公募基金是实现个体投资者机构化，以达到改善市场环境的主要途径之一，但由于忽略了基金管理能力存在差异，现有的文献无法提供证据证明公募基金可以改善市场定价效率。本研究以 2005-2020 年中国市场数据为基础，构建了股票的持股基金质量指标（而非权重），并研究了该指标对未来表现的预测能力。实证结果表明具有较好持股基金质量的股票表现显著优于较差的股票，基于该指标构建的套利组合可以获得年化 14%左右的超额收益，且该现象不能被基金持股权重、中国市场系统性风险和其他定价异象所解释。本文首次发现了公募基金提高了市场定价效率的直接证据，拓展了股票市场和基金市场的研究。实证结论意味着市场中仅有一部分具有有效管理能力的基金改善了市场质量，因此优化基金产品评价以提高市场资金配置效率对于加强散户投资“机构化”的正面作用有着深远意义。

本文从含有时变高阶矩的条件资本资产定价模型（CAPM）出发，基于我国上证 50ETF期权数据，检验了期权隐含的风险中性各阶矩的期限结构中是否包含有助于预测市场收益率和波动率的有效信息。采用偏最小二乘回归（PLS）的数据降维方法，我们发现：在 2015 到 2020年样本期内，从 50ETF 期权的隐含方差和高阶矩的期限结构中所提取的因子能显著地样本外预测未来 2 至 8 周的市场收益，且该预测能力在控制了常见的经济预测变量后仍十分显著。并且，从期权隐含方差的期限结构中所提取的因子能样本外预测市场波动。基于上述市场收益率和波动率预测的择时策略可以给投资者带来显著的经济价值。我们的实证分析表明：有别于已有文献中的经济预测变量，50ETF 期权市场可为投资者提供关于市场收益与风险之间短期权衡关系的特有信息。

随着金融市场和计算机信息技术的不断发展和渗透，互联网金融对商业银行的影响越来越明显。 在阐述相关理论的基础上，本文首先运用主成分分析法测算了我国商业银行的系统性风险。接着，运用SVAR模型等计量方法实证研究了互联网金融发展对我国商业银行系统性风险的影响。结果表明： 互联网金融发展主要通过影响银行的资产负债结构，进一步影响银行的成本收入比，进而对我国商业银行系统性风险产生影响。且它对银行系统性风险的影响存在“期限结构效应”，即互联网金融发展在短期内会增加我国银行系统性风险，但从中长期来看，对我国银行系统性风险的影响并不大，互联网金融与传统银行可作为互利共生的事物共同发展。 最后，本文分析了结论的形成原因并提出了相关政策建议。

China's stock market (the "A share market'') has a lower correlation with the global market and is less affected by international financial contagions than any other major economy. The inclusion of mainland China stocks into an international portfolio increases its Sharpe ratio. However, we find that Chinese stocks providing the most diversification benefits also carry the most policy risk for international investors. Holding Chinese stocks listed in Hong Kong does not reap the same diversification benefits. While global market integration and the increase in foreign ownership can diminish diversification benefits, mainland China stocks still provide valuable diversification opportunities for international investors up till the most recent time in late 2010s.

We provide direct evidence of leverage-induced fire sales contributing to a market crash using account-level trading data for brokerage- and shadow-financed margin accounts during the Chinese stock market crash of 2015. Margin investors heavily sell their holdings when their account-level leverage edges toward their maximum leverage limits, controlling for stock-date and account fixed effects. Stocks that are disproportionately held by accounts close to leverage limits experience high selling pressure and abnormal price declines which subsequently reverse. Unregulated shadow-financed margin accounts, facilitated by FinTech lending platforms, contributed more to the crash despite their smaller asset holdings relative to regulated brokerage accounts.

We analyze the effects on Chinese firms of the "China Connect" equity market liberalization. Because China is a capital abundant country, unlike typical emerging markets in the literature, the benefits and costs of liberalization are logically different. Nonetheless, the liberalization brought benefits: lower funding costs, higher stock prices, and more investment for connected firms compared to unconnected firms, despite a common negative effect on all firms from capital outflows. These benefits come from a new channel: reducing domestic credit misallocation between private- and state-owned enterprises. We also document costs: connected firms became more sensitive to external shocks than unconnected firms.

Fluctuations in investor demand dramatically affect firms' valuation and access to capital. To quantify its real impact, we develop a dynamic investment model that endogenizes both the demand- and supply-side of capital. Strong investor demand elevates equity prices and dampens price impacts of issuance, facilitating investment and financing, while weak investor demand instead incentivizes firms to optimally repurchase shares at favorable prices, which can crowd out investment, especially among firms with liquidity constraints. We estimate the model using indirect inference by matching the endogenous relationship between investors' portfolio holdings and firm characteristics. Our estimation suggests that investor demand substantially distorts firms' real investment decisions and impedes the efficient capital allocation across firms. Eliminating excess demand reduces dispersion in the marginal product of capital by 10.74% and TFP losses by 16.20%. Investor demand also influence firm size distributions and generates a heavy right tail---large excess demand provides firms with market power and opportunities to profit from their financial market activities, contributing to the emergence of superstar firms.

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we examine the effect of industry-specific knowledge transfer on audit performance after a merger of two Chinese audit firms with different levels of expertise in an industry. For clients in an industry audited by both merging audit firms, those audited by the audit firm less specialized in that industry belong to the treatment group, while all other clients belong to the control group. We find an economically-significant improvement in audit quality (as reflected in a reduction in financial misstatements) for the treatment group relative to the control group in the same merged audit firm. We show that the treatment effect is not driven by changes in auditor incentives or personnel movement and is more pronounced when we expect stronger communication between the less and more specialized auditors after the merger. We caution that our findings are specific to China and may not generalize to other countries.

Over the past twenty years, especially the past decade, China has taken enormous strides to develop its bond market as an integral step of financial reform. This paper aims to provide the most up-to-date overview of Chinese bond markets, by highlighting two distinct and largely segmented markets: Over-the-Counter based interbank market, and centralized exchange market. We explain various bond instruments traded in these two markets, highlighting their inherent connection with the banking system, and many multi-layer regulatory bodies who are interacting with each other in an intricate way. We also covers the credit ratings and rating agencies in Chinese market, and offer an account of ever-rising default incidents in China starting 2014. Finally, we discuss the recent regulatory tightening of shadow banking since late 2017 and its impact on bond investors, and the forces behind the internalization of Chinese bond markets in the near future.

Using data from 56 nations over 45 years, we find that nations that are more likely to elect left wing governments face higher (and more volatile) sovereign spreads. To explain these facts, we build a sovereign default model in which two policymakers (left and right) alternate in power. The probability of an incumbent staying in power is increasing in the share of government spending. We parametrize the left policymaker as having a higher marginal political gain from increasing government spending than the right does, a feature found in our data. Model economies in which the left is more frequently in power face worse borrowing terms due to higher default risk, a greater reluctance for fiscal austerity in bad times, and a higher share of government spending on average. These features imply large welfare losses for households.