进入1990 年代以来，以短期利率为目标进行间接货币政策调控已经成为世 界各主要中央银行货币政策操作的普遍模式。本文首先以美国为例，说明公开市场操作与中 央银行利率操作的主要模式，并对我国十余年来，特别是2003 年以来，公开市场操作情况 进行概述，指出央票利率已初步具备了央行基准利率的特征。实证分析表明，央票利率与主 要货币市场利率具有长期协整关系，并且是货币市场利率的格兰杰原因，同时央票利率与产 出缺口和通胀缺口还具有显著的线性关系，说明我国可以通过引导利率进行间接货币政策调 控。最后，分析了我国当前公开市场操作和间接货币政策调控存在的问题，并提出了相应的 政策建议。

本文采用2006 年10 月以来的金融市场交易日数据，通过对Shibor 和同业 拆借利率、债券质押式回购利率的均值、方差均等性检验、VAR 模型及格兰杰因果检验、 脉冲响应函数和方差分解等实证分析表明，经过近三年的运行，Shibor 报价具有很高的真实 性、准确性和可靠性，在金融产品定价中的作用日益显著，其货币市场基准利率的作用已经 确立。目前，Shibor 的运行机制是良好的，对于实际运行中出现的各种问题，需要进一步加 强完善新股发行机制、健全Shibor 报价行激励约束机制等金融市场制度建设，将Shibor 培 育为一个成熟的货币市场基准利率体系和中国收益率曲线的短端基准。

In this paper, the relationship between firm performance’s combinations and differences as well as the timeliness of actual and scheduled third-quarter report disclosures is examined by regressing on data extracted from the semi-annual and the third-quarter reports of Chinese listed companies between 2003 and 2004. After controlling for the possible impact of semi-annual report disclosures, stock exchanges, firm size, ratios of tradable A-shares and B-shares, and so on, the results indicate that managers of listed companies may have the incentive to manipulate information in the actual and scheduled third-quarter report disclosures; the rule of “releasing good news earlier than bad news” is thus not strictly complied with. This paper further indicates that a firm’s performance, its combinations and differences, have a significant impact on the timeliness of disclosures of these two reports. I therefore suggest minimising the probability of information manipulation of listed companies, boosting investor relation management to safeguard the rights of small and medium shareholders, and enhancing the timeliness of information disclosures of Chinese listed companies.

本文主要考察公司业绩组合、公司业绩差异与季报披露的时间选择之间的关系以及季报披露时间的信息内涵。实证研究显示，上年年报和一季度季报均为“好消息”，一季度每股收益、净资产收益率和主营业务利润率高的上市公司季报披露时间间隔大；上年年报为“好消息”而一季度季报为“坏消息”，上年年报为“坏消息”而一季度季报为“好消息”，上年年报和一季度季报均为“坏消息”，一季度每股收益比上年度高的上市公司季报披露时间间隔小。这可能是由于一季度季报和上年年报均要求在4月30日之前披露的特殊性，上市公司管理层在信息披露的过程中可能存在组合动机与信息操作行为，一季度季报披露的时间选择可能关键取决于上年年报和一季度季报披露的“好消息”或“坏消息”带来的积极影响或消极影响的组合与权衡。

本文从公司治理角度所作的研究表明，在内部治理机制亟待完善、外部审计约束相对乏力的情况下，集中持股、具有绝对信息优势的第一大股东不仅有动机也有能力粉饰甚至虚构财务报表，掩盖实际存在的问题，避开外部审计约束；而此时，其他大股东通过外部治理机制进行制衡时所面临的成本更低而成功的概率更大，因此很有可能不选择通过内部治理机制实施对第一大股东的制衡，而是更多的求助于外部治理机制，利用自身的信息优势与外部审计者合作，降低信息不对称性，配合注册会计师审计、发现控股股东的财务粉饰和造假行为，提高外部审计约束的有效性。

