Over the past decade, the rapidly digitizing economy in China has attracted much attention in both academic and policy circles. Most existing studies focus on the positive impact digitalization has had on China's inclusive growth. Few of them have attempted to measure the widening digital divide and its potential impact. Using the 2017 and 2019 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) data, this paper: (i) provides the first evidence that the digital divide has a significant negative impact on household consumption. For every unit increase in the digital divide, the level of household consumption will drop by about 28 percent; (ii) finds the negative impact stems from an integrated channel of rising unemployment, intensified liquidity constraints, and declining financial literacy; and (iii) further discloses that the digital divide has differential impacts on household consumption by category, while hinders consumption diversification. The results are robust to correcting for potential endogeneity due to sample selection, household heterogeneity, and reverse causality. Our findings shed new light on some little-documented evidence and have profound implications for related socio-economic policies that fully utilize technology to drive efficiency and inclusivity in the digital economy.

We examine the role of borrowers' digital footprints in debt collection. Using a large sample of personal loans from a fintech lender in China, we find that the information acquired by the lender through borrowers' digital footprints can increase the repayment likelihood on delinquent loans by 18.5%. The effect can be explained by two channels: bonding borrowers' obligations with their social networks and locating borrowers' physical locations. Moreover, the lender is more likely to approve loan applications from borrowers with digital footprints, even though these borrowers may occasionally have a higher likelihood of delinquency. The use of digital footprints can remain legitimate under stringent privacy protection regulations and fair debt collection practices. Our findings suggest that digital footprints, as a new type of collateral, can ultimately enhance financial inclusion by facilitating the lender's collection of delinquent loans.

机器人投资顾问（RIA）能为投资者提供信息，帮助其决策，已出现在多种投资平台上。利用2020和2021年中国最大投资平台的账户数据，本文检验了机器人投资顾问提供的不同服务。总体上看，机器人投顾的使用率越高，未来的净收益和风险调整后收益也越高，资产更多元，风险也越高。和信息服务相比，建议服务能对未来交易行为产生更大影响；这可能是因为机器投顾的建议比较简单，容易理解，因此能更好地被遵循，这与信息服务提供的海量信息形成对比。本文没有发现现有机器人投顾能移除行为偏差的证据。

实施新旧动能转换，深化供给侧结构性改革，培育新的经济结构，是实现经济持续健康发展的重要途径。商业银行，作为我国金融体系的主体力量，通过市场资金的流动，起到联通、协调不同行业发展的作用，在新旧动能转换过程中能够发挥重要的引导作用。但是在实际运行中商业银行信贷结构有待优化、风险管控能力有待提高、业务和产品创新能力面临考验等问题，制约着银行效能的发挥。如何找到银行经营与新旧动能转换的契合点,抢抓历史发展机遇，发展壮大自身，成为商业银行亟待解决的重要问题。

本文以2007至2016年共10年间我国A股非金融上市企业和开放式股票型基金为样本，基于Fama-French五因子模型风险调整后的投资业绩测度了持股基金投资能力，以上市公司高管基金行业背景校友数量和滞后持股基金投资能力为工具，分别采用固定效应模型和工具变量回归，揭示了持股基金投资能力差异对股票价格的因果性影响。计量分析发现：（1）高水平基金持股显著降低了股票价格波动性，持股基金投资能力越高，股价整体波动性和特质波动性越低；（2）控制投资能力以后，基金持股规模与股价波动性正相关，即基金持股比例越高股票价格反而波动越剧烈。

We examine the information content of changes in shareholdings after private issuance of public equity (PIPE) by mutual funds that participate in PIPEs in China. The results show that the changes in shareholdings is positively related to alpha and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for PIPE issuers with high information asymmetry, suggesting that the participating mutual funds have superior information. These results are robust after controlling for investment skill, geographic location, and alumni relation. The positive relation between shareholding change and information content is driven by PIPE issuers with weaker corporate governance. In addition, the positive relation is stronger when the placement discount is lower. These results are consistent with a hypothesis that controlling shareholders/management in Chinese PIPE firms may collude with mutual funds to do tunneling.

随着“互联网+”成为国家战略，公募基金行业迎来了爆发性增长，截止到2016年9月底，我国境内共有公募基金管理公司107家，基金总数达到3415支，资产达到8.83万亿元。“互联网+”基金作为新兴事物，既很大程度上推动了基金行业的发展，又为基金行业提供了基于行为金融学理论的新的投资思路。对互联网+基金的绩效评价重要性日益凸显。 运用绝对收益指标和多种风险调整后的收益指标、CAPM单因素模型、Fama-French三因素模型、Carhart四因素模型进行业绩归因分析，重点考察了由大数据因子产生的超额Aalpha情况，并针对实证结果从行为金融学的角度开展分析，在一定程度上填补了目前“互联网+”基金绩效评价的空白。 研究结果表明，2014年6月16日至2016年9月30日，“互联网+”股票型基金的绝对收益率要优于比较组，风险收益和波动率弱于比较组；通过CAPM、Fama-French三因子模型、Carhart四因素模型，超额收益显著优于比较组。同时，基金所依托的不同互联网数据平台，对投资风格也有所影响。

Although implicit guarantees are widely used in the shadow banking system, we know very little about its qualitative and quantitative properties. In this paper, we use a micro-level data set on China's shadow bank products to quantify the risk of implicit guarantees. We find a robust empirical fact that banks extend more implicit guarantees to their shadow bank debt (i.e., wealth management products) when their own default risks increase. Our result shows that this effect is particularly stronger when riskier banks plan to issue certificates of deposits in the interbank market. A simple model that is based on a signaling game is proposed to rationalize this fact. The key mechanism of the model is that as a bank's reputation becomes worse, it has stronger incentives to send positive signals to the market, i.e., to boost the realized returns of its shadow bank obligations, although it has no obligation to do so. Our findings show that implicit guarantees have nonlinear negative effects on bank fundamentals and the risk-weight of off-balance-sheet exposure should be increasing in banks' default risks.

Shadow banking in China constitutes a dual-track interest rate reform that adds a new market track beside the controlled formal banking track. Shadow banking leads to Kaldor-Hicks improvement if the gains from financing the underfunded private enterprise (PE) and reducing bank capital idleness caused by ultrahigh reserve requirements outweigh the losses from shadow banking risk. Pareto improvement is feasible as the state-owned enterprise (SOE), a potential reform loser, participates in shadow banking to transfer credit to the more productive PE. Full interest rate liberalization, which removes formal banking controls after the dual-track reform, does not warrant additional profit gain if bank credit misallocation favoring the SOE and SOE's low productivity persist.

本文基于贷款市场空间竞争模型，结合多元所有制的银行业市场结构，探讨政府强化竞争政策对不同所有制银行的差异化影响，以及对社会福利的作用。研究表明：国有银行的均衡贷款利率和经营风险较低，市场份额较大，但是较低贷款利率会降低国有银行的期望经营利润。强化市场竞争通过削弱两类银行的垄断定价权而降低均衡贷款利率，并且私有银行的贷款利率和经营风险下降更明显。国有银行的参与通过降低社会融资成本、提升银行经营稳健性来增进社会福利，特别在市场竞争不足时，社会福利水平会得到大幅提升。