The credit collusion is the main form of internal fraud and will lead to the wrong decision on loan-issue and further worsen the operation risk as well as the default risk. At present, the loan initiated by commercial banks in China is surging and challenges the loan management. Based on the literature and the situation of risk management in Chinese banking industry, this paper adopts the P-S-A model to study the collusion between loan officers and lending firms. Finally, it derives the collusion-free conditions and proposes some measures to reduce the collusions, which includes: (1) to impose harsher penalty on bribes to deter any collusion for increasing individual welfare; (2) to launch more sophisticated remuneration for loan officers to develop long relationship with commercial banks; (3) to spend more efforts on monitoring the larger sized loans.
Using Chinese data, we offer new evidence on industry clusters as a mechanism that
may promote relational contracting and facilitate inter-firm financing when legal and
financial systems are weak. In particular, we find that industry clusters lower firms’
dependence on courts and bank loans, and financing costs, and in turn improve firms’
profitability. While firms’ propensity of joining clusters increases with less efficient
courts and less developed financial markets, industry clusters cannot completely
mitigate the negative impact of deteriorated institutions. The impacts of industry
clusters are significant even after controlling for the existence of other substitutive
mechanisms such as business associations.