We examine how regulators tackle two types of widespread tunneling activities in China. Controlling shareholders and related parties can divert assets from listed firms or coerce firms to serve as guarantors on questionable loans. The government announced and enacted two new rules during the same period: the first rule prohibits asset diversion from listed firms for ‘non-operational’ purposes by large shareholders, while the second standardizes the practice of listed firms providing loan guarantees. Relative to firms not affected by either rule, firms complying with the first rule experience a reduction in the ownership stakes of controlling shareholders, an increase in investment, and significantly better performance. The second rule has no impact on firms. Our results highlight the importance of enforceability: laws and regulations that can be enforced at lower costs are much more likely to succeed, especially in countries with weak institutions.

This paper examines the value of political participation by private entrepreneurs in China. Using a unique sample of all initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms during 1994-2007 and political participation by the controlling entrepreneurs, we test the hypothesis that firms with entrepreneurs who participate in politics are able to exploit rent-seeking opportunities that normal firms do not have access to. We document that the long-run stock performance after the IPO of firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics is superior to that of common entrepreneurial firms. Our results also show that political participation has a significant positive effect on change in operating performance and a negative effect on first-day returns. Moreover, we find that economic development and local institutions are important for this value effect. The difference in performance is even larger in regions characterized by more abundant rent-seeking opportunities, indicating that the value effect of political participation likely originates from rent seeking. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that political participation facilitates entrepreneurs’ rent seeking.

本文以2003-2008年中国A股市场非金融类公司为研究样本，考察了不同控股股东所有权性质对上市公司现金持有行为的影响及起作用的路径。研究发现：一方面，控股股东的国家所有权性质有助于缓解信息不对称带来的融资约束，显著降低了企业现金持有水平，其对外部融资的敏感性随控股股东的政治干预能力的增强而降低，这一优势在货币政策环境变化时更为明显，并随着政府干预能力的增强作用增大。但另一方面，国有企业的代理链条过长和所有者缺位加剧了企业的代理冲突，显著损害了上市公司现金持有的市场价值，地方政府控制企业的代理问题最为严重。好的公司治理机制有效地降低了所有权性质的代理成本，但作用有限。因此，国家所有权性质虽有助于解决信息不对称，但其过高的代理成本对于公司价值的损害说明国有企业的改革仍然任重道远。

China’s listed companies often exchange corporate assets with their unlisted affiliates such as parent companies, which is rarely observed in their American counterparts. We find that listed companies which are incompletely restructured from former state-owned enterprises tend to exchange more profitable assets for less profitable assets (i.e., tunneling). However, when there is a need to avoid reporting losses and to raise additional capital, listed companies tend to exchange less profitable assets for more profitable assets (i.e., propping). We also find that the market reacts indifferently to assets exchange announcement. Finally, we find that assets exchange with tunneling (propping) incentive is associated with detrimental (improved) post-exchange stock performance and financial performance. In summary, this study contributes to the corporate assets literature by providing two new incentives (tunneling and propping).

本文考察媒体在股权分置改革及流通股股东分类表决的制度安排下所发挥的治理职能。研究表明，作为宏观治理环境的一个重要组成部分，媒体在股权分置改革中发挥着非常重要的治理作用。在控制其它影响因素的前提下，媒体关注程度越高，治理环境越好，“公司治理溢价”越高，信息环境和信息质量越有保证，非流通股股东的私有利益越小，中小流通股股东所面临的信息风险越低，相应地，其所要求的实际对价也会相对较低。反之，中小流通股股东会向那些媒体关注程度较低公司的非流通股股东要求更高的对价。同时，密集的媒体披露水平可以明显影响甚至强化非流通股持股对实际对价所产生的正向相关关系。分组回归分析的结果表明这些媒体的公司治理职能仅在中小流通股股东对实际对价高度满意的研究样本中存在。进一步地，媒体的这些公司治理职能的发挥主要是通过提高中小流通股股东参与股改投票的热情、进而使其自身意见更有可能在分类表决中得到体现来加以实现的。

The Chinese market is characterized by state-controlled and closely held firms as well as significant differences in economic development and legal structures at the provincial level and corporate regulations that require firms seeking external financing to show a history of dividend payment. Using a sample of listed Chinese firms, we investigate the firm’s choice of cash or stock dividends and market reactions to the announcement of these dividend choices. We find that profitable, low leverage, high cash holding, stronger shareholder protection firms, and those firms with state ownership prior to listing and undertaking subsequent equity offerings are more likely to pay dividends and cash dividends, in particular. In addition, we find that growing firms with high levels of retained earnings and investing more in fixed assets pay stock dividends. Firms appear to cater to investor demands in setting dividend policy; hence firms with a large proportion of non-tradable shares are more likely to pay cash dividends. Consistent with the use of stock dividends to attract the attention of analysts, we find that the announcement of a stock dividend initiation is associated with significant positive market reactions and increased analyst following.

论文首先分析了新股发行“三高”现象，并从中国资本市场制度缺陷，新股发行制度和外部环境等几方面深度剖析了新股发行“三高”现象的成因，最后提出了明确资本市场定位、改革新股发行制度、加强信息披露制度建设、建立强制分红制度、完善退市制度、健全监管法律体系等破解新股发行“三高”问题的对策建议。

上市公司过度融资现象普遍存在，这影响了资本市场的有效资源配置，也降低了公司长期业绩。本文通过改进理论模型，以2002-2007年187个再融资样本的为研究对象，通过对比适度融资和过度融资公司的业绩变化，利用最小二乘回归以及广义最小二乘回归等方法探究上市公司过度股权再融资对公司长期业绩的影响。结果表明上市公司普遍存在过度融资的情况，并且在股权分置改革下，非流通股比例与过度融资程度呈正比，而过度融资公司的业绩显著低于适度融资公司的业绩。过度融资程度越大，公司长期业绩下滑越快。加强对股东的监督和对募集资金的监管能有效提高资金使用效率，防止过度融资，促进资本市场健康发展。

通过物理方法研究经济学均衡问题，争取实现经济学的数值解法

本文利用Wang(2010)提出的固定效应随机前沿模型，针对我国制造业上市公司2004-2009年面板数据研究融资约束对其技术效率的影响，从而在公司微观层面为技术效率以及融资约束领域的研究提供新的经验证据。采用传统指标(公司规模、杠杆率和公司年龄)以及依据投资-现金流敏感性模型估计的融资约束变量进行分析，本文发现融资约束对于公司技术效率的提高具有显著抑制作用。利用短期融资券推出作为自然实验解决内生性问题，得出了相同的结论。此外，与国有上市公司相比，融资约束的缓解对于民营上市公司技术效率的提升起到更大程度的促进作用。因此，应当着力完善信贷市场机制，缓解公司融资约束程度，为促进生产率的提高奠定基础。