本文从公司治理角度所作的研究表明，在内部治理机制亟待完善、外部审计约束相对乏力的情况下，集中持股、具有绝对信息优势的第一大股东不仅有动机也有能力粉饰甚至虚构财务报表，掩盖实际存在的问题，避开外部审计约束；而此时，其他大股东通过外部治理机制进行制衡时所面临的成本更低而成功的概率更大，因此很有可能不选择通过内部治理机制实施对第一大股东的制衡，而是更多的求助于外部治理机制，利用自身的信息优势与外部审计者合作，降低信息不对称性，配合注册会计师审计、发现控股股东的财务粉饰和造假行为，提高外部审计约束的有效性。

本文利用随机贴现因子的框架探讨了外汇风险溢酬与宏观经济波动的关系。本文的理论推导证明，外汇风险溢酬取决于两国的经济波动与两国经济波动的相关程度。本文的经验研究表明：当两国经济平稳，两国经济波动相关性很高时，外汇的风险溢酬将近似于零均值白噪声；而当经济危机爆发时，汇率风险溢酬将表现出巨大的波动。

Businesses often face the problem of providing incentives for agents to work effectively together on projects that develop over time. The agents' costly and unobservable effort jointly affects the survival of the project and thus the expected value of its cash now. A key feature of many contracting problems with multiple agents is that the agents exert effort at different times: some at the outset and some over time. The optimal timing of compensation reflects the timing of effort with payment for up-front effort preceding compensation for continuous effort. Deferring payment for agents exerting effort over time improves their incentives without impairing incentives for the up-front effort because this effort is sunk once the project is set up. The exact pattern of compensation between the agents with continuous effort depends on the relative severity of their moral hazard problems. In a special case where moral hazards are equally severe, the agents equally split the cash flow once it becomes available. This study suggests an approach to understanding a broad set of contracting problems in economics and finance. It rationalizes business conventions such as deferred compensation for top executives, the 50:50 split between law firm partners, and profit shares of influential directors (or lead actors) and residual claims of producers in the movie industry. Furthermore, the model predicts business failures such as the crisis in the mortgage industry due to the lack of characteristics suggested in the optimal contract.

Financing of and investing in R&D are prone to risks of appropriation by competitors, information asymmetry, and agency problems. Although legal protection of intellectual property (IP) rights at the national level is necessary to encourage investing in R&D, we show that the effective enforcement at the local level is also critical. We concentrate on the impact of IP rights enforcement at the provincial level on the financing of and investing in R&D, using a unique and rich sample of high technology firms. These firms are located in twenty-eight provinces/districts throughout China. The enforcement of IP rights differs at the provincial level, although the firms are under the same set of national and international laws. Controlling for provincial institutional factors such as economic development, banking system development, legal system performance, and local government corruption, we find that the enforcement of IP rights positively affects firms’ ability to acquire new external debt (including formal and informal financing) and external equity. The firms in provinces with better enforcement of IP rights invest more in R&D, generate more patents, and produce more sales from new products. We also find better enforcement of IP rights helps mitigate the problem of appropriation by local partners in foreign and ethnic joint ventures. Our evidence confirms that enforcement of IP rights matters even in China. Furthermore, our results support that the enforcement of IP rights affects the growth in the economy via the channels of financing of and investing in R&D.

本文基于2003年的评价样本，从中国上市公司治理指数( )及其所涉及的六个维度：控股股东行为指数、董事会治理指数、经理层治理指数、信息披露指数、利益相关者治理指数、监事会治理指数进行实证研究发现：上市公司治理指数对总资产收益率、每股净资产、加权每股收益、每股经营性现金流量、总资产周转率、总资产年度增长率、财务预警值均有显著的正面影响，这表明拥有良好的公司治理机制有助于提升企业的盈利能力、股本扩张能力、运营效率、成长能力，有助于增强财务弹性和财务安全性。公司治理中所涉及的控股股东治理、董事会治理、经理层治理、信息披露、利益相关者治理、监事会治理机制，在很大程度上决定了上市公司是否能够拥有一套科学的决策制定机制与决策执行机制，而这将对公司业绩和公司价值产生直接而且深远的影响。

本文基于国内外的相关研究，从公司治理的角度提出六个研究假设，然后构建回归模型研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的股权分置现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应”，具体探讨非流通股和流通股流动性、股权监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响。实证结果显示，非流通股股东（通常为控股股东）和流通股股东（通常为中小股东）之间的确存在严重的利益冲突。各类非流通股和流通股股东的持股比例、所持股份类型以及他们之间的监督制衡作用对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出六点建议试图限制非流通股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利。

鉴于公司的财务行为受到公司治理因素的影响，本文从公司治理的角度，基于国内外的相关研究提出六个研究假设，然后构建回归模型，依据1999-2003年中国上市公司数据进行假设检验，具体探讨前五大股东持股比例以及在此基础上大股东之间的监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响，研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的特殊现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应”，探索其中的影响机制和制衡机制。研究显示，前五大股东的持股比例、大股东控制力（或联合控制力）、大股东制衡度（或联合制衡度）对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出五点建议试图限制控股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利，保护中小股东的正当权益。

本文通过模拟交易员对冲衍生品空头的盈亏情况来研究模型风险以及它给衍生品定价和复制带来的影响。本文检验了在参数复制和传统的Delta复制两种复制策略下，其复制误差与模型选择、真实测度的漂移项和真实状态变量等的关系。本文还详细讨论了参数复制策略和Delta复制策略的优劣，以及模型风险对这两种复制策略的影响。

在预测未来波动率时，究竟是基于历史数据的时间序列模型还是基于期权价格的隐含波动率模型效率更高？本文对香港恒生指数期权市场所含信息的研究发现，在预测期限较短（一周）时，GARCH（1,1）模型所含信息较多，预测能力最强，但在预测较长期限（一个月）时，隐含波动率所含信息较多，预测能力较强。同时，期权市场交易越活跃，所反映的信息就越全面，隐含波动率的预测能力也就越强。

我国“九五”期间真实经济增长率是个富有争议的问题。大部分中国经济学家认为官方的数据比较准确地反映了那一时期经济运行的实际状况，有的经济学家甚至称之为中国经济增长“奇迹”，但也有少数国内外经济学家认为，“九五”期间我国名义经济增长率被高估了。本文采用官方公布的实物产量数据，从工业产品产量增长率、实物投资增长率和高能耗产品单产能耗是否下降这几个方面分析了是否存在中国经济增长“奇迹”。本文结论如下：一、“九五”期间我国工业产品产量增长率远远低于工业产值增长率，特别是1998年；二、实物投资增长率远远低于名义投资增长率；三、“九五”时期我国能源利用率几乎没有提高；四、实际上，不存在现有经济理论尚无法解释的经济增长“奇迹”，但是，这种“奇迹”的出现并非政府有关部门有意为之。