本文研究了宏观调控对房地产上市公司资本结构的影响及其资本结构调整方式的变化。研究发现，宏观调控之后，房地产上市公司总负债率显著提高;借款的期限发生了显著变化，长期借款显著增加而短期借款显著减少，但总的有息负债没有发生显著变化;房地产上市公司的贸易应付款显著增加，这是资产负债率显著提高的主要原因。对房地产上市公司宏观调控前后融资方式变化的研究发现，随着宏观调控带来的银行信贷政策的趋紧，房地产企业融资方式出现了多元化，新的融资工具得以出现和发展，金融市场的完全性提高。研究表明，在金融市场不完全和管制环境下，资本结构并不完全是企业自主决策的结果。宏观政策和资本市场供给条件，可能是中国企业资本结构是最重要的影响因素。

根据"法与金融"理论，严格的投资者保护制度有助于降低公司的权益资本成本， 本文以赴中国香港跨地上市后返回中国大陆发行A 股的公司为研究对象，检验其是否因受制于更为严格的投资者保护制度而具有较低的权益资本成本。研究结果表明，在A 股市场仁，赴港跨地上市公司比其他公司的权益资本成本更低，跨地上市对权益资本成本具有降低作用，且这种降低作用与香港较为严格的投资者保护制度有关。

本文以一项关于中国上市公司财务行为的问卷调查和相关公开市场数据为基础，对问卷调查样本公司的融资行为特征进行了研究。在此基础上，我们结合中国资本市场特殊的制度因素，对样本公司融资行为与公司财务理论描述的差异做出了一定的分析与讨论。由于问卷调查能够直接考察公司决策者在实际融资决策时的考虑因素和动机，属于"事前直接证据从而区别于基于公开市场数据的实证研究所提供的"事后间接证据能够从不同角度检验理论的解释能力，具有重要的理论和实践价值。研究结果表明，样本公司的融资行为在一些方面符合现有公司财务理论的描述，但也存在很多不一致之处。本研究的意义在于:第一，以"事前直接证据"的方式对上市公司融资行为进行的研究，揭示了在中国特殊的制度环境中上市公司融资行为的动机和影响因素，其中一些动机和影响因素存在着不同于成熟市场经济国家上市公司的特殊性;第二，指出了现有主要以美国制度为背景发展起来的公司财务理论对融资行为的一些经典解释，可能不适用于中国上市公司，对中国上市公司融资行为的解释需要考虑中国特殊的制度因素;第三，为公司财务理论的进一步发展和如何改进中国资本市场监管提供了一些有益的经验证据。

以我国的股权分置为原型，本文抽象出流通权分割结构是否影响公司价值的问题。以MM定理I的假设为基础，运用投资组合复制法论证了企业价值与流通权分割结构无关。本文同时研究扩充了MM定理II。同时认为，资产定价的流动性效应和本文的研究结论本质上是一致的，并应用这一最新的理论框架分析了我国的股份分置及改革问题。进一步讲，本文提出的公司价值四维模型很好地回答了股权分置对股市定价问题的影响机理。

本文以沪深全部上市公司1990 -2004的IPO面饭数据，运用多元回归的方法，研究市场时机行为中I资本结构的影响及其持续性。研究发现，我国股市明显存在市场时机选择行为，并且对上市公司的资本主市构影响显著;公司的历史估值和杠杆水平之间具有显著的负相关性，历史估值得上升一个单位，将引起账面杠杆和市值扪柯:分别下降4.87和2.9个单位;进一步研究表明，中国上市公司市场时机对资本结构的影响咱可以持续5-8年。

In recent times, the prices of internationally-traded commodities have reached record highs and are expected to continue growing in the foreseeable future. This phenomenon is partially driven by strong demand from a small number of emerging economies, such as China and India. This paper places the recent commodity price boom in historical context, drawing on an investigation of the long-term time-series properties, and presents unique features for 33 individual commodity prices. Using a new methodology for examining cross-sectional variation of commodity returns and its components, we find strong evidence that the prices of world primary commodities are extremely volatile. In addition, prices are roughly 30 percent more volatile under floating than under fixed exchange rate regimes. Finally, using the capital asset pricing model as a loose framework, we find that global macroeconomic risk components have become relatively more important in explaining commodity price volatility.

