This paper examines the spillover effect of environmental regulations on firms’ green technological innovation, from the perspective of supply chain relationships. Analyzing data from Chinese listed companies, we find that the average environmental regulatory pressure faced by the client firms of a supplier firm enhances the green patent applications filed by the supplier firm, indicating that environmental regulatory pressure from clients spills over to suppliers. When the industries of suppliers are more competitive or the proportion of their sales from the largest client is higher, suppliers feel more pressured to engage in green innovation, resulting in more green patent applications. Thus, via their negotiation power, client firms can prompt supplier firms to innovate to meet their demand for green technologies. Finally, we show that this effect is particularly pronounced when supplier firms are located in highly marketized regions, receive low R&D government subsidies, or have high ESG ratings.

We study the role of firm heterogeneity and imperfect competition for global production networks and the gains from trade. We develop a quantifiable trade model with two-sided firm heterogeneity, matching frictions, and oligopolistic competition upstream. More productive buyers endogenously match with more suppliers, thereby inducing tougher competition among them to enjoy lower input costs and superior performance. Transaction-level customs data confirms that downstream French and Chilean firms import higher values and quantities at lower prices as upstream Chinese markets become more competitive over time, with stronger responses by larger firms. Moreover, suppliers charge more diversified buyers lower mark-ups. Counterfactual analysis indicates that entry upstream benefits high-productivity buyers, while lower matching or trade costs benefit all buyers, with the biggest boost to mid-productivity buyers. All three shocks generate sizeable welfare gains, especially under package reforms. Global production networks thus mediate bigger effects and cross-border spillovers from industrial and trade policies.

This study investigates how firms respond to restricted access to government information. Specifically, the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act, which limits the stock trading activities of government officials (hereafter referred to as politicians), reduces the willingness of politicians from federal executive branches to engage with firms. Utilizing this exogenous disruption in private communication, we employ a difference-in-differences approach to demonstrate that firms with significant government customers decrease the frequency of management forecasts more than other firms due to the STOCK Act. This reduction is more pronounced for firms where government sales are crucial to their performance and for those that serve as suppliers and government contractors. Further, the positive impact of the STOCK Act on voluntary disclosures is more significant for firms that ex-ante rely heavily on direct political engagements, as indicated by their discussions of political risk and political contributions, and for those expecting government support, as evidenced by higher competition levels within their industry. Conversely, the STOCK Act does not significantly affect the non-financial disclosures of these firms. Finally, consistent with findings on executive branch officers, our results indicate that congressmen are also involved in corporate communications and are effectively regulated on information exchange by the STOCK Act. Overall, these results justify the powerful supervisory impact of the STOCK Act on the U.S. government and capital market and help to facilitate a new U.S. government information disclosure policy for a fairer investment environment.

Suppliers’ bargaining power mainly comes from their market position or top supplier status. However, it is also affected by the horizontal competition from top supplier size homogeneity based on the purchasing proportion of a buyer. Using a sample of listed companies in China, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the supplier size homogeneity with shared customers and trade credit provisions. As size homogeneity increases, suppliers may increase (decrease) trade credit provision to expand sales (for cash income). That is, based on the degree of supplier size homogeneity, the homogeneity may strengthen or weaken the supplier competition effect. We also find that if upstream and downstream firms have associated relationships, or if the business environment is poor, the competition effect from supplier size homogeneity is not obvious, whereas the weak financing ability of buyer promotes the supplier competition. In addition, the competition effect from supplier size homogeneity is not observed in state-owned firms.

High-bargaining-power (low-bargaining-power) customer (supplier) firms borrow (lend) more trade credit according to the literature. We study whether this bargaining power effect strengthens or weakens when the credit supply tightens. We construct a Nash bargaining model of trade credit and show that the bargaining power effect weakens if their financing costs increase more than that of the customers. We find support for our theory using a unique database of listed firms in China that discloses firms’ transaction information with important customers and suppliers. Interest-rate sensitive suppliers, proxied by a non-state ownership, a high debt rollover risk, and a high financial constraint index, reduce trade credit to their high-bargaining-power customers during credit contractions.

