Research Question/Issue: This study investigates whether and how political connections affect customer complaints in the Chinese market, using a comprehensive dataset from the country’s largest online complaint platform. Research Findings/Insights: Analyzing 22,644 firm-year observations from 2018 to 2023, we find that politically connected firms experience significantly fewer customer complaints. A one-unit increase in political connection strength is associated with a 9% reduction in complaints relative to the sample mean. This effect operates through two primary mechanisms: a reputation-motivation channel and a financial resource channel. The mitigating effect is more pronounced for firms in highly marketized regions, those with higher advertising expenditures, companies facing greater earnings pressure, and those with lower tangible asset ratios. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study contributes to the literature on political connections and corporate governance by demonstrating how political capital translates into tangible consumer experience advantages. It also advances research on the determinants of customer complaints by highlighting the role of internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial political ties. Our findings support the Corporate Reputation and Financial Resource Hypotheses while challenging alternative explanations based on regulatory shielding or managerial complacency. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For corporate leaders, our results underscore the importance of reputation management and quality investment, particularly when political connections are absent. Policymakers should consider strengthening public monitoring institutions to reinforce reputational incentives across markets. Investors may use customer complaints as an indicator of product quality and operational stability in their investment decisions.

Data-factor marketization (DFM) serves as a critical driver for cultivating manufacturing-enterprise new-quality productive forces (ME-NQPF), fundamentally supporting China's transition toward high-quality economic development. Integrating matched panel data from A-share listed Chinese manufacturing firms (2011–2022) with the staggered establishment of regional data trading platforms as a quasi-natural experiment, this study employs a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) framework to identify the causal impact of DFM on ME-NQPF. Empirical results demonstrate that DFM significantly enhances ME-NQPF, a finding that remains robust across alternative specifications and endogeneity treatments. Mechanism analysis identifies enterprise digital transformation as a pivotal mediator in this relationship, while competitive intensity is found to positively moderate the productivity gains from data marketization. Heterogeneity analysis further indicates that these effects are most pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, technology-intensive sectors, and firms situated in China's eastern and central regions. These findings suggest that institutionalizing data-factor markets and accelerating digital integration are effective mechanisms for optimizing resource allocation and sustaining advanced industrial productivity.

We investigate how the loss of informative salient signals in financial markets influences stock return volatility, using the 2024 intraday disclosure reform of the mainland China-Hong Kong Stock Connect program as a natural experiment. The reform eliminated the real-time disclosure of northbound capital (NC) flows on trading platforms, rendering NC trading information invisible to Chinese investors during market hours. We find that the removal of NC signals induces increased investor belief dispersion and intensifies informed trading, thereby amplifying intraday volatility in NC-eligible stocks. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for stocks with higher investor attention, indicating that attentive investors suffer stronger anchor loss when NC signals disappear. In contrast, lottery-type stocks and stocks with alternative NC trading clues exhibit weaker volatility responses, since the presence of strong alternative signals reduces the effect of NC signal loss. These findings highlight the informational role of insightful salient signals in stabilizing stock returns.

We study the role of superstition in China’s peer-to-peer lending market by ex-amining whether lenders time their bids according to “lucky hours” from the Chinese farmer’s calendar. Loans funded during lucky hours perform better—but only because the platform lists higher-rated loans at those times. This pattern is consistent with a screening mechanism: highly risk-averse lenders place greater value on both true risk reductions and auspicious-day signals, so the platform maximizes surplus by bundling the two—listing low-risk loans on auspicious days. Moreover, listing safer loans at lucky hours can further boost proffts because biased beliefs decay more slowly under asymmetric (bad-news-heavy) learning.

The governmental governance environment significantly influences real corporate investment. Based on the data of listed A-share enterprises from 2010-2020,we adopt a heterogeneous timing difference-in-differences method to examine the impact of Open government data (OGD) on real corporate investment by leveraging the launch of OGD platforms. It is found that OGD significantly promotes real corporate investment. This conclusion remains robust after a series of tests for robustness and endogeneity, including parallel trend, placebo, heterogeneity treatment effect, and replacing variable. The analysis of the impact mechanism reveals that OGD influences real corporate investment by reducing enterprise uncertainty and alleviating financing constraint. The heterogeneity analysis indicates that OGD exerts a more pronounced investment promotion effect on non-state-owned enterprises, without political affiliations, regions characterized by intense government intervention, and areas exhibiting low social trust. This study contributes both conceptual insights for advancing the real economy with higher quality and practical recommendations to support the modernization of national governance structures and administrative effectiveness.

