Green finance has drawn increased worldwide attention from policymakers as a financial mechanism that could potentially encourage corporations to actively engage in sustainable activities. However, despite a growing body of studies investigating the economic outcomes of green financial policies, there is still a lack of research that systematically quantifies the social welfare implications of green finance. Hence, this study aims to fill this research gap by establishing the causal effect of green finance on corporate environmental responsibility. Exploiting the "bottom-up" enforcement of the green finance pilots in 2017 in China as a quasi-natural experiment and the difference-in-difference-in-difference identification strategy, we find that green finance significantly enhances corporate environmental responsibility performance in high-polluting industries relative to their counterparts, and this evidence continues to survive a battery of robustness checks. Moreover, we explore three underlying mechanisms that possibly explain this beneficial effect: risk-taking, external governance and financing channels. Furthermore, we uncover that corporate environmental responsibility serves as a plausible non-economic channel that combines green finance with economic benefits by stimulating green innovation, promoting total factor productivity and expanding market share. Overall, our study offers new insights on both the economic and non-economic consequences of green finance on business performance.

Corporate philanthropy is increasingly seen as an effective way to promote social equity. This paper estimates the effect of donation tax deduction policy on corporate donations. Using data from Chinese A-share listed companies, we find that the donation tax deduction policy has a significant positive effect on the amount donated. This finding remains robust to a number of robustness tests. Meanwhile, our study also suggests that the policy increases donation participation. Finally, heterogeneity analysis suggests that the effect is significant only for firms with high media attention and political connections. Our findings provide important evidence for the optimizing of social welfare.

Despite the lack of electoral accountability, China has built an expanding welfare system that is set to include most citizens. Why does China defy the conventional prediction of an exclusive autocratic welfare state? This paper looks at the critical time when China first established its social security system in the 1990s and argues that the state adopts a “demand-driven strategy” where the redistribution effort varies with the expected collective action of economic losers. Analyzing an original granular county-level dataset of China’s laid-off workers and social security taxation, the paper finds that a group of newly-emerged economic losers, precipitated by state policy, drives the local states’ efforts to redistribute. In particular, the number of laid-off state-owned enterprise workers explains 46% of the variations in social security collection among non-state-owned enterprises. Instrumental variable estimation, with legacy state-owned enterprises established in historical contingencies as the instrument for laid-off workers, shows consistent results. Further analysis on mechanisms demonstrates that layoffs lead to an increase in SOE protests, which in turn foster greater redistribution.

Research has argued that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should bear more social responsibility than other listed firms, because their own goals include maintaining social stability and promoting social welfare. In contrast with the privatization of SOEs observed in other countries, in China, some listed firms’ major shareholders have become SOEs in recent years. This transition offers a good opportunity to investigate the impact of ownership change on firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using the propensity score matching difference-in-differences method, we document that the CSR performance of these firms does not improve when their ownership structure changes, and it can even worsen. Our results remain robust to a series of tests. Further investigating the underlying economic mechanism, we uncover those political connections, bank financing, and government subsidies play critical roles in determining the negative effect of ownership structure change on public firms, which is consistent with the soft budget constraint framework. In an additional analysis, we find that CSR performance is poor for manufacturing industry firms after ownership structure change. After calculating the frequency of keywords appearing in the annual reports of such firms, we find them to be satisfied with their new SOE background after ownership structure change. Our paper provides a possible explanation for the phenomenon of SOEs becoming major shareholder of listed firms.

In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model for market liquidity and its impact on asset prices when constant participation in the market is costly. We show that, even when agents' trading needs are perfectly matched, costly participation prevents them from synchronizing their trades, which gives rise to the need for liquidity. Moreover, the endogenous liquidity need, when it occurs, can lead to market crashes in absence of any aggregate shock. We also show that the lack of coordination among agents in the demand and the supply of liquidity generates negative externalities, and the loss in social welfare can out-weigh the savings on participation costs.