finds that reported fund returns do not necessarily represent the returns of mutual fund investors, especially over long investment periods. We show that mutual fund’s reported returns are calculated using NAV and represent the mutual fund manager’s skill in extracting value from the capital market. However, the real returns earned by mutual fund investors depend not only on the mutual fund manager’s skill but also on the subscription and redemption activities. Using the inflow and outflow information reported in the mutual funds’ semi-annual reports in China, we are able to calculate mutual fund investors’ real returns. We further derive the adjusted gain coefficient (AGC) to capture the difference between the reported mutual fund returns and the mutual fund investors’ real returns. We find that the AGC is significantly lower than 1, which suggests that the real returns of mutual fund investors are significantly lower than reported mutual fund returns in China. The underperformance of mutual fund investors relative to the mutual fund managers they invest in is very persistent and is stronger in more recent years. A further investigation reveals that this underperformance is largely attributed to investors’ poor timing skills and additional fees incurred as a result of excessive subscription and redemption activities. We also identify skilled mutual fund investors using AGC and find that fund managers can benefit from investors’ timing skills. Skilled mutual fund investors flow in when the mutual fund managers have good investment opportunities and flow out when the mutual fund managers have extra cash. The synchronization of the mutual fund investors’ flow and mutual fund managers’ investment strategies can reduce the need for liquidity management and improve mutual fund performance. Using Chinese mutual funds data, we show that a 1% increase in AGC can increase fund riskadjusted return by 0.2% in the next six months.

We examine the impact of political connections on the investment decisions of Chinese mutual funds. We identify a direct link between mutual funds’ political connections and stocks held from the same political network using hand-collected information on the professional backgrounds of Chinese mutual fund managers and fund management company (FMC) shareholders. While mutual funds tend to allocate more investments to stocks based on their political connections, this effect alleviates somewhat after the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. Our findings suggest that anti-corruption campaigns can help to reduce the political effects of government-related agencies on fund holdings and contribute to better market fairness.

We study how professional fund managers’ growth expectations affect the actions they take with respect to equity investment and in turn the effects on prices. Using novel data on China’s mutual fund managers’growth expectations, we show that pessimistic managers decrease equity allocations and shift away from more-cyclical stocks. We identify a strong short-run causal effect of growth expectations on stock returns, despite statistically significant delays in price discovery from short-sale constraints. Finally, we find that an earnings-based measure of price informativeness is increasing in fund investment.

We examine the impact of institutional investor networks on firm innovation in China. Employing the unexpected departure of mutual fund managers and the inclusion of the Shanghai-Shenzhen 300 index as identifications, we find that institutional investor networks have a positive impact on firm innovation. Specifically, firms that are hold by well-connected institutional investors are motivated to make R&D investments and receive greater patents than their counterparts. This positive influence is more pronounced for non-SOEs and for firms located in less-developed regions, indicating that institutional investor networks act as information flow facilitator and a value certifier to encourage innovation activities.

This study investigates Chinese equity mutual funds’ performances while holding those that are well behaved in financial disclosure (transparent) companies, so-called peace of mind investing. This study uses detailed semi-annual data on mutual funds from 2011 to 2020, and finds that holding these transparent companies’ stocks is profitable for mutual funds and trusted by investors, thereby boosting their inflows. However, there is no significant evidence that mutual funds can beat the market portfolio when fees are considered. The study then provides possible explanations for the above findings from mutual fund managers’ skills and mutual holdings between institutional shareholders of fund management and transparent companies.

We examine how sell-side equity analysts strategically disclose information of differing quality to the public versus the buy-side mutual fund managers to whom they are connected. We consider cases in which analysts recommend that the public buys a stock, but some fund managers sell it. We measure favor trading using mutual fund managers’ votes for analysts in a Chinese “star analyst” competition. We find that managers are more likely to vote for analysts who exhibit more “say-buy/whisper-sell” behavior with these managers. This suggests that analysts introduce noise in their public recommendations, making the more-precise information provided to their private clients more valuable. Analysts’ say-buy/whisper-sell behavior results in information asymmetry: the positive-recommendation stocks bought by the managers who vote for the analysts outperform the stocks sold by these managers after the recommendation dates. Our findings help explain several puzzles regarding analysts’ public recommendations.