This paper investigates the supervisory incentive effects of employee stock ownership plans based on a corporate risk-taking perspective using data from a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006-2021. The results show that employee stock ownership plans significantly enhance corporate risk-taking. The specific mechanism is that employee stock ownership plans reduce the two-tier agency costs between shareholders and managers and managers and employees, alleviate corporate financing constraints, and thus enhance the level of corporate risk-taking. It is also found that employee stock ownership plan enhances the level of corporate risktaking with high quality, because employee stock ownership plan not only promotes R&D investment which is beneficial to corporate value growth, but also reduces excessive investment and high debt which are detrimental to corporate value, and the corporate risk-taking is of higher quality and more substantial value effect. In addition, differences in the institutional design of employee stock ownership plans have different effects on corporate risk-taking: employee stock ownership plans that are leveraged, highly discounted, with longer lock-up periods and duration, and entrusted to third-party institutions have a stronger effect on corporate risk-taking; employee subscriptions can promote corporate risk-taking more than executive subscriptions; employee stock ownership plans in China do not have the problem of "free-riding There is no "free-rider" problem in China's employee stock ownership plan. The larger the issuance ratio of the employee stock ownership plan, the greater the number of participants, and the larger the scale of capital, the better the implementation effect.

To avoid illiquidity spillovers and basis risk in swaps, interbank lenders are especially cautious about whether interbank borrowers can meet their claims. We examine whether the incentive of interbank lenders to penalize risky borrowers can reduce borrowers' liquidity risk taking. We find that interbank borrowers, especially small and medium banks, manage their liquidity risks more prudently than their counterparts. This phenomenon is especially significant for borrowers with high information asymmetry, low liquidity buffers, and high funding gaps. Our results suggest that interbank exposure reduces the asset, funding, and off‐balance‐sheet liquidity risks of small and medium borrowing banks, and can therefore supplement regulatory liquidity requirements, which target only the largest banks.

Understanding the impacts of new technology and innovations on the banking sector is important and of growing interest. However, there is limited research on the detailed channels of the impacts, and consequently, the evaluations for the aggregate welfare impacts. We contribute both empirically and quantitatively. We construct a new data set for Chinese banks. We ffnd banking innovations can improve efficiency, and mostly reduce non-interest costs but not so much on deposit rates. We show the ffnding is quite robust under a battery of checks. In a new structural, quantitative model, banks have heterogeneous capital, decide innovation investment and also risky lending, face regulations on the capital requirement and have limited liability. When aggregate new technology improves, it can reduce financial intermediation costs and social deadweight loss; however, it will also change the bank’s risk consideration and increases moral hazard when the cost is largely reduced. We also find several other new implications for R&D investment credit policy and Capital Requirement policy (CAR).

This paper investigates the consequences of Chinese regulators deviating from a long-standing full bailout policy in addressing a city-level commercial bank’s distress. This event led to a persistent widening of credit spreads and a significant decline in funding ratios for negotiable certificates of deposit issued by small banks relative to large ones. Our empirical analysis pinpoints a novel contagion mechanism marked by diminished confidence in bank bailouts, which accounts for the subsequent collapse of several other small banks. However, the erosion of confidence in government guarantees enhances price efficiency and credit allocation while discouraging risk taking among small banks.

Bank bailouts are systemic in China, having been extended to nearly all distressed banks, including those with no systemic importance. This paper investigates the consequences of regulators seizing control of Baoshang Bank, the country’s first bank failure in two decades. Despite the numerous liquidity and credit provision measures immediately implemented by bank regulators, we find that the collapse of this city-level commercial bank significantly exacerbated funding conditions in the market for negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD), resulting in liquidity distress for other banks. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the spillover of Baoshang’s collapse is disproportionately concentrated in systemically unimportant (SU) banks, owing to diminished market confidence in government bailouts of SU banks, or implicit nonguarantee. We employ a difference-in-differences approach to show that the Baoshang event had a persistent and significant effect on SU banks’ NCD issuance, increasing credit spreads by 21.9 bps and the likelihood of issuance failure by 6.3%. Our empirical framework further enables us to examine the impact of China’s long-standing guarantee of SU banks, which we find impairs price efficiency, undermines market discipline, encourages excessive risk taking, and raises equity prices.

