Existing literature has demonstrated the aggregation and allocation effects of the corporate holding financial institutions on financial resources, but there is little literature to discuss whether it will further affect corporate employment. Therefore, this paper uses data from China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2021 to examine whether holding financial institutions can affect corporate employment, thus serving the real economy. Empirical results show that holding financial institutions significantly expands corporate employment, which is pronounced in periods of tight monetary policy, in financially underdeveloped areas, and for enterprises with high financing constraints, weak external supervision, and high labor intensity. The conclusion still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests. Mechanism tests show that holding financial institutions can expand corporate employment by alleviating liquidity constraints and inhibiting the dissipation of internal funds caused by agency problems. Further discussion also shows that holding financial institutions has significantly improved corporate operating performance and increased the salary levels of executives and ordinary employees, which means that there is no “executive plunder” after profit increases; Meanwhile, holding financial institutions generates spillover effects along the supply chain, expanding corporate employment among major suppliers and customers. This paper has important implications for taking measures related to “finance serves for the real economy” to achieve high-quality economic development.

China's SMIC and Taiwan's TSMC are caught on opposite sides of the "Global Chip War." TSMC, despite having extensive commercial ties and fabs in the Mainland, is a beneficiary of U.S. efforts to stifle competition from Mainland competitors like SMIC. Geopolitical considerations, therefore, are increasingly influencing TSMC’s business decisions, as shown by TSMC’s construction of fabs in Japan and the United States despite founder Morris Chang’s longstanding opposition to overseas fabs due to their high costs. SMIC, meanwhile, is the Mainland’s best hope for creating a “red chip supply chain” and achieving 70% semiconductor self-sufficiency via domestic suppliers, which has taken on even more importance due to U.S. sanctions on advanced chips for AI model development. This article analyzes SMIC founder Richard Chang’s dream of building a red chip giant on the Mainland that can rival or even replace TSMC, which will directly conflict with Chang's former co-worker and fellow Taiwanese Morris Chang’s dream of solidifying TSMC and Taiwan’s position as the irreplaceable center of the semiconductor industry well into the 21st century.

Trade credit is a vital external source of financing, playing a crucial role in redistributing credit from financially stronger firms to weaker ones, especially during difficult times. However, it is puzzling that the redistribution perspective alone fails to explain the changes in trade credit when firms get involved in major litigation, which can be seen as an external shock for firms. Based on a firm-level dataset of litigations from China, we find that firms involved in major litigation not only exhibit an increased demand for trade credit but also extend more credit to their customers. Our further analysis reveals that whether as plaintiffs or defendants, litigation firms experience an increase in the demand and supply of trade credit. Moreover, compared to plaintiff firms, defendant firms experience a more pronounced increase in the demand for trade credit. Using firms’ market power and liquidity as moderators, we find that the increase in the demand for trade credit is more likely due to firms’ deferred payments rather than voluntary provision by suppliers, and the increase in the supply of trade credit appears to be an expedient measure to maintain market share. Generally, our results provide evidence of credit contagion effect within the supply chain, where the increased demand for trade credit is transferred from firms’ customers to themselves when they get involved in major litigations, while the default risk is simultaneously transferred from litigation firms to upstream firms.

Forming diversified global supply chains (GSC) is an important approach to improving economic resilience. When firms expand their oversea suppliers for such purposes, information friction is a major challenge, and internetization may help firms cope with it by more efficient communication of information. We introduce a dynamic discrete choice model for firms’ searching for new supplier sources estimated with structural methods, and construct counterfactual studies to analyze the internetization effects on Chinese firms’ GSC diversification. Our quantitative studies reveal that internetization relieves information friction, which reduces firms’ searching costs by 13.4%, and thus significantly diversifies firms’ GSC. It also raises firms’ productivity by 0.5% through efficient communication of information. Reductions in searching costs are revealed as the main channel of such effects of internetization, while the productivity channel is less significant. Moreover, the internetization effects on diversifying GSC are persistent over time, and are biased towards high-productivity and importing firms.

Recent research highlights the significant impact of managerial industry tournament incentives on internal firm decisions. However, their potential impact on external stakeholders-in the context of evolving product market relationships-has received scant attention. To address this gap, we examine the effect of customer aspiration, incentivized by CEO industry tournaments (CITIs), on supplier innovation. Utilizing customer-supplier pair-level data from 1992 to 2018, we establish that customer CITIs enhance supplier innovation, both in quantity and quality. Additionally, we identify that CITIs positively impact the relationship-specific innovation and market valuation for suppliers. The effect of CITIs is more pronounced when customers are larger, geographically closer, socially connected, and have long-standing relationships with their suppliers. The results remain robust to alternative specifications and considering potential endogeneity issues. Our study highlights the bright side of executives’ industry tournament incentives, which not only drive innovation within the sector but can also positively influence related sectors within the supply chain.

