private information

  • 详情 Linear Contracting in Joint Ventures
    We present a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing contractual relationships in joint ventures (JVs), integrating both agency and information problems. Our analysis shows that linear contracts are optimal, with the fixed component mitigating information asymmetries and the share term addressing moral hazard. We demonstrate that JVs outperform self-ownership only in the absence of agency problems; when such problems exist, JVs are preferable solely under unbalanced two-sided agency issues—otherwise, self-ownership dominates. Moreover, the relative importance of agency versus information problems depends on firm productivity: information problems dominate for highly productive firms, whereas agency concerns prevail when productivity is low. Empirical evidence from Chinese public companies corroborates these theoretical predictions.
  • 详情 Order Imbalance and ETF Returns: The Role of Arbitrage Frictions
    This paper investigates how arbitrage frictions shape ETF return dynamics in China, providing a clean setting to abstract from firm-specific private information. Using a panel of 316 equity ETFs in China's markets, we document that retail-driven order imbalances generate immediate price pressure, which is rapidly reversed in large-cap ETFs but persists in small-cap ETFs due to severe inventory and execution constraints. During the 2015 market crash, systemic price limits blocked creation-redemption channels, causing the usual mean-reversion to collapse into sustained positive continuations. Our findings highlight that, absent information asymmetry, post-shock ETF returns are governed primarily by the structural resilience of the arbitrage mechanism rather than behavioral overreaction.
  • 详情 The effect of online discussions among individual investors on managerial learning from stock prices
    Utilizing data from the East Money stock forum, one of China's most influential financial portals, this study examines how online discussions among individual investors influence managerial learning from stock prices to make investment decisions. We find that higher discussion intensity is associated with lower investment-q sensitivity, indicating that investors' online discussions impede managerial learning from prices. This effect operates through a decline in information asymmetry and the probability of informed trading. Furthermore, the negative impact is more pronounced when managers exhibit stronger incentives to learn from market signals. Overall, our findings support a crowding-out mechanism: online discussions crowd out the private information gathering of informed traders, thereby reducing the informativeness of prices for real investment decisions.
  • 详情 ESG ratings inconsistency and its effects on information in capital market
    Purpose-This study explores how inconsistency in environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings affects the information environment of publicly traded companies in emerging markets. Design/methodology/approach-Drawing on data from six ESG rating agencies covering listed Chinese firms from 2010 to 2022, we construct measures of pairwise ESG rating divergence and average them across 15 unique rater pairs. We then employ a battery of econometric methods to examine how inconsistencies in ESG ratings affect stock return synchronicity in the Chinese capital market. Findings-Our findings indicate that greater ESG rating divergence correlates with increased stock return synchronicity, suggesting a decline in the dissemination of firm-specific information. Supporting evidence for this relationship includes reduced private information flow, heightened opportunistic executive sales and decreased stock turnover for firms associated with higher ESG rating divergence. Our analysis suggests that such divergence hinders informed trading by institutional investors and the effect is more pronounced for firms with lower transparency, such as those with fewer analysts, limited investor oversight and sparse ESG disclosure, as well as for firms in non-polluting industries. These findings emphasize that ESG rating divergence exacerbates uncertainty about firms' future performance, discourages informed trading and ultimately restricts the integration of firm-specific information into stock prices. Originality/value-This study adds to the literature on ESG ratings and market efficiency by highlighting the importance of standardizing rating methodologies and improving corporate disclosure to counteract the adverse impacts of rating divergence.
  • 详情 Less Informative Advice, More Informative Prices
    Less informative strategic advice can produce more informative prices. We study an informed adviser who both trades on his own account and receives compensation linked to the post-report price. Holding private information fixed, we show how promotion can restrain manipulation motivated by trading profits. At sufficiently high reputation, raising compensation enough to eliminate false bad news used to buy cheaply improves market price informativeness in every equilibrium, even though the strategic adviser’s report becomes uninformative. Under further sufficient conditions, always-favourable strategic reporting yields the most informative current prices among equilibria at every interior reputation. We also derive analytical sufficient conditions under which higher reputation lowers the adviser’s expected payoff and worsens prices within the same equilibrium. Financial influencers motivate the joint incentives: a reward for higher prices can counteract the incentive to depress prices before buying, while greater credibility need not benefit its holder.