We document a novel platform effect caused by the emergence of FinTech platforms in financial intermediation. In China, platform distributions of mutual funds emerged in 2012 and grew quickly into a formidable presence. Utilizing the staggered entrance of funds onto platforms, we find a marked increase of performance-chasing, driven by the centralized information flow unique to FinTech platforms. This pattern is further confirmed using proprietary data from a top platform. Examining the platform impact on fund managers, we find that, incentivized by the amplified performance-chasing, fund managers increase risk taking to enhance their probability of getting onto the top ranking.

This paper studies the economic impact of the emergence of FinTech platforms on financial intermediation. In China, platform distributions of mutual funds emerged in 2012 and grew quickly into a formidable presence. Utilizing the staggered fund entrance onto platforms, we find markedly increased flow sensitivities to performance. Akin to the winner-take-all phenomenon in the platform economy, net flow captured by top 10% performing funds more than triples its pre-platform level. This pattern of platform-induced performance chasing is further confirmed using private data from Howbuy, a top platform in China. Consistent with this added incentive of becoming top performers in the era of large-scale platforms, fund managers increase risk taking to enhance the probability of becoming top performers. Meanwhile, organizational cohesiveness of fund families weakens as platforms level the playing field for all funds.

This paper deals with the option-pricing problem. In the first part of the paper we study in more details the discrete setting of the option-pricing problem usually referred to as the binomial scheme. We highlight basic differences between the old and the new approaches. The main qualitative distinction of the new pricing approach from either binomial or Black Scholes’s is that it represents the option price as a stochastic process. This stochastic interpretation can not give straightforward advantage for an investor due to stochastic setting of the pricing problem. The new approach explicitly states that the options price is more risky than represented by binomial scheme or Black Scholes theory. Continuous setting will be considered in the second part of the paper following [1]. One significant conclusion follows from the new model. It states that there is no sense in using either neutral probabilities or ‘neutral world’ applications for options valuation either theoretically or numerically. Recall that after the Black Scholes’ publication [2] the ‘simplified’ approach named later binomial scheme was introduced in [3]. In this paper referring to the historical tradition we first represent discrete scheme. In several examples we discuss two-period plain vanilla option valuation. Then we extend the discrete scheme applications to an exotic option-pricing referred to as a compound option. The compound option in Black Scholes setting was first studied in [4] and then in [5,6]. To highlight the difference between stochastic and deterministic option price definitions note that if a deterministic value is interpreted as a perfect or fair price we can comment that the stochastic interpretation provides this number or any other with the probability that real world option value at maturity will be bellow chosen number. This probability is a pricing risk of the option. Thus with an investor’s motivation of the option pricing the stochastic approach gives information about the risk taking. The investor analyzing option price and corresponding risk makes a decision to purchase the option or not. As far as this paper presents alternative point on option pricing it might be useful to present a short history of this development. Recall that according the US law institutions must provide clients by the risk information regarding client’s prospective on their investments. This circumstance implies importance new approach measuring risk of investments. Different parts of this paper were submitted and sent to journals, conferences, and prominent professors. The third part of the paper was sent to Federal Reserve from the Congressman office and simple examples showing drawbacks of the benchmark option valuation method were submitted to SEC in August 2002.

The purposes of this research are to examine bank risk taking behavior and its relationship with bank charter value, particularly whether the responses of risk measures to charter value are different for banks with high and low level of charter value for the five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) during the period 1993-2002. By employing Galloway et al’s (1997) empirical model, the findings are partially consistent with their results. The consistency is the acceptance of the ‘moral hazard’ hypothesis that banks with low charter value are more apt to engage in high risk taking strategies. Further analyses found this behavior was constrained in the early 2000s. Moreover, it is interesting that the results also illustrate that risk taking increased with bank charter value over the period, which rejects the ‘bankruptcy cost’ hypothesis that when banks charters are valuable, they are more likely to be risk aversion due to the fear of potential losses of their valuable charters. Overall, the pooled data indicate that there is a non-linear relationship between risk taking behavior and bank charter value.