This paper examines the impact of ESG rating divergence on stock price delays in the context of the Chinese capital market. We find that ESG rating divergence significantly increases the stock price delays. Mechanism analysis results suggest that ESG rating divergence affects stock price delays by reducing information transparency and firm internal control quality. Heterogeneous analysis results indicate that the impact of ESG rating divergence on stock price delays is more pronounced in high-tech firms and when investor sentiment is high.

Informal institutions can play a crucial role in fostering corporate and policy innovation, especially when formal institutions are weak. However, their intangible nature makes them difficult to quantify. In this paper, we proxy the strength of kinship-based informal institutions using surname homogeneity among business owners, specifically, the extent to which they share a limited number of surnames within the same county. Our analysis reveals that a one-standard-deviation increase in the strength of informal institutions leads to a 21.1% increase in patent filings and an 18.9% increase in policy innovation. We find that kinship-related informal institutions foster corporate innovation by compensating for weak formal institutions, enhancing protection for intellectual property rights, facilitating access to finance, improving public service delivery, and promoting supply chain cooperation. We also suggest that kinship-related informal institutions encourage local governments to engage in policy experimentation, which relies on the collaboration of business owners. This experimentation process is easier to coordinate and monitor in counties dominated by a few kinship networks. Both informal institutions and policy innovation contribute to economic development and foster entrepreneurial market entries. However, the positive impact of informal institutions declines over time as formal institutions strengthen in China.

We investigate the effect of third-party certification for green bonds by analyzing its impact on issuer's future green innovation performances. We find that third-party certification for green bonds can significantly promote issuer's future green innovation performances. Furthermore, the promotion effect is more prominent in non-state-owned issuers, large issuers and heavy polluting issuers, and can be more significantly exerted by professional and reputable third-party certification agencies. Besides, third-party certification for green bonds can play the effect by reducing the issuer's tax expenditure, increasing the issuer's loan financing, and receiving a positive response in stock returns. But unexpectedly, it cannot play the effect by further reducing the credit spread of green bonds. Our findings indicate that independent external supervision can play a positive role in green bond issuance, but there is still a long way to go.

The stock price of a firm is dynamically influenced by its own factors as well as those of its peers. In this study, we introduce a Graph Attention Network (GAT) integrated with WaveNet architecture—termed the GAT-WaveNet model—to capture both time-series and spatial dependencies for forecasting the stock price crash risk of Chinese listed firms from 2012 to 2021. Utilizing node-rolling techniques to prevent overfitting, our results show that the GAT-WaveNet model significantly outperforms traditional machine learning models in prediction accuracy. Moreover, investment portfolios leveraging the GAT-WaveNet model substantially exceed the cumulative returns of those based on other models.

Using firm-customer matched data from 2005 to 2020 in China, we examined the spillover effects and mechanisms of green innovation (GI) among supply chain partners. Results show a positive association between customers' GI and their supply firms' GI, indicating spillover effects in the supply chain. Customers' GI increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile leads to a significant 19% increase in supply firms' GI. Certain conditions amplify the spillover effect, including customers with higher bargaining power, operating in less competitive industries, and supply firms making relationship-specific investments or experiencing greater customer stability. Geographic proximity and shared ownership further enhance the spillover effect. Information-based and competition-based channels drive the spillover effect, while customers with higher GI encourage genuine GI activities by supply firms. External environmental regulations, such as the Chinese Green Credit Policy and Environmental Protection Law, strengthen the spillover effect, supporting the Porter hypothesis. This research expands understanding of spillover effects in the supply chain and contributes to the literature on GI determinants.

We examine the impact of state-owned shareholders on fraud within private firms. Utilizing a sample of A-share private listed firms in China observed from 2008 to 2021. We discover a significant negative association between state-owned shareholders and the likelihood of fraud in private firms. State-owned shareholders primarily act as inhibitors of fraud, and their effect on the probability of fraud being detected is not statistically significant. This finding remains robust even after conducting a series of sensitivity tests to mitigate potential selectivity bias and reverse causality endogeneity issues. In the analysis of heterogeneity, we found that state-owned shareholders play a more active role under conditions of imperfect external institutional development, and they also exert a more significant inhibitory effect on enterprises with lower governance levels and higher business risks. Our mechanism test demonstrates that the inhibitory effect of state-owned shareholders on corporate fraud is achieved by improving corporate governance and alleviating financial distress. This study also examines the impact of state-owned shareholders' local characteristics, external supervision mechanisms, and internal governance mechanisms in unique Chinese enterprises on fraudulent behaviour by private enterprises. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence that state-owned shareholder ownership is associated with reducing fraudulent behaviour within private firms.

Based on the sample of Chinese A-listed firms from 2003 to 2020, this paper investigates the effect of common institutional ownership on labor income share. The result shows that common institutional ownership can significantly increase firms’ labor income share. Mechanism tests indicate that common ownership can: 1) alleviate financial constraints by reducing the debt financing costs and increasing the trade credit financing, thus increasing the labor income share; 2) improve corporate innovation and therefore enhances the demand for highly-skilled labor, which eventually boost labor income share. Competitive hypothesis test represents that common institutional ownership can reduce the monopoly power of enterprises and decrease monopoly rent, so as to increase the proportion of labor in the distribution. Further analyses present that the network formed by the common ownership can effectively exert the financing support role of SOEs and the knowledge spillover effect of innovative-advantage firms, which contributes to the labor income share increasing of other related firms in the network connection. This study not only enriches the economic consequences of common institutional ownership, but also provides policy guidance for the government to further optimize the income-distribution pattern by deepening the reform of the financial market.

Amid growing global interest in state interventions, this paper examines the impact of Chinese government infrastructure investments on improving firm productivity. It centers on a policy aimed at directing regional governments to foster a more conducive market environment for private enterprises. Our analysis reveals that the positive effect of infrastructure investment on firm productivity is increased by 42.5% for private firms in industries that benefitted from improved market entry opportunities and an even more striking 97.9% in provinces where arbitrary fines were curtailed. These findings underscore the complementary roles of state interventions and the development of market mechanisms in boosting firm productivity.

This paper explores the impact of government intervention on local analysts’ earnings forecasts, based on a scenario of financial misconduct in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, under the influence of the government, local analysts’ earnings forecasts for SOEs with financial misconduct are less accurate and more optimistically biased. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that forecast bias by local analysts is greater when officials have stronger promotion incentives, when regions are less market-oriented and have a larger share of the state-owned economy, and when SOEs contribute more to taxation and employment. In further analysis, we find that local analysts have a more optimistic tone in reports targeting non-compliant SOEs. Local analysts who depend heavily on political information will also issue more biased and optimistic forecasts on SOEs with violations. Finally, as a reward for achieving government goals, the local brokerages affiliated with these analysts and providing these optimistic forecasts are more likely to become underwriters in seasoned equity offerings of SOEs. This paper reveals that government intervention significantly influences analyst forecasts, providing implications for understanding the sources of analyst forecast bias.

We propose a sufficient statistics approach to measuring Ricardian comparative advantage in a quantitative trade model featuring cross-country differences in productivity, factor prices, market size, as well as monopolistic competition, endogenous markups, and firm heterogeneity. The model’s micro-foundations do not necessarily imply that the relevant data for the proposed sufficient statistics must include micro information, but its micro-structure is needed to understand how only macro information can be used instead. Applying the approach to Chinese microdata and cross-country macrodata, we show that imperfect competition with endogenous markups and firm heterogeneity have far-reaching implications for correctly measuring Ricardian comparative advantage.