This paper explores whether the pricing of the option-type derivative is affected by some of fundamental characteristics, such as size and liquidity of the derivative itself and the underlying asset, which are not involved in the standard pricing theory. Considering the unique status of warrants in China due to the relatively more flexible trading mechanism, I empirically examine the pricing of Chinese covered warrants to develop this study. Empirical results show that market prices of Chinese warrants are significantly higher than theoretical prices predicted by traditional pricing models such as Black-Scholes, Jump-Diffusion, and CEV model. For call warrants, about 25 percent of the market price can not be explained by pricing models, and this figure rises to over 60 percent for put warrants. Further regression tests show that both size and liquidity of warrants and underlying stocks significantly affect warrant pricing errors. The way in which the size and liquidity affect the pricing error depends on the type of warrants. In addition, it is evident that movements of put warrant prices in China do not follow movements of stock prices. To explain the above pricing puzzles,the concept of functional asset pricing is proposed. According to this concept, these pricing puzzles just reflect the existence of functional value of financial instruments that has long been neglected by traditional pricing models. In fact, Due to the high level of liquidity and popularity, the Chinese warrant may well function as a good tool for obtaining short-term profits. The pricing of Chinese warrants by the market may correctly re°ect the value of this function, and thus is rational in essence.

This paper assesses the impact of the recent financial reforms in China. Following the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization, financial liberalisation has picked up considerable momentum. Measures introduced encompass deregulation in the banking sector and refinements in various financial markets, as well as allowing more freedom for Chinese and foreign investors to participate and interact domestically and overseas. Compared to other studies on financial liberalisation, this study focuses on a relatively narrower aspect of financial reforms namely, the impact on stock market liquidity. Using a panel data set drawn from the Shanghai stock market, we find a positive and significant liquidity impact associated with the recent round of measures, which reflects not only an improvement in capital allocation efficiency in China’s equity market but, from a financial stability point of view, also a reduction in its vulnerability. The finding also provides evidence on one of the important channels in which financial liberalisation can be transformed into economic growth over time.

The study aims to analyze the role of institutional investors in mediating the interest conflicts between blockholders and minority shareholders in emerging markets. China’s Non-tradable Share Reform provides us a perfect research environment. Before the reform, the ownership of Chinese public firms was concentrated in one or several blockholders. This part of block shares was non-tradable, and tradable shares were held by minority shareholders and institutional investors like mutual funds. Chinese government launched Non-tradable Share Reform in 2005, giving non-tradable shares liquidity rights. At the same time, non-tradable share owners had to compensate tradable share owners, such as offering a certain percentage of shares to them. The compensation schemes were advanced by non-tradable share owners and must be supported by two-thirds of votes cast by tradable share owners. Our study finds that institutional investors did actively participate in voting, but their number and holdings were reversely related with the compensation level. Our results suggest that institutional investors played shareholder activism in this reform, but their activism served for blockholder’s interests rather than minority shareholders’.

We examine changes in market values and accounting returns for a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms around announcements of block-share transfers among government agencies (“State Bureaucrats”), market-oriented State-owned enterprises (“MOSOEs”) and private investors (“Private Entities”). We provide evidence that transfers from State Bureaucrats to Private Entities result in larger increases in market value and accounting returns than transfers to MOSOEs. We also find that CEO turnover occurs more quickly when shares are transferred to Private Entities. Moreover, we find that the changes in firm value and accounting returns as well as the likelihood of CEO turnover are all functions of the incentives and managerial expertise of the new block holder. We conclude that corporate governance can be improved at State-controlled firms by improving the incentives and managerial expertise of controlling block holders, and that this is better accomplished by transferring ownership to private investors rather than by shuffling ownership among State controlled entities.