本文立足于承销商的角度，首次从“关系”视角实证研究了投行与上市公司之间 的“关系”在投行竞争公司再融资（SEO）承销业务中的影响，并进而深入探讨了“关系” 与“声誉”机制在影响SEO 承销竞争方面的相互替代作用。结果发现，投行与上市公司“关 系”越紧密，即如果该投行是公司IPO 的承销商，或者在公司IPO 时的承销份额越高，或 者持有上市公司的股权，那么其越有可能获得公司SEO 的承销业务；然而，“声誉”会削弱 “关系”的影响，只有在投行声誉较弱的情况下，“关系”才能发挥作用。本文研究不仅提 供了在中国制度环境下“关系”在微观层面发挥作用的证据，从而丰富了投行行为的研究内 容，而且开拓了“关系”与“声誉”机制交互研究的新领域。

Using a sample of China’s listed private firms we investigate the relationship between control-ownership wedge, bank connections and collateral requirement. We find that while control-ownership wedge relates to more pledged collateral, it is mainly the firm’s bank connections rather than its political connections that reduce the collateral requirement and weakens the positive relationship between the control-ownership wedge and collateral. We furhter find that the split-share structure reform and regions with high lender competition also require less collateral and weaken the positive relationship between the control-ownership wedge and collateral. We argue that in an emerging market where legal protection for creditors and investors are weak and relationship is prevalent, bank connections is a substitute for collateral through mitigating the information asymmetry and agency concerns by creditors, which has been further exacerbated due to the tunnelling risk by the controlling shareholders.

corporate governance. We hypothesize that (a) Firms in more individualistic cultures should suffer more from agency problems and should use more corporate governance practices; (b) Firms in more individualistic cultures should use more debt since financing policy can also be used to control managerial opportunism, but the cultural effect should be smaller in firms with already higher corporate governance standards. Using the corporate governance scores from ASSET4, we find that individualism can explain a large variation in firm-level corporate governance and the empirical results are consistent with the our hypotheses.

Using a sample of 1250 companies listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock exchanges for the time period from 1999 to 2010, we find that for firms with a higher level of uncertainty, the benefits of the connections and advice provided by directors outweigh the costs of the impairment in decision making related to having a large board size. In particular, the positive incremental effect of board size on Q, for firms with a higher proportion of State shares, suggests that connections provided by directors is crucial for firms to get access to greater resources and it is even more important to Stateowned than to Non-State-owned firms during the economic reform in China. Our results indicate that that both agency theory and resource dependence theory play an important role on board efficient research.

Hermalin和Weisbach(2012)表明股东支付给管理层更高的薪酬能提高其披露信息的质量，而Gelb和Zarowin（2002）发现提高信息披露质量能增加股价信息含量。但本文发现，我国上市公司管理层薪酬与股价信息含量负相关。本文模型将其归因于股东在（薪酬，披露信息质量）博弈中讨价还价能力的丧失。进一步的实证结果支持了这一推断，明晰产权、增加管理层持股以及提高公司整体治理效力都能显著降低管理层的薪酬和股价信息含量的负相关性。此外，作为类比，本文也发现国企高管在职消费与股价信息含量负相关。本文的研究表明，我国上市公司必须先完善治理结构，才能通过薪酬激励管理层提高信息披露的质量。

传统文献认为只有绿地投资才能促进东道国经济增长，跨国并购对东道国的经济增长没有贡献。本文使用全球173个国家和地区的数据进行的实证研究表明，在东道国金融市场健全，制度环境稳定时，跨国并购可以通过“再投资”过程转化为东道国内源投资，从而促进东道国的经济增长。本文同时还发现在发达国家，FDI对经济增长的促进作用强于内源投资，而在发展中国家，FDI与内源投资在促进经济增长方面没有显著差异。

How do private equity (PE) investors affect a firm’s decision-making during the IPO process? The special IPO approval system for China’s stock market provides a unique setting to investigate this issue. In China, all IPO candidates need to submit an application to the China Securities Regulatory Commission and only approved firms can then be listed. Using data from ChiNext, we documented that pre-IPO PE investors, who invested in a firm less than a year prior to the IPO filing day, are associated with higher earnings management at the IPO, while longterm PE investors are associated with lower earnings management at the IPO. We propose that this is because long-term PE investors may prefer conservative financial statements to increase the probability of gaining approval in order to guarantee successful exit; on the other hand, pre- IPO PE investors are more likely to have political connections that can help the firms gain approval and they share the profits through a high IPO price. Consistent with this explanation, we find that local pre-IPO PE investors, who are more likely to have strong political connections, are associated with a higher probability of IPO approval. The evidence suggests that PE investors do have an impact on a firm’s decision-making during the IPO process. It also points to an important cost of the IPO approval system in China as well as the rent-seeking behavior associated with it.

现有的研究大多认为，并购会损害企业长期绩效，并会表现出“先升后降”的特征。然而，本文利用DEA-SFA二次相对效益模型对关联并购绩效的研究结果却表明，关联并购无论对企业短期绩效还是长期绩效均具有明显的提升作用，而并非传统观点所谓的会表现出“先升后降”的特征。事实上，真正“先升后降”的是关联并购对企业绩效的提升程度。本文的研究结论是，现阶段关联并购对上市公司绩效主要是发挥“支持之手”的作用，不过这种提升作用会随着时间推移而逐渐减弱。此外，本文还借助DEA-SFA二次相对效益模型估计了影响因素对关联并购绩效的作用。

本文在剔除由资产规模变动引起的机械效应基础上重新检验了企业的融资行为对资本结构调整速度、均值反转与持久性的影响。实证结果发现：在剔除了这种机械效应后，企业的融资行为仍引致资本结构的均值反转现象，但因调整速度很低而使得均值反转的趋势不是很明显。同样地，在剔除了机械效应后，资本结构的持久性系数不再为正，企业的长期融资行为导致资本结构发生了偏离目标值的过度调整。这意味着Lemmon等（2008）所发现的资本结构持久性现象很可能是资产规模长期变动引起的机械效应所致，而不是企业长期融资行为的结果。总之，在剔除了机械效应的影响后，我们没有发现支持动态权衡理论的足够证据。

近年来，利率市场化、金融脱媒化、金融互联网化趋势已愈演愈烈。与过去相比，传统的银行业经营环境正变得更加动态化、更加难以预测。因此，银行加强自身战略研判能力，对适应银行业竞争形势的发展有着重要意义。本文系统梳理了国有商业银行和股份制银行研究部门的演变历程，并选取了18家城市商业银行作为研究对象，系统分析了我国城市商业银行研究部门的职能定位、人员构成以及组织模式变迁等方面的情况，最终指出了我国城市商业银行研究部门组织模式的发展路径。