本文利用随机贴现因子的框架探讨了外汇风险溢酬与宏观经济波动的关系。本文的理论推导证明，外汇风险溢酬取决于两国的经济波动与两国经济波动的相关程度。本文的经验研究表明：当两国经济平稳，两国经济波动相关性很高时，外汇的风险溢酬将近似于零均值白噪声；而当经济危机爆发时，汇率风险溢酬将表现出巨大的波动。

Businesses often face the problem of providing incentives for agents to work effectively together on projects that develop over time. The agents' costly and unobservable effort jointly affects the survival of the project and thus the expected value of its cash now. A key feature of many contracting problems with multiple agents is that the agents exert effort at different times: some at the outset and some over time. The optimal timing of compensation reflects the timing of effort with payment for up-front effort preceding compensation for continuous effort. Deferring payment for agents exerting effort over time improves their incentives without impairing incentives for the up-front effort because this effort is sunk once the project is set up. The exact pattern of compensation between the agents with continuous effort depends on the relative severity of their moral hazard problems. In a special case where moral hazards are equally severe, the agents equally split the cash flow once it becomes available. This study suggests an approach to understanding a broad set of contracting problems in economics and finance. It rationalizes business conventions such as deferred compensation for top executives, the 50:50 split between law firm partners, and profit shares of influential directors (or lead actors) and residual claims of producers in the movie industry. Furthermore, the model predicts business failures such as the crisis in the mortgage industry due to the lack of characteristics suggested in the optimal contract.

Financing of and investing in R&D are prone to risks of appropriation by competitors, information asymmetry, and agency problems. Although legal protection of intellectual property (IP) rights at the national level is necessary to encourage investing in R&D, we show that the effective enforcement at the local level is also critical. We concentrate on the impact of IP rights enforcement at the provincial level on the financing of and investing in R&D, using a unique and rich sample of high technology firms. These firms are located in twenty-eight provinces/districts throughout China. The enforcement of IP rights differs at the provincial level, although the firms are under the same set of national and international laws. Controlling for provincial institutional factors such as economic development, banking system development, legal system performance, and local government corruption, we find that the enforcement of IP rights positively affects firms’ ability to acquire new external debt (including formal and informal financing) and external equity. The firms in provinces with better enforcement of IP rights invest more in R&D, generate more patents, and produce more sales from new products. We also find better enforcement of IP rights helps mitigate the problem of appropriation by local partners in foreign and ethnic joint ventures. Our evidence confirms that enforcement of IP rights matters even in China. Furthermore, our results support that the enforcement of IP rights affects the growth in the economy via the channels of financing of and investing in R&D.

本文基于2003年的评价样本，从中国上市公司治理指数( )及其所涉及的六个维度：控股股东行为指数、董事会治理指数、经理层治理指数、信息披露指数、利益相关者治理指数、监事会治理指数进行实证研究发现：上市公司治理指数对总资产收益率、每股净资产、加权每股收益、每股经营性现金流量、总资产周转率、总资产年度增长率、财务预警值均有显著的正面影响，这表明拥有良好的公司治理机制有助于提升企业的盈利能力、股本扩张能力、运营效率、成长能力，有助于增强财务弹性和财务安全性。公司治理中所涉及的控股股东治理、董事会治理、经理层治理、信息披露、利益相关者治理、监事会治理机制，在很大程度上决定了上市公司是否能够拥有一套科学的决策制定机制与决策执行机制，而这将对公司业绩和公司价值产生直接而且深远的影响。

本文基于国内外的相关研究，从公司治理的角度提出六个研究假设，然后构建回归模型研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的股权分置现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应”，具体探讨非流通股和流通股流动性、股权监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响。实证结果显示，非流通股股东（通常为控股股东）和流通股股东（通常为中小股东）之间的确存在严重的利益冲突。各类非流通股和流通股股东的持股比例、所持股份类型以及他们之间的监督制衡作用对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出六点建议试图限制非流通股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利。