投资-现金流敏感性能否用来检验融资约束假说存在颇多争议，投资机会的 衡量偏误和融资约束分组的样本选择偏误对研究的可信性困扰已久。鉴于中国银行为主导的 融资渠道，本文利用银行授信进行分组，通过模型设定检验，发现投资机会的衡量偏误和授 信分组的样本选择同时影响了基于投资-现金流敏感性的统计推断。然而，在控制了二者的 影响后，没有授信的公司表现出显著的投资-现金流敏感性，但获得授信的公司则没有表现 出这种特征。因此，本文认为，在合理控制衡量偏误和样本选择偏误后，投资-现金流敏感 性可以作为检验融资约束假说的依据。

This study analyses financial consequence of the moral hazard activities of the controlling shareholder. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies during 2002 to 2009, we find that firms with a wider divergence between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights are more financially constrained and the cost of equity is significant higher in these firms. Our results suggest that potential tunneling and other moral hazard activities of the controlling shareholder are facilitated by his excess control rights. These activities have a real impact on corporate financial outcomes.

风险投资企业绩效受政府背景影响视市场化进程的不同而产生变化。论文通过风险企业家政府背景、风险投资企业董事会政府背景强度及深度三个维度，刻画了风险投资企业政府背景，以2006年至2010年包括创业板在内的575家有风险投资持股的上市公司为研究样本，对政府背景、市场化进程与风险投资企业绩效的相关性进行了实证检验。结果显示：（1）无论是采用净资产收益率衡量企业现实业绩还是Tobin Q值衡量企业成长价值，高管政府背景都对风险投资企业绩效有正面影响；（2）市场化程度较高的地区，高管政府背景对风险投资企业绩效影响更显著。

本文基于内部资本市场与公司股利政策的相关理论，认为内部资产市场的组织能够影响集团成员的股利政策。该想法通过建立模型，模拟一系列独立公司组成企业集团运营一个内部资本市场，以发放股利的形式来降低外部财务成本，即将现金流通过现金股利的形式从现金富足的公司转移至集团内其他公司，推导出集团内的上市公司比非集团公司支付更多的股利。在此基础上，通过上市公司的面板数据，对该想法进行了实证检验，并进一步分析集团成员公司的现金股利与该集团中其他公司的投资呈正相关关系。

以股利政策为例，本文探讨上市公司的行为是否受到了投资者态度的影响。具体的，我们分析上市公司的股利政策（用分红倾向，分红水平来度量）是否与市场对股利的态度（用股利溢价（dividend premium）来度量）相一致。结果显示，在股权分置改革之前，上市公司的分红倾向、分红水平与股利溢价负相关；而当这一改革完成之后，分红倾向、分红水平与股利溢价显著正相关。本文的研究不仅从新的视角展示了公司行为如何受到外部环境的影响，也显示了在后股改时代规范上市公司短期行为的必要性。

不同于传统的“业绩－薪酬”机制，本文从参与约束的角度提出了一种新的经理人薪酬决定机制。采用国有上市公司作为样本，我们发现：（1）如果经理人在上一年度获得的薪酬低于（高于）同行公司的中位值，那么其在本年度的薪酬将显著提高（降低）；（2）在自利的经理人的干预下，这种同行比较机制使得薪酬易于上调而难以下调，从而表现出不对称性。本文的结论表明了限制经理人权力在完善公司治理中的意义。

We investigate how a firm’s political connections may affect its corporate policies. We propose and test the hypothesis that firms’ political connections enhance investors’ endorsement of managerial decisions, which elevates firm investment and encourages equity issuance and less cash payout. Using a sample of non-state owned Chinese firms, we find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. Specifically, politically connected firms are less likely to pay dividends and pay less if they pay. The dividend announcement returns are significantly lower in connected firms than in otherwise similar but unconnected firms. Investors prefer firm investments to cash payouts by politically connected firms with high growth opportunities, and tend to value these firms’ investment decisions significantly higher. Finally, connected firms are also more able to tap public equity market for external funds. Our evidence is more consistent with political connections being an investor endorsement device rather than the expropriation device as suggested in the prior literature.

This study examines how corporate governance influences short-term and long-term bidder returns from China’s domestic mergers and acquisitions during 2001-2010. We examine a range of corporate governance measures covering ownership structure, board structure, insider ownership and managerial incentives while controlling for bidder and deal characteristics. Our initial results from events analyses show that market responses differ in ways which suggest a difference in how the market’s assessment of share price from the perspectives of short run and long run. Bidders obtain significant positive abnormal returns over the five-day event period but suffer significant wealth losses for two years following the deal completion. Our further analyses on factors driving the price difference show that executive ownership (positive) and state ownership (negative) exert opposite effects on the announcement period returns. The returns further differ by way of payments with positive (negative) effects from stock (cash) financing. Our long-term regression analyses show that the positive impact of executive ownership remains. Independent directors record a negative effect on abnormal returns. Nevertheless, board independence measured by the composite corporate governance index exerts a significant, positive effect on shareholder wealth. Our study highlights the need for the state to accelerate the share structure reform and formulate policies that encourage executive ownership and sound corporate governance.

本文研究了用8个模型预测A股23个行业和市场收益率的问题，针对文献中常用的平方预测误差损失函数和R_OS^2统计量的不足构建了损失函数g(r_(t+1),r ?_(t+1) )和R_OS^ORDER统计量。R_OS^2统计量显示收益率不可预测而R_OS^ORDER统计量显示收益率可预测，我们进而研究了基于预测的行业轮动策略，结果支持使用损失函数g(r_(t+1),r ?_(t+1) )和R_OS^ORDER统计量评估预测。本文给出了不同预测模型的相对表现。

与管理层权力理论不同，社会影响理论强调存在着CEO和董事会的社会心理因素对高管薪酬的影响。本文将从社会心理因素视角出发分析社会影响机制对高管薪酬的作用，首先对社会心理因素的内涵加以分析，然后通过文献梳理总结董事会服务于高管利益的动因及过程，并对社会心理因素和社会影响机制如何影响高管薪酬水平加以阐释，最后提出研究展望。