The role of institutional investors in the development of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria lacks consensus in the academic community. This study utilizes a quasi-natural experiment involving Chinese mutual funds that have signed the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) to investigate whether institutional Investors’ ESG investment commitments can significantly reduce ESG rating disagreement among the companies in their portfolios. We first find that companies held by ESG commitment institutional Investors exhibit less disagreement in ESG rating compared to those held by Non-ESG commitment institutional Investors. we then show that institutional Investor’ ESG investment commitment influence ESG rating disagreement by enhancing the quality of ESG disclosure and attracting external ESG attention. We further discover that institutional investors’ ESG investment commitments significantly mitigates the ESG rating disagreement among domestic ESG rating agencies and firms with a higher level of corporate governance.

In this paper, we present a rational expectation equilibrium model in which fundamental and ESG traders hold heterogeneous valuations towards the risky asset. Trading occurs based on private information and price signal which is determined by a weighted combination of these diverse valuations. Our findings indicate that higher level of ESG rating disagreement increases ESG information uncertainty, thereby reducing trading intensity among ESG traders and attenuating the price informativeness about ESG. We further discover that allowing fundamental traders access to ESG information increases the coordination possibilities in the financial market, leading to multiple equilibria exhibiting characteristics of strategic substitutability and complementarity. Additionally, through measuring the ESG rating disparities among four prominent agencies in China, we deduce that ESG rating disagreement negatively impacts price informativeness by decreasing stock illiquidity.

Based on institutions' general role and the specialty of motivated investors' relatively larger stake, we examine whether ownership by motivated investors is associated with the focal firm's ESG rating disagreement in China. Our results suggest that ownership by motivated investors can decrease the focal firm's ESG rating disagreement. That relationship is strengthened by a better internal or external information environment. What's more, ownership by motivated investors can increase the quality of ESG disclosure and the level of consensus ESG rating. ESG rating disagreement increases stock return volatility and price synchronicity, while motivated investors can mitigate those negative effects. Our results confirm that motivated investors have greater incentive and capability to discipline managers and influence corporate policies and actions even in an emerging market with weak investor protection and the popularity of exploration by ultimate controllers. That would shed valuable insights into the high-quality development of other emerging markets, especially those in south-east Asian.

Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2021, we examined the impact of ESG rating disagreement on stock price synchronicity and its mechanisms. We discovered that ESG rating disagreement increases stock price synchronicity by raising investors' information costs and reducing the efficiency of ESG information incorporation into prices. This effect is more pronounced when average ESG ratings are either low or high. Our findings highlight how ESG rating disagreement affects stock price synchronicity and provide insights for regulators to standardize rating criteria and foster a conducive ESG investment environment, promoting pricing efficiency in the capital markets.

This paper explores the relationship between ESG rating disagreement and the stock price crash risk. Using 2011-2020 Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as research sample, the empirical test results show that ESG rating disagreement significantly increases the stock price crash risk. The mechanism tests find that ESG rating disagreement influences the stock price crash risk by undermining corporate information transparency and increasing the level of investor sentiment. The findings of this paper reveal the potential negative economic consequences of ESG rating disagreement and enrich the research on the influencing factors of stock price crash risk, which contribute to the prevention of possible financial risk and the sustainable development.