The independent directors of a board can impact CEO pay-performance more effectively if a compensation committee provides information and assist them in designing relevant executive pay schemes. On the basis of this idea, we developed and tested the hypotheses that Chinese firms with a compensation committee have a closer CEO pay link with performance when a larger proportion of independent directors serves on the board. We focused primarily on the effect of a compensation committee on CEO pay-performance relation as a consequence of its help for the board and found that board independence produces a stronger relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese listed firms. This association is more evident in those firms which have a compensation committee. Our findings suggest that the interaction between independent directors on the board and a compensation committee has important consequences for CEO incentive systems as well as corporate governance structures in China.

Using data from a large sample of the listed firms in China from 1999 to 2002, we find that firm profitability and state ownership are negatively related to top management turnover only when firm profitability is below target (measured by industry median). We also find that top management turnover has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when it occurs under performance below target, but has a negative impact when it occurs under performance above target. Lastly, we find that top management turnover under low performance has a positive impact on subsequent firm profitability when the state is not the largest shareholder, but has no impact when the state is the largest shareholder.

The separation of the government from the industry in telecommunications sector was carried out in a gradualist or experimental manner to make sure a “reform without losers”. Both the supervising ministries and local governments became the “early winners” who were in favor of the status quo. A meaningful industrial reform started from 1994 but ended in 1998. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was just right on time to secure the outcome of the reforms. However, determined by the nature of uncompetitiveness and state monopoly, the telecommunications sector was against the liberalization requested by the GATT/WTO members. Close administrative and financial connections between the supervising ministry and subordinate sector caused a high degree of convergence of their interest that in turn implies that the ministry had strong incentives of protecting the sector. After having terminated the fragmented governance since 1995, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) successfully prevented the sector from giving much concession compared to the other sectors during Sino- US negotiations. Although a limited concession was made, it is possible that the supervising ministries would not fulfil its commitment. On the one hand, the MII would refuse to cut off its administrative and financial ties with the enterprises. On the other hand, the enterprises would still be willing to be protected by the government for the monopolistic benefits. Even though the door is half-open to international competition, the Ministry had developed other means to block the entry of foreign service providers. A new form of fragmented governance is taking shape since 2003 when the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was founded. It created tensions between the bureaucracies and might create loopholes for the foreign entry in the future.

We investigate the following important questions in international business: How do MNEs choose ownership strategies when facing strong uncertainty in foreign market entries? How are the choices affected by industry contingencies? Following the key tenets of real options theory, we propose that, under a high level of market uncertainty, MNEs choose more flexible (rather than more committed) ownership strategies that allow adjustment of investment decisions in future. We further suggest that using flexible strategies in response to uncertainty becomes less valuable for MNEs when the industry they enter in the host country enjoys strong sales growth potential, requires less irreversible investments, and has intense competition. Empirically, we analyze the ownership strategies (ownership structure and equity share) of over 5,000 new foreign investments in manufacturing industries in China during 2000- 2006. We find qualified support for our hypotheses and discuss the industry boundary conditions of adopting flexible ownership strategies in foreign market entries.

2010年中央经济工作会议明确“调结构、促销费、防通胀”的发展方针，在此背景下，碳银行业务发展将逐步成为商业银行发展的主线。本文就我国碳金融市场和碳银行经营管理等展开讨论，为经济结构调整过程中的我国商业银行开展碳银行业务经营管理提供智力支持。

香港股票市场上交易的股票主要分为香港本地股、国企股（即H股）和红筹股三个类别，虽然都在同一个市场上市交易，但是由于上市公司性质的不同导致这三类股票的市场特征具有很大的不同。本文研究的目的是为了比较香港本地股、国企股和红筹股之间流动性差别，并且从信息不对称角度探究形成流动性差别的原因。研究结果表明，国企股和红筹股的流动性显著高于香港本地股的流动性，主要是由于这两类中资企业股的信息不对称程度相较于香港本地股较低造成的，国企股和红筹股的逆向选择成本低于香港本地股，信息性交易概率也低于香港本地股。而且，研究发现逆向选择成本和信息性交易概率具有内在关联性，两者互成正比。另外，本文从知情交易者和非知情交易者的行为角度解释了香港本地股与中资企业股的流动性差别的深层次原因。最后，本文根据实证结果提出了相应的政策含义。

广义自回归条件异方差（GARCH）族模型已得到了极大的丰富和发展。然而，随之而来的一个问题是实际应用中究竟应选择怎样的异方差结构。本文从波动性预测的角度，以股权分置改革之后中国股票市场的指数数据为样本，对10类常见的GARCH类结构进行了实证研究。与现有研究不同的是，为了减少参数估计的效率损失对模型绩效评价的影响，研究中利用估计函数方法——一种效率较高的半参数方法进行参数估计。此外，还分别使用最小二乘方法和SPA检验法进行绩效评价，以期给出统计意义下的结果，并减少“数据窥察”（DataSnooping）问题。结果发现，与其它GARCH类结构相比，指数GARCH（EGARCH）和非对称幂GARCH（APARCH）模型能够更好地描述金融资产收益率的波动过程。

随着我国证券分析师行业的发展,分析师作为信息中介在资本市场上的作用日益凸显。论文运用OLS检验了在中国这一新兴市场中影响证券分析师跟进数量的决定因素,研究了公司规模、业务复杂度、投资风险、股权结构和投资者关系等特征是如何影响中国分析师做出是否跟进的决策的。在此基础上,论文进一步运用计数(Countdata)计量的Poisson方法对实证结果进行了稳健性检验,研究发现,分析师倾向于跟进那些规模较大、交易额较高、机构持股较多且投资者关系较好的公司,而规避那些投资风险较大、内部持股比例和业务复杂程度较高的公司。本文的结果与之前成熟市场中的研究结论基本一致,所存在的差异在一定程度上体现了新兴市场中分析师的行为特征,这对我们更好地理解分析师在新兴资本市场中的信息中介作用有着很大的价值。

中国权证市场已经成为世界上交易活跃、成交量最大的权证市场之一。但学术界对我国权证的定价及其属性缺少系统性分析。本文实证研究中国权证的价格和收益行为,旨在以标准的期权理论为基础分析我国权证定价的规律性以及探究其属性。鉴于我国股票市场禁止卖空,传统期权定价理论赖以生存的证券组合复制仅在一定程度上适用于认购权证定价,但对认沽权证定价无能为力。这就决定了我国权证尤其认沽权证在理论上无法定价的现状。本文通过分析沪深交易所上市交易的所有权证的收益、波动性和定价误差,论证了认购认沽权证具有部分普通股票的性质,例如他们都与股票指数有联动关系,并伴随着低杠杆比率,但是,认沽权证的表现更像是普通股票而非期权类衍生工具。本文的研究结论对于我国投资者和衍生产品市场监管者都有借鉴作用。

本文利用深圳证券交易所所有投资者账户信息和交易信息,基于财富水平,将个人投资者分为小个人组、中个人组和大个人组三类,在此基础上,研究分类个人投资者和机构投资者的交易行为。结果显示,小个人组的交易行为左右了个人总体的行为,而中个人组和大个人组的行为与机构极其相似;小个人组和个人总体在买入时,从短期来看采用反转策略,从长期来看采用动量策略,卖出时均采用反转策略;中个人组、大个人组和机构无论从长期还是短期来看,在买入时都采用反转策略,卖出时都采用动量策略。同时我们发现,小个人组趋于非理性,是风险偏好型投资者,具有损失厌恶心理,并且存在处置效应和周内效应;而中个人组、大个人组和机构投资者是风险厌恶型投资者。