  • 详情 The More You See, The Less You Agree: Corporate Transparency and Disagreement
    Traditional information asymmetry theories suggest that greater corporate transparency should reduce investor disagreement. Using Chinese mutual fund holdings, we document the opposite pattern: transparency amplifies disagreement among institutional investors. Mechanism tests show that transparency discourages herding while intensifying private information acquisition among fund managers. The effect is stronger for growth-oriented and high-skill funds, and during periods of elevated market sentiment, and among firms with lower credibility, excessive disclosure frequency, and greater investor attention. Further analysis indicates that this transparency-induced disagreement stems from informed trading rather than noise, thereby enhancing price informativeness and market efficiency. Overall, the evidence reveals the dual nature of transparency as both an informational input and a behavioral catalyst that increases disagreement in financial markets.
  • 详情 ESG Rating Disagreement and Price Informativeness with Heterogeneous Valuations
    In this paper, we present a rational expectation equilibrium model in which fundamental and ESG traders hold heterogeneous valuations towards the risky asset. Trading occurs based on private information and price signal which is determined by a weighted combination of these diverse valuations. Our findings indicate that higher level of ESG rating disagreement increases ESG information uncertainty, thereby reducing trading intensity among ESG traders and attenuating the price informativeness about ESG. We further discover that allowing fundamental traders access to ESG information increases the coordination possibilities in the financial market, leading to multiple equilibria exhibiting characteristics of strategic substitutability and complementarity. Additionally, through measuring the ESG rating disparities among four prominent agencies in China, we deduce that ESG rating disagreement negatively impacts price informativeness by decreasing stock illiquidity.
  • 详情 Microstructure-based private information and institutional return predictability
    We introduce a novel perspective on private information, specifically microstructure-based private information, to unravel how institutional investors predict stock returns. Using tick-by-tick transaction data from the Chinese stock market, we find that in retail-dominated markets, institutional investors positively predict stock returns, consistent with findings from institution-dominated markets. However, in contrast to the traditional view that institutional investors primarily rely on value-based private information, our results indicate that microstructure-based private information contributes almost as much to their predictive power as value-based private information does, with both components jointly accounting for approximately two-thirds of the total predictive power of institutional order flow. This finding reveals that retail investors’ trading activities significantly impact institutional investors, naturally forcing them to balance firm value information with microstructure information, thus profoundly influencing the price discovery process in the stock market.
  • 详情 The Effects of Analyst-Auditor Connections on Analysts’ Performance
    Using Chinese data, we find that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate and less biased when analysts are socially connected with the company’s signatory auditor. We also find that forecast performance improves following mandatory auditor rotations that result in new analyst-auditor connections and declines following mandatory rotations that terminate existing connections. We further find that our results become stronger when the information that auditors possess is likely to be more useful to analysts, that connected analysts have better career outcomes than unconnected analysts, and that investors and other analysts are more responsive to forecast revisions issued by connected analysts. Finally, we find that connected auditors provide higher quality audits to their connected clients and are more likely to retain those clients. Overall, our findings are consistent with connected analysts benefitting from private information obtained from their social connections with auditors by providing better earnings forecasts, and in turn, with auditors benefitting from information they receive from connected analysts by delivering higher quality audits that improve client retention.
  • 详情 Bank Stress Tests: Frequency vs. Strength
    Bank stress tests can be an effective information disclosure policy in persuading stakeholders to avoid “attacking” a bank, thereby decreasing the probability of bank failure during distress. This paper studies stress test design along two dimensions: strength and frequency, assuming stakeholders are privately informed and move sequentially. We characterize all robustly persuasive stress tests that ensure all bank stakeholders disregard private information and coordinate actions perfectly based on test results (“pass” or “fail”). Our ffndings indicate that more frequent stress tests can substitute for increased test strength in making the stress test result robustly persuasive. We then identify the optimal stress test policy and investigate how the optimal frequency and strength depend on macroeconomic conditions, bank idiosyncratic characteristics, and endogenous maturity choices of banks. Finally, we discuss how other regulatory measures may complement the stress test policy.
0.103280s