China’s emissions trading system applies a two-stage emissions intensity-based compliance quota allocation scheme different from the cap-and-trade systems prevalent in developed economies. It was designed to accommodate the country’s socioeconomic complexities and implemented following a learning-by-doing approach. Compliance firms significantly expanded green investment and production workforce. Their climate decisions are influenced by state ownership and regional heterogeneity. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and less liberal market firms increased hiring, but not investment; non-SOEs and more liberal market firms grew investment. There are mixed welfare effects: compliance firms maintained productivity and efficiency; however, ordinary workers’ real wages were reduced, more prominent in SOEs.

In geographically segmented credit markets, local real estate booms can divert capital away from manufacturing firms, create capital scarcity, increase local real interest rates, lower real wages, and cause underinvestment and relative decline in the industrial sector. Using exogenous variation in the administrative land supply across 172 Chinese cities, we show that the predicted variation in real estate prices does indeed cause substantially higher capital costs for manufacturing firms, reduce their bank lending, lower their capital intensity and labor productivity, weaken firms' financial performance, and reduce their TFP growth by economically significant magnitudes. This evidence highlights macroeconomic stability concerns associated with real estate booms.