While observational studies have long suggested a positive correlation between social relationships and online transactions, surprisingly little research demonstrates a causal link. Effects identified in observational data generally conflate the Information effect, which bears the counterfactual causal interpretation, with the Homophily/environment effect. Against this background, this study conducted a pioneering a randomized field experiment design to isolate the Information effect of friendship disclosure from confounding homophily factors. We exploit a rare opportunity to conduct a field experiment on a large Chinese online second-hand platform, in which we manipulate buyer and seller’s awareness of their preexisting friendship ties. We provide the first empirical evidence that the effect of revealing friendship information between transaction parties turns out to be insignificant. We demonstrate that reliance on observational estimates of the “total effect” of friendship significantly overstates the benefits of providing friendship information in online marketplaces. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of social commerce and highlight the potential fallacy of relying on observational data in business studies.

With the digital transformation of the capitalist economy, some contemporary scholars have put forward the Techno-Feudalism narrative of the digital economy. This narrative emphasizes that digital platform enterprises, as emerging market entities in the digital economy, have many practices that are highly similar to those of feudal lords. For example, digital platform enterprises plundering user data is similar to feudal lords plundering land; digital platform enterprises collecting digital rent is similar to feudal lords collecting land rent; digital platform enterprises controlling users and workers is similar to feudal lords controlling slaves. However, this narrative has many theoretical fallacies. Marx's theory of surplus value shows that the above phenomena are essentially still the contemporary form of capital seizing surplus value through technological innovation. The techno-feudalism narrative ignores the internal logic of capital using technological iteration to reconstruct the exploitation mechanism and falls into a superficial misjudgment. In contrast, the Chinese governance practice of digital economy breaks the monopoly of platforms on data elements through the innovation of the separation of three rights of data property rights; promotes fair competition and optimal allocation of resources in the digital economy by strengthening anti-monopoly supervision and promoting the construction of digital infrastructure; proves that the socialist system can break the capital proliferation cycle and achieve "people-centered" development by building a labor rights protection system to promote the creation and sharing of value and transcending the techno-feudalism phenomenon of the digital economy.

We conducted a nationwide field experiment with 4,800+ Chinese-listed companies, randomly raising ESG concerns to their management teams via high-visibility and high-stakes online platforms. Tracking the full impact-generating process, we find that companies respond to our concerns by providing high-quality answers, publishing ESG reports, and making commitments to investors. Over time, Environmental (E) inquiries boost stock valuations, while Governance (G) concerns prompt skepticism. Productive and opaque firms are more likely to respond, consistent with a signaling model where costly ESG actions signal firm quality under information asymmetry. Overall, ESG actions are likely driven by profit-oriented signaling rather than values-based motives.

This paper extracts investor risk concern from the text of investormanagement communications and examines their impact on insider opportunistic sales. Utilizing data from listed companies holding online earnings communication conferences (OECCs) in China from 2007 to 2022, we find that heightened investor risk concern significantly curbs insider opportunistic sales, as manifested by reduced frequency and magnitude of such transactions. This governance effect of investor risk concern persists irrespective of motivation strength behind opportunistic sales. Further analysis reveals that the governance effect intensifies when investors exhibit superior information processing capabilities and when management’s risk statements better align with investor expectations. Notably, while mitigating opportunistic sales, elevated investor risk concern also significantly decreases the firm’s cost of equity capital. Our findings underscore the importance of fostering transparent and engaging investor-management communication in promoting effective corporate governance and mitigating insider misconduct.

Shill bidding, the use of non-genuine bids to inflate prices, undermines auction market integrity. Exploiting China’s online judicial housing auctions as a laboratory, we identify 2% of participants as suspected shill bidders, affecting 8% of auctions. They raise price premium by 14.3%, causing an annual deadweight loss of ¥570 million for homebuyers. Mechanism analysis reveals they create bidding momentum and intensify competition. We establish causality using a difference-in-differences analysis leveraging a 2017 regulatory intervention and an instrumental variable approach using dishonest judgment debtors. These findings offer actionable insights for policymakers and auction platforms to combat fraud in online high-stake auctions.