Factoring financing is the most widely used form of supply chain finance, which has been adopted by more and more enterprises. The existing literature focuses on the motivation of suppliers to adopt factoring financing and the factors that affect the development of factoring. However, little attention is paid to the results of factoring. This study uses the event study method, draws on the Extended Resource based theory (ERBT), discussing how the factoring business announcement affects the stock market value of listed companies from the perspective of competitive advantage and the firm's own characteristics. By manually collecting 205 factoring business announcements from 115 Chinese listed companies from October 2019 to December 2022, we found that: (1) from the perspective of competitive advantage, the announcement of factoring business by non-Combination of Industry and Finance enterprises or their holding enterprises has more positive impact on the stock price of the enterprises. There is no obvious relationship between the size of factoring quota and stock price. (2) From the perspective of the enterprise's own characteristics, the announcement of factoring business by state-owned enterprises and small-scale enterprises can have a positive impact on the stock price of the enterprise. Before and after the Civil Code came into effect, there was no significant difference in the relationship between factoring business announcements and stock prices. This study uses secondary data to fill the gap in the study of the impact of factoring announcements on stock market value. This paper discusses the relationship between factoring business announcement and stock market value from the perspective of competitive advantage for the first time, providing theoretical guidance for managers to adopt factoring business under what circumstances. In addition, this study also provides documentation for the empirical study of factoring business announcements in China.

We examine the effect of the identification of high-tech enterprises on corporate innovation from the perspective of supplier relationship management. We use data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2020 as samples and a time-varying difference-in-differences (DID) method. The results show that the identification of high-tech enterprises significantly promotes corporate innovation. The potential mechanism is that there is a sharp decline in the concentration of suppliers, the occupation of suppliers’ trade credit, and the inventory cost of enterprise after getting the identification of high-tech enterprises. Further analyses show that the enterprise identified as a high-tech enterprise tends to be more innovative due to the improvement of the supplier relationship management, leading to a better operating performance. Overall, our findings indicates a positive implementation effect of the policy of identification of high-tech enterprises. This paper not only contributes to the research about the economic consequences of the identification of high-tech enterprises from the perspective of supplier relationship management, but also enriches the existing literature on the effect of the supply relationship on corporate innovation, and supplier relationship management from the perspective of identification of high-tech enterprises. In summary, this study provides a theoretical basis and policy reference for the evaluation of the implementation effect of the policy of identification of high-tech enterprises, and the strengthening of supplier relationship management .

This paper exploits China’s first default of state-owned enterprises to study the implicit government guarantee’s effect on SOEs’ trade credit financing. It finds that SOEs increase trade credit by 2.3% of total liabilities, on average, relative to non-SOEs after the first SOE default in China’s bond markets in 2015. The additional reliance on suppliers’ credit is more prominent among SOEs with higher information opacity. It is consistent with the literature where trade credit advantage lies in the suppliers’ superior information, as they can observe their clients through daily transactions. The current paper also finds that trade credits positively affect SOEs when IGG weakens. Overall, the results suggest that the reduction in IGG significantly affects Chinese firms’ financing decisions, highlighting the trade credit advantage against the backdrop of imperfect market institutions.

This article develops a model in which an intermediary uses a supply chain finance (SCF) program to fund suppliers. The SCF program pools liquidity from suppliers and meanwhile provides immediate payment to suppliers with pressing liquidity needs. We show that the intermediary optimally selects not only suppliers with positive profitability but also suppliers with negative profitability who, however, contribute to the liquidity pool. Inserting the model to an otherwise standard monetary framework, we show that with higher nominal interest rates, the SCF program emphasizes the liquidity contribution more and the profitability contribution less. Deviating from the Friedman rule, where only suppliers with positive profitability are selected, may lead to welfare gains.

Using both the onset of the US-China trade war in 2018 and the most recent Russia-Ukraine conflict and associated trade tensions, we show that government-linked firms increase their importing activity by roughly 33% (t=4.01) following the shock, while non-government linked firms trading to the same countries do the opposite, decreasing activity. These increases appear targeted, in that we see no increase for government-linked supplier firms generally to other countries (even countries in the same regions) at the same time, nor of these same firms in these regions at other times of no tension. In terms of mechanism, government supplier-linked firms are nearly twice as likely to receive tariff exemptions as equivalent firms doing trade in the region who are not also government suppliers. More broadly, these effects are increasing in level of government connection. For example, firms that are geographically closer to the agencies to which they supply increase their imports more acutely. Using micro-level data, we find that government supplying firms that recruit more employees with past government work experience also increase their importing activity more – particularly when the past employee worked in a contracting role. Lastly, we find evidence that this results in sizable accrued benefits in terms of firm-level profitability, market share gains, and outsized stock returns.