This paper examines the spillover effect of environmental regulations on firms’ green technological innovation, from the perspective of supply chain relationships. Analyzing data from Chinese listed companies, we find that the average environmental regulatory pressure faced by the client firms of a supplier firm enhances the green patent applications filed by the supplier firm, indicating that environmental regulatory pressure from clients spills over to suppliers. When the industries of suppliers are more competitive or the proportion of their sales from the largest client is higher, suppliers feel more pressured to engage in green innovation, resulting in more green patent applications. Thus, via their negotiation power, client firms can prompt supplier firms to innovate to meet their demand for green technologies. Finally, we show that this effect is particularly pronounced when supplier firms are located in highly marketized regions, receive low R&D government subsidies, or have high ESG ratings.

We study the role of firm heterogeneity and imperfect competition for global production networks and the gains from trade. We develop a quantifiable trade model with two-sided firm heterogeneity, matching frictions, and oligopolistic competition upstream. More productive buyers endogenously match with more suppliers, thereby inducing tougher competition among them to enjoy lower input costs and superior performance. Transaction-level customs data confirms that downstream French and Chilean firms import higher values and quantities at lower prices as upstream Chinese markets become more competitive over time, with stronger responses by larger firms. Moreover, suppliers charge more diversified buyers lower mark-ups. Counterfactual analysis indicates that entry upstream benefits high-productivity buyers, while lower matching or trade costs benefit all buyers, with the biggest boost to mid-productivity buyers. All three shocks generate sizeable welfare gains, especially under package reforms. Global production networks thus mediate bigger effects and cross-border spillovers from industrial and trade policies.

This study investigates how firms respond to restricted access to government information. Specifically, the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act, which limits the stock trading activities of government officials (hereafter referred to as politicians), reduces the willingness of politicians from federal executive branches to engage with firms. Utilizing this exogenous disruption in private communication, we employ a difference-in-differences approach to demonstrate that firms with significant government customers decrease the frequency of management forecasts more than other firms due to the STOCK Act. This reduction is more pronounced for firms where government sales are crucial to their performance and for those that serve as suppliers and government contractors. Further, the positive impact of the STOCK Act on voluntary disclosures is more significant for firms that ex-ante rely heavily on direct political engagements, as indicated by their discussions of political risk and political contributions, and for those expecting government support, as evidenced by higher competition levels within their industry. Conversely, the STOCK Act does not significantly affect the non-financial disclosures of these firms. Finally, consistent with findings on executive branch officers, our results indicate that congressmen are also involved in corporate communications and are effectively regulated on information exchange by the STOCK Act. Overall, these results justify the powerful supervisory impact of the STOCK Act on the U.S. government and capital market and help to facilitate a new U.S. government information disclosure policy for a fairer investment environment.

Suppliers’ bargaining power mainly comes from their market position or top supplier status. However, it is also affected by the horizontal competition from top supplier size homogeneity based on the purchasing proportion of a buyer. Using a sample of listed companies in China, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the supplier size homogeneity with shared customers and trade credit provisions. As size homogeneity increases, suppliers may increase (decrease) trade credit provision to expand sales (for cash income). That is, based on the degree of supplier size homogeneity, the homogeneity may strengthen or weaken the supplier competition effect. We also find that if upstream and downstream firms have associated relationships, or if the business environment is poor, the competition effect from supplier size homogeneity is not obvious, whereas the weak financing ability of buyer promotes the supplier competition. In addition, the competition effect from supplier size homogeneity is not observed in state-owned firms.

High-bargaining-power (low-bargaining-power) customer (supplier) firms borrow (lend) more trade credit according to the literature. We study whether this bargaining power effect strengthens or weakens when the credit supply tightens. We construct a Nash bargaining model of trade credit and show that the bargaining power effect weakens if their financing costs increase more than that of the customers. We find support for our theory using a unique database of listed firms in China that discloses firms’ transaction information with important customers and suppliers. Interest-rate sensitive suppliers, proxied by a non-state ownership, a high debt rollover risk, and a high financial constraint index, reduce trade credit to their high-bargaining-power customers during credit contractions.