We examine the unintended consequences of bankruptcy court establishment on corporate behavior. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2019 and a staggered difference-in-differences model, we find that the establishment of bankruptcy courts increases accrual earnings management by about 17% among high bankruptcy risk firms relative to low-risk firms. While bankruptcy courts improve bankruptcy efficiency and justice, reduce local government intervention, and accelerate the exit of zombie firms, they also induce greater earnings management. This effect is driven mainly by survival pressure and managerial reputation concerns, rather than by efforts to correct external evaluations. Consistent with this interpretation, we do not observe improvements in long-term operations, governance, performance, or real earnings management. Overall, this paper enriches the literature on earnings management from the perspective of judicial governance and on the economic consequences of creditor-friendly bankruptcy institutions.

Can bank competition help attenuate the prevalence of zombie firms? Motivated by a stylized model, this paper studies the effect of bank competition on the formation of zombie firms in two stages: the formation of distressed firms and distressed firms obtaining zombie lending. Using China’s 2009 bank entry deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment, the paper finds that bank competition lowers the probability of the formation of distressed firms, while it increases the probability of distressed firms obtaining zombie lending. Overall, bank competition decreases the formation of zombie firms. In addition, the findings show that a higher ex ante proportion of bad loans and higher probability of bad loan recovery will lead to a higher probability of distressed firms receiving zombie lending. Both factors encourage banks to sustain lending to distressed firms to keep them alive and to gamble that those firms may recover in the future.

Using a new case-level dataset we document a set of stylized facts on bankruptcy in China and study how the staggered introduction of specialized courts across Chi- nese cities affected insolvency resolution and the local economy. For identification, we compare bankruptcy cases handled by specialized versus traditional civil courts within the same city and filed in the same year. We find that specialized courts decrease case duration by 36% relative to traditional civil courts. We provide evi- dence consistent with court specialization increasing efficiency via selection of better trained judges and higher judicial independence from local politicians. We docu- ment that cities introducing specialized courts experience a relative reallocation of employment out of zombie firms-intensive sectors, as well as faster firm entry and a larger increase in average capital productivity.