Recent sociological research suggests that culturally tight environments enforce strong social penalties for mistakes. I find that such culturally tight environments incentivize managers to suppress negative information, increasing stock price crash risk. Opaque financial disclosure is a channel through which cultural tightness affects managerial bad news hoarding. Labor and capital market pressures strengthen the positive effect of cultural tightness on crash risk. The instrumental regressions using labor-intensive agriculture and ethnic homogeneity as instruments confirm a positive tightness-crash relationship. Finally, changes in environments because of headquarters relocations affect managerial tendencies to withhold bad news, resulting in changes in crash risk levels.

We examine how stakes affect investor behaviors. In our unique setting, the same investors trade stocks in real accounts using their own money and, at the same time, trade in a simulated setting. Our real-world within-investor estimation produces strong evidence that investors exhibit stronger biases and perform worse in their higher-stakes real accounts than in their lower-stakes simulated accounts. Even with no monetary stakes, investors exhibit strong biases in their simulated accounts, and biases in the two types of accounts are strongly positively correlated. Such behavioral consistency suggests that low-stakes experimental methods, although imperfect, can be informative about real-world human behaviors. Using account data from two brokerage companies, we find that investors exhibit a stronger disposition effect on positions with greater portfolio weight. Hence, the finding that stakes-strengthening-biases may not be unique to the comparison between no-monetary and high-monetary stakes.

We study the demand for government participation in China’s venture capital and private equity market. We conduct a large-scale, non-deceptive field experiment in collaboration with the leading industry service provider, through which we survey both sides of the market: the capital investors and the private firms managing the invested capital by deploying it to high-growth entrepreneurs. Our respondents together account for nearly $1 trillion in assets under management. Each respondent evaluates synthetic profiles of potential investment partners, whose characteristics we randomize, under the real-stakes incentive that they will be introduced to real partners matching their preferences. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties, indicating that the benefits of political connections are small compared to the cons of having the government as an investor. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms, and this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and follow-up surveys suggest political interference in decision-making is the leading mechanism why government capital is unattractive to private firms. We feed our experimental estimates and administrative data into a simple model of two-sided search to discuss the distributional effects of government participation. Overall, our findings point to a “grabbing hand” interpretation of state-firm relationships reflecting a desire by the government to keep control over the private sector.

We investigate the power structure of the Chinese political system and explore its implications on corporate finance. With a large sample of firms from 1999-2007, we document large-scale ‘re-nationalization’—local governments re-establish controlling ownership stakes in previously privatized firms. We find that firms located in provinces with newly appointed, top-ranked Party leaders who do not belong to any of the three dominant political factions are more likely to be renationalized. With a number of instrument variables, including the political status of the top-ranked provincial party leaders, we find that re-nationalization leads to lower sales and labor productivity for the firms. We also find some evidence that re-nationalization temporarily lowers the unemployment rate in the region without any significant, long-term economic benefits.

We examine how regulators tackle two types of widespread tunneling activities in China. Controlling shareholders and related parties can divert assets from listed firms or coerce firms to serve as guarantors on questionable loans. The government announced and enacted two new rules during the same period: the first rule prohibits asset diversion from listed firms for ‘non-operational’ purposes by large shareholders, while the second standardizes the practice of listed firms providing loan guarantees. Relative to firms not affected by either rule, firms complying with the first rule experience a reduction in the ownership stakes of controlling shareholders, an increase in investment, and significantly better performance. The second rule has no impact on firms. Our results highlight the importance of enforceability: laws and regulations that can be enforced at lower costs are much more likely to succeed, especially in countries with weak institutions.

We document the market response to an unexpected announcement of proposed sales of government-owned shares in China. In contrast to the “privatization premium” found in earlier work, we find a negative effect of government ownership on returns at the announcement date and a symmetric positive effect in response to the announced cancellation of the government sell-off. We argue that this results from the absence of a Chinese political transition to accompany economic reforms, so that the positive effects on profits of political ties through government ownership outweigh the potential efficiency costs of government shareholdings. Companies with former government officials in management have positive abnormal returns, suggesting that personal ties can substitute for the benefits of government ownership. In both cases, we may rule out explanations based on a supply effect of the share sales. We further find that the “privatization discount” is higher for firms located in Special Economic Zones, where local government discretionary authority is highest, And that companies with relatively high welfare payments to employees, which presumably would fall with privatization, benefit disproportionately from the privatization announcement.

We document the under-pricing of state asset sales in China. Because these stakes were in partially privatized firms, there is a credible benchmark - the price of publicly traded shares - to measure the extent of under-pricing. On average, we find that blocks of government shares sell at a discount of more than 70 percent relative to tradable shares. Further, sellers that conceal their state ownership status (likely in order to elude regulatory scrutiny) sell at a further 5 percentage point discount. The impact on subsequent performance is negative - both profitability and investment fall after transfers. We also document patterns in the data consistent with increased tunneling after asset sales.