option value of waiting

  • 详情 Why Auction Timing Matters: Evidence from China’s Land Market
    This paper studies the effect of auction timing on land prices and auction failures using a 2021 policy that shifted residential land sales from sequential to simultaneous auctions in 22 Chinese cities. Land prices increased following the policy, while overall auction failure rates did not rise consistently. I examine two mechanisms. First, the value of waiting: sequential auctions create an incentive to shade bids to preserve capacity for better future land, while concentrated auctions reduce this waiting option. Second, bidder sorting: simultaneous auctions change which parcels developers choose to enter. Further evidence on price heterogeneity, future auction opportunities, and bidder allocations supports these mechanisms. Increased purchases of lower quality land by local government financing vehicles may help explain the limited response in auction failures. A model with financially constrained developers and endogenous auction choice examines these forces.
  • 详情 Corporate Investment Under Uncertain Business Cycles
    We provide empirical evidence and a theoretical explanation for the asymmetries of capital growth rate at the firm level and in the aggregate. Capital growth rate at the firm level is positively skewed, while the average capital growth rate across firms, as well as its slope, is negatively skewed. We develop a model of irreversible corporate investment that can reconcile these opposite patterns. The key to our model is that firms do not observe the true state of economy and have to infer it from noisy signals. The time-varying uncertainty in the learning process leads to variations in the option value of waiting, which causes many firms to react to bad signals arriving in good times, and few firms to react to good signals arriving in bad times. As a result, the capital growth rate at the aggregate level exhibits a negative skewness both in levels and in the slope, even though irreversibility causes positive skewness at the individual firm level.
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