本文研究汇率体制转型过程中的资本市场均衡决定，并给出比较静态性质。我们发现，本币升值预期对资产市场的影响不会超过预期货币升值幅度，本币升值速度的提高对资产价格的影响不敏感。在完美的资本市场上，升值预期只会使资产的市盈率一次性上涨，资产升值之后将开始逐步下降，并在升值预期结束时回到长期均衡水平。汇率升值过程的不确定性会增加热钱投机的风险，进而降低资本市场的膨胀程度。提高升值速度未必导致更多的热钱流入，当存在资本流入障碍时，更多热钱流入的条件是资本流动速度对利差的凸性。本文预言的资产价格运动趋势和中国股票市场的表现一致。

To understand the interaction between internal control mechanism and the mar- ket for control, using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences methodology, we examine CEO turnover following an exogenous decline of takeover threats? second generation of antitakeover legislation in the U.S. Di¤erent from previous research using only time series variation in CEO turnover, we ?nd that, compared to a control group, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance increased for the ?rms a¤ected by the laws. The increases are both statistically and economically signi?cant. We also ?nd that the increases in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance are concentrated in the ?rms with bad internal governance. Our results suggest that internal control mechanism and the market for control may be substitutes instead of complements.

This study aims to examine empirically whether ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms affect income-smoothing behavior in China. The sample comprises 1353 companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Market during the period 1999 to 2006. By comparing the variability of income to the variability of sales an income smoother can be identified if income is less variable. Our empirical results show that the proportion of Chinese firms practicing income-smoothing is greater than those of Singaporean, Japanese and U.S. firms. Income smoothing in China is more severe when the state is the controlling shareholder of the listed firm. Firms with more independent directors are more likely to engage in income smoothing. This article presents the current development of China’s corporate governance system and indicates that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minor investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China.

本文针对管理者激励的两种假说——“最优契约论”与“管理权力论”，结合制度背景对我国国有企业高层管理者激励补偿效应进行研究。通过实证分析，我们发现，以往文献之所以存在高管薪酬与企业绩效之间相关与不相关的结论，是因为没有充分考虑权利较大的管理者对董事会的影响以及权利较小的管理者对会计利润的盈余操纵两个重要因素。高管薪酬与企业绩效之间实质上并不相关，管理者权力没有真正提高企业绩效，却成了机会主义盈余管理，创造虚假业绩的重要来源，权力收益没有起到激励作用。本文研究支持“管理权力论”假说。

本文研究了中国上市公司内部人交易与盈余预测误差的关系，进而，鉴于有效 地公司治理能够保护外部投资者利益，约束内部人自利行为，本文还分析了公司治理对内部 人交易与盈余预测误差敏感性的影响。研究结果表明，针对管理层增持，公司偏好盈余预测 低估；针对管理层及大股东减持，公司偏好盈余预测高估。此外，公司治理能够显著影响内 部人交易与管理者盈余预测误差的敏感性，即针对管理层交易，管理层持股比例越高，公司 董事长、总经理及财务总监交易本公司股份比例越高，以及董事长与总经理两职合一时，基 于管理层增持、减持的公司盈余预测低估、高估偏好显著增强；针对大股东交易，当董事长 或总经理来自交易大股东单位及其在交易大股东单位领取薪酬时，当交易性大股东中包含控 股股东时，以及交易性大股东之间制衡度较低时，基于大股东减持的公司盈余预测高估偏好 显著增强；当非交易性大股东对交易性大股东制衡度较高时，基于大股东减持的公司盈余预 测高估偏好显著降低。

在公司治理制度从强制性治理向自主性治理跃迁的背景下，本文基于构造的中国上市公司自主性治理水平指标，研究了强制性治理、自主性治理与公司绩效之间的关系。我们研究发现：中国上市公司强制性治理对公司绩效的作用不显著，自主性治理对公司绩效具有显著的促进效应，并且这一促进效应更多是由于股东权利、董事会效率和投资者关系管理等自主性治理机制发挥作用的积极结果；自主性治理对公司绩效的促进效应在强制性治理水平较低的公司中更为显著。我们进一步发现，自主性治理与公司绩效之间存在着很强的内生性关系：自主性治理不仅对公司绩效有显著的促进作用，而且公司绩效对自主性治理也有强烈的反馈作用。

This paper investigates the relationship between firm productivity and corporate governance, including ownership structure, incentive compensation and board characteristics. Using TFP approach, I find ownership concentration and total compensation both are positively related to TFP, and the state ownership and the power of the first largest holder have negative effects on TFP. Using demand labour function approach, I find some contrary results, which need to be studied further.

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study intends to solve the disputes between the free cash flow hypothesis and the tunneling hypothesis in explaining the role of cash dividends on asset expropriation of the controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms, by investigating the values of cash holdings and cash dividends between firms with high and low ownership control. Research Findings/Insights: The results show that investors value more the cash dividends of firms with high ownership control than those of firms with low ownership control, and value more the cash holdings of firms with low ownership control than those of firms with high ownership control, more consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis rather than the tunneling hypothesis. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study contributes to the literature of agency theory and international corporate governance by solving the disputes regarding the role of cash dividends in asset expropriation of controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms. This study also contributes to the literature of cash holdings by showing that the most essential condition for these firms to hold high level of cash holdings is the quality of investor protection. This provides an example of the applicability of the Anglo-Saxon theory to emerging markets. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Even though the evidence does not support the tunneling hypothesis of cash dividends, it still suggests that investors are concerned with high cash payouts, which could thus lower firm value. Thus, changing corporate ownership structure and improving investor protection are necessary to deepen the development of financial markets.

公司治理和制度环境是保护投资者利益的两个重要方面。本文旨在考察微观层面的公司治理与宏观层面的制度环境之间的关系，对“替代假说”（公司治理能够在制度环境较弱的情况下发挥替代作用，即制度环境弱，公司治理强）和“结果假说”（公司治理是对制度环境要求的响应，即制度环境强，公司治理强）进行检验。以中国上市公司2001-2006年间的控股股东资金占用为研究切入点，根据证监会的相关政策本文将样本时期划分为三个阶段，并且比较了公司治理在三个时期制约控股股东资金的作用。研究结果显示，在转型经济的中国股票市场，公司治理只是对制度环境变化的响应结果，而没有替代作用。这一经验证据突出了正确认识公司治理的作用、加强制度环境建设以保护中小投资者利益的重要性。

本文以我国2002-2006年上市民营企业的数据为样本，实证分析了政治关联与企业经营绩效的关系。在控制了政治关联与企业经营绩效存在的内生性关系后，研究发现民营企业的政治关联程度越高，企业的经营效率越差；实际控制者的政治关联程度越高，企业的经营效率也越差。进一步的研究发现，制度环境的不同对政治关联与企业经营绩效之间的关系产生不同影响，随着政府干预程度的减弱和法律保护程度的提高，企业的政治关联程度对于经营绩效的负面影响也在减轻。