We provide empirical evidence and a theoretical explanation for the asymmetries of capital growth rate at the firm level and in the aggregate. Capital growth rate at the firm level is positively skewed, while the average capital growth rate across firms, as well as its slope, is negatively skewed. We develop a model of irreversible corporate investment that can reconcile these opposite patterns. The key to our model is that firms do not observe the true state of economy and have to infer it from noisy signals. The time-varying uncertainty in the learning process leads to variations in the option value of waiting, which causes many firms to react to bad signals arriving in good times, and few firms to react to good signals arriving in bad times. As a result, the capital growth rate at the aggregate level exhibits a negative skewness both in levels and in the slope, even though irreversibility causes positive skewness at the individual firm level.

Agency theory posits that debt-like compensation (such as defined-benefit pensions and other deferred compensation) aligns managerial interests more closely with those of debtholders and reduces the agency cost of debt. Consistent with theory, we find that a higher CEO relative leverage, defined as the ratio of the CEO's inside leverage (debt-toequity compensation) to corporate leverage, is associated with lower cost of debt financing and fewer restrictive covenants, for a sample of private loans originated during 2006-2008. These findings persist after accounting for the endogeneity of CEO relative leverage, and are more pronounced for firms with higher default risk. Additional analysis on a sample of new public bond issues also shows a negative relation between CEO relative leverage and bond yield spread. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that debtholders recognize the incentive effects of executive debt-like compensation and adjust the terms of corporate debt contracts accordingly.

This study examines the effect of transaction costs and information asymmetry on firms’ capital-structure decisions in 40 countries. The findings indicate that transaction costs affect both capital-market timing and capital-structure rebalancing. Past market-timing activity has a significantly negative impact on the current debt ratio, and this impact is stronger for firms facing lower transaction costs of external financing, as defined by legal origin, capital-market development, and securities rules in their home countries. Further analysis indicates that firms in countries with lower transaction costs also rebalance their capital structure more quickly after a deviation from the target, but the rebalancing does not eliminate the market timing effect on capital structure completely.

In this paper we show that the volatility of risk is an important factor in explaining capital structure choices of firms. This effect is over and above the traditional determinants of capital structure such as the current level of risk, size, market-to-book ratio, tangibility of assets and profitability. We show that both (1) the fraction of debt in total new external financing raised by the firm, and (2) the long term debt as a fraction of the assets of the firm, are decreasing in the volatility of risk of the firm. Moreover this negative relationship is significantly stronger for firms that do not have a credit rating. These results are consistent with the theoretical reasons that we provide to explain the negative relationship between leverage and volatility of risk.

In this paper we compare counterfactual corporate bond issuing dates to actual issuing dates in order to test the ability of firms to time the credit market. The 50 most active bond issuing financial firms and the 50 most active industrial firms are studied using one week, one month, and one quarter windows. The ability to time firm-specific CDS prices is studied from January 2002 - October 2009. The ability to time the risk-free rate (10 year US government bond) is studied from January 1988 - October 2009. We find that: firms do not successfully time the risk-free rate or the credit spreads. There is no evidence of CDS timing ability over one week or one month, but there is some borderline evidence at one quarter. For a typical bond issue, the firm loses about 1% of the face value of the bond relative to a 1 month window, due to their inability to time the market. If the firms could improve their market timing, they could save many hundreds of millions of dollars. Since there is a degree of statistical predictability in the data, we find it surprising that these firms are not able to do a better job of timing the credit market.

技术分析方法是否有效一直是富有争议的话题。本文收集整理了1997-2010年我们股票上出现的346 次股价长期横盘形态，用logit模型检验了技术交易规则在中国市场的有效性，并在实证中引入持股集中度等影响技术交易规则有效性的重要因素，同时发现存在其他约束条件如横盘请价格波动方向、平均股价等对横盘后的方向选择有密切关系。

Modern financial development theories suggest that, financial development can promote technological progress and long-term economic growth. Based on the Chinese mainland provincial panel data, the paper tests empirically the relation between financial intermediation development and total factor productivity growth. In terms of the degree-of-freedom of bank loan decision-making, the ratio of loans of private enterprises and individuals to total loans is used to measure the development of Chinese financial intermediation. This paper finds that financial intermediation development significantly promotes total factor productivity growth when controlling for other variables, such as capital formation rate, foreign direct investment, government intervention and the urbanization level

当资产回报率服从椭圆分布和投资者具有二次效用函数的假设都不满足时，方差（标准差）不再是风险的一个恰当度量方法，而这会导致传统的最小方差套期保值存在缺陷。本文提出了一个新的基于核密度估计的计算最小VaR 和最小CVaR 套期保值比率的非参数方法。基于沪深300 现指日收盘价格数据和沪深300 股指期货合约仿真交易日结算价格数据的实证结果表明，本文提出的改进的非参数方法表现最优，最大程度上降低了套期保值投资组合的标准差、VaR 和CVaR。

独立董事治理是公司治理研究关注的重点之一，但现有经验证据并不稳定甚至相互矛盾。本文引入新的独立董事特征——董事网络位置，利用社会网络分析方法考察独立董事在上市公司董事网络中位置的差别对独立董事治理行为的影响。具体而言，本文检验了独立董事的网络位置特征与公司投资效率的关系，结果显示：网络中心度越高，独立董事治理作用越好，表现为其所在公司的投资效率越高；在区分投资不足与投资过度之后可以发现，网络中心度高的独立董事既有助于缓解公司的投资不足，也有助于抑制投资过度；进一步地，在政府干预程度高的地区，与非国有上市公司相比，国有上市公司中独立董事网络中心度对投资效率的治理作用会减弱，但在政府干预程度低的地区没有显著差异。这些发现意味着，独立董事的网络位置是独立董事的重要特征，能够对独立董事参与公司决策产生重要影响，但其作用的发挥同时也会依赖于公司最终控制人产权性质和地区政府干预水平。

This study investigates the influence of equity characters characteristic on firm performance using panel data for 373 listed companies for the period from 2001 to 2009.We find that there is non-linear correlation between ownership characters and firm performance.(ii)the high state ownership has significant positive influence on performance but we have not found evidence that the small and medium state ownership have any influence on performance.(iii) the legal person ownership has negative influence on performance but the individual ownership is positive relation with performance.