This paper, based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies between 2009 and 2019, employs the implementation of the "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect" as a landmark event of capital market liberalization, utilizing a difference-in-differences model to empirically examine the impact of market openness on firms' cross-region investment behavior and its underlying mechanisms. The findings indicate that: (1) the launch of the "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect" has significantly promoted the establishment of cross-provincial and cross-border subsidiaries by the companies involved; (2) capital market liberalization influences firms' cross-region investment through three dimensions: finance, governance, and stakeholders. In terms of finance, the openness alleviated financing constraints and improved stock liquidity; in governance, it pressured companies to adopt more digitalized and transparent governance structures to accommodate cross-regional expansion; in the stakeholder dimension, it attracted the attention of external investors, accelerating their understanding of firms and alleviating the trust issues associated with cross-region expansion. (3) The effect of capital market liberalization on promoting cross-border investments by private enterprises is particularly pronounced, and this effect is further strengthened as the quality of corporate information disclosure improves. Firms with higher levels of product diversification benefit more from market liberalization, accelerating their overseas expansion. (4) Capital market liberalization has elevated the level of cross-region investment, thereby significantly fostering innovation and improving investment efficiency. The conclusions of this study provide fresh empirical evidence for understanding the microeconomic effects of China's capital market liberalization, the intrinsic mechanisms of corporate cross-region investments, and their economic consequences.

The disordered and rampant local tax incentives have interfered with regular business competition and resource allocation, and whether they have the rationality of existence has also become an urgent problem to be clarified. In China, the government has undertaken a new round of policy adjustment to comprehensively sort out and standardize tax incentives, trying to realign value-oriented tax competition among local governments. Thus, this paper examines the real effect of standardizing tax incentives using China's State Council documents Nos. 62[2014] and No. 25[2015], with the measurement of abnormal tax burdens and abnormal fiscal subsidies. The result shows that this round of policy governance has maintained the steadiness of the overall tax burden and fiscal subsidy, and only abnormal tax burdens and fiscal subsidies have been reduced through structural adjustment; In addition, it has also taken into account the difference among regional economic development. The governance in the Midwest is generally lighter than in the East. Meanwhile, the effect of governance among different property companies has presented a reduced tendency as "state-owned enterprises -- local state-owned enterprises -- private enterprises".

Chinese companies have a distinctive feature by embedding Communist Party of China (CPC) into governance structure. In this study, we examine the impact of embedded CPC governance on disclosure quality in Chinese private firms. We find that embedded CPC governance improves disclosure quality. We also document that internal control mediates the relationship between embedded CPC governance and disclosure quality. Further analyses show that our results are pronounced for private firms with greater peer pressure, stronger industry competition, and poorer information environments. Overall, our findings aid our understanding of the role of embedded CPC in influencing disclosure practices in private enterprises.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.

Using sample of Chinese listed firms from Q1 2017 to Q4 2022, this article examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty on share repurchases. We find that economic policy uncertainty significantly increases the probability and scale of open market share repurchases. Private enterprises, government-supported enterprises, innovative enterprises, and investment hotspot enterprises repurchased more shares during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Additionally, the market value of repurchase programs issued during periods of high economic policy uncertainty is larger. We also discover that economic policy uncertainty substantially influences the characteristics, timing, and outcomes of the repurchase programs. Lastly, this article confirms that share repurchase behavior has a similar effect to voluntary disclosures and can alleviate the information asymmetry triggered by economic policy uncertainty. In summary, Chinese listed firms have resorted to more share repurchases during periods of high economic policy uncertainty to convey their actual value and boost investor confidence, aligning with the signaling motive. Open market share repurchases surface as an efficacious instrument to cope with the risk from economic policy uncertainty.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.

We examine communication of political connections in corporate China, and show that politically inclined positive words—words in connotation of political sentiment—serve as a distinct and effective signaling device for corporate political connections. Using a large sample of corporate news, we find that news’ political sentiment, instead of orthodox political measures such as occurrences of political nouns and political entities, reflects executives’ political connections for private enterprises, and is related to rent-seeking benefits in government subsidy, tax refund, financing constraints and political risk. Our results demonstrate that political sentiment is an effective way to decode subtle corporate political connections in modern China’s “Mind Politics” environment that infiltrates into private corporations.

Modern financial development theories suggest that, financial development can promote technological progress and long-term economic growth. Based on the Chinese mainland provincial panel data, the paper tests empirically the relation between financial intermediation development and total factor productivity growth. In terms of the degree-of-freedom of bank loan decision-making, the ratio of loans of private enterprises and individuals to total loans is used to measure the development of Chinese financial intermediation. This paper finds that financial intermediation development significantly promotes total factor productivity growth when controlling for other variables, such as capital formation rate, foreign direct investment, government intervention and the urbanization level

This study examines the relation between political connections and investment efficiency in China. For listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for those with than without political connections. Politically connected SOEs over-invest significantly more than non-connected SOEs. This negative impact of political connections is primarily observed in SOEs controlled by local governments and/or in SOEs without sufficient investment opportunities. However, for private enterprises, investment expenditure is significantly more sensitive to investment opportunities and over-investment is significantly less in politically connected firms than in those without such connections. We further show that over-investment reduces firm value across the board for both SOEs and private enterprises. Taken together, our findings suggest that political connections distort investment behavior, reduce investment efficiency, and damage firm value in listed SOEs in China, but for listed private enterprises, political connections improve investment efficiency, reduce over-investment, and consequently enhance firm value.

Firm diversifications are prevalent in many emerging economies in contrast to the practices in developed economies. A fundamental difference between these two types of economies is the existence of sound economic institutions including in particular property rights protection. Indeed it has been argued that diversified firms may thrive in situations of poor economic institutions, but much research is needed to substantiate this idea. In this paper, using a survey data set of private enterprises in China, we examine whether cross-region variations in the degree of property rights protection a¤ect the extent of firm diversification. We find that poorer property rights protection causes firms to be more diversified. We then explore several possible mechanisms through which property rights protection may affect firm diversification.