近年来，我国大力推动绿色金融发展的顶层设计，制定和出台了一系列促进绿色金融发展的法律法规，逐步探索构建起我国绿色金融体系。2007 年 7 月 12 日环保总局、人民银行、银监会三部门联合提出《关于落实环境保护政策法规防范信贷风险的意见》，标志着绿色信贷这一经济手段全面进入我国污染减排的主战场。2016年 8 月 31 日，中国人民银行、财政部等七部委联合发布《关于构建绿色金融体系的指导意见》，成为中国和全球的绿色金融元年。邮储银行在绿色信贷发展方面做了大量的工作，本文结合邮储银行绿色金融实践，从机构及产品角度分析绿色金融发展存在的问题，包括：产品创新不足、业务联动不足、资源配置不足、资源分配机制落后。据此，本文结合招商银行、兴业银行等金融机构的先进案例，提出邮储银行绿色金融供给侧改革意见和建议，一是以创新思维推动绿色信贷产品创新，二是形成跨部门多层级的联动营销机制，三是以市场为基础从需求出发配置资源，四是肩负敢于作为勇于担责的使命责任。

应对国际气候变化的政策框架有两类：一是减排政策，政府补贴、碳税与碳配额作为市场性政策的代表，从奖励与惩罚两方面下手，各有千秋，碳税政策或更符合我国国情；二是绿色金融，当下统一绿色金融界定标准、激励绿色信贷、进行环境信息披露制度、气候风险分析和前瞻性压力测试是较优的政策选项。

本文以2006年至2015年我国上市公司为研究对象考察了期权激励对企业并购行为的影响及其作用机制。实证结果表明，授予高管的期权激励显著提升了企业发起并购的可能性和并购规模，缓解代理问题和提升风险承担是期权激励影响企业并购行为的潜在机制。异质性分析结果表明，高管特征差异对期权激励效果具有重要影响，期权激励对企业并购的影响在管理者年龄较高、管理者任期较长以及管理者相对薪酬水平较低的企业中更加明显；同时，企业产权性质也会影响期权激励的效果，期权激励对企业并购行为的影响在非国有企业中更加突出。进一步，本文还发现期权激励提升了企业并购的财务业绩，实现了高管的股票期权回报。本文的研究丰富和拓展了期权激励影响企业并购活动的相关研究，对制定合理的激励机制以及理解企业并购行为具有一定的参考意义。

Using the establishment of the Chinese Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund in 2014 as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate whether and how the national industrial investment fund affects corporate R&D investment. We find that the policy has a significant and positive effect on corporate R&D investment, and this effect is more pronounced in firms with more severe financial constraints, poorer internal governance, and laxer external supervision. Furthermore, the mechanism tests show that this policy helps alleviate firms’ financial constraints and agency conflict, thereby increasing corporate R&D investment.

We examine an important yet understudied form of reputational sanction in China, namely public criticisms imposed on culpable firms by the Chinese stock exchanges from 2013 to 2018. We find significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date, and they were affected by several factors, including financing propensity, governance mechanism, and equity nature. However, the market reaction is significantly negative only for firms relying on external financing and non-state enterprises, and importantly, becomes insignificant in cases where the firm had self-exposed misconduct before the official announcement of public criticism. Further, we examine other effects of public criticism, finding that public criticism does not improve firms’ long-term values, nor produce strong deterrence to change their behaviour. Overall, the evidence of the effects of public criticism on culpable firms is mixed, suggesting that reputational sanction is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of market regulation in China.

In this paper, we use a distinct quasi-natural experiments to examine the effect of liberalization of the stock market on corporate environmental, social, and governance(ESG) disclosure quality. We find that the liberation of the opening of Shanghai(Shenzhen)-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SHSC) significantly and consistently improves ESG disclosure quality of listed companies, and this effect is most evident in environmental information disclosure. We then find that the SHSC can improve the quality of ESG disclosure of listed companies through “voting with feet” and “external supervision” effect. Furthermore, the effect is stronger in firms that are Non-SOEs and with low equity concentrations. Overall, our results suggest that the liberalization of stock market can improve the quality of companies’ ESG disclosure quality.

发展供应链金融对于深化金融供给侧结构性改革，增强金融服务实体经济具有不容忽视的重要战略意义。本文通过对 2007 年-2019 年中国 A 股上市公司全 部公告和全部网络财经新闻报道大数据信息的进行收集整理，实证检验了上市公司发展供应链金融业务以及参与金融科技的意愿对企业价值的影响。研究结果表明：上市公司发展供应链金融在短期可以促进企业股价的上涨，在长期可以促进企业价值的提升，并且上市公司采用的供应链金融业务越多，公告中提到供应链金融业务越频繁，这种提升效果越显著。已采用供应链金融业务的上市公司在新闻报道中提到大数据、区块链、人工智能等金融科技相关词汇越多，对上市公司企业价值提升的效果越强。上市公司在发展了供应链金融业务之后会通过提高风险承担水平，提高投资支出与投资收益，提高资金效率和全要素生产率的方式促进企业价值的提高。在进行一系列稳健性检验之后，上述结论依然成立。本文不仅为发展供应链金融提高企业价值提供了基于公开市场数据大样本的实证证据，也对于国家和地方政府支持供应链金融的发展具有现实启示。

We study how shadow banking affects the effectiveness of monetary policy in China.Using novel data on bank-issued off-balance sheet wealth management products (WMPs), we show that banks improve their on-balance sheet risk profile by issuing WMPs. This in turn lowers the sensitivity of banks' wholesale funding cost to monetary policy and reduces the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. The effect of our mechanism on total credit is quantitatively similar to the effect arising from the substitution between traditional loans and shadow banking loans previously analyzed in the literature. The channel documented in this paper has novel implications for the regulation of banks' off-balance sheet activities and market-based funding.

We provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of shadow banking in terms of technological innovation. Firm-to-firm entrusted loans, the largest part of the shadow banking sector in China, enhance the borrowers’ innovation output. The effects are more prominent when the borrowers are subject to severer financial constraints, information asymmetry, and takeover exposures. A plausible underlying channel is capital reallocations from less productive but easy-financed lender firms to more innovative but financially less-privileged borrower firms. Our paper suggests shadow banking helps correct bank credit misallocations and thus serves as a second-best market design in financing the real economy

China’s shadow banking system has experienced surprisingly high growth since the global financial crisis. We develop a model to understand this puzzling phenomenon. With local government interventions in bank loans for low-quality projects and information asymmetry between banks and regulators, a policy combination of tightening formal banking and loosening shadow banking can reduce inefficiency, because the higher funding liquidity risk of shadow banking incentivizes banks to be more disciplined about the quality of projects. We find consistent empirical evidence that when on-balance-sheet financing was constrained by regulators, banks primarily shifted high-quality projects into their controlled shadow banking system.