We extend the ex-ante mean-variance (SVIX) asset pricing models of Martin (2017) and Martin-Wagner (2019) to a mean-variance-asymmetry (AVIX) framework by incorporating higher-moment and co-moment risk in asset pricing. Our proposed AVIX model is risk-neutral with left-tail asymmetries in returns to correct the SVIX approach's downside bias. We derive an option implied market beta of a stock as the weighted average of the betas of SVIX and AVIX. Empirically, the implied beta has significant predictability of risk/return relationship We develop an investible portfolio (MKT*) that mimics realized outcomes on the implied market index adjusted for volatility asymmetry.

We propose a new investor sentiment index by estimating the differences in variance,skewness, and kurtosis from realized stock returns and option implied moments. We show that our index cannot be explained by risk factors such as market risk, firm size, value, or profitability. Furthermore, we present evidence that this correlation can be exploited for momentum strategies, which perform significantly better during high-stimulation periods. In fact, our methodology can be extended to a daily sentiment measure and stock-specific sentiment indices.

防范化解金融风险是金融工作的永恒主题。为维护金融稳定，国务院金融稳定发展委员会鼓励长期机构投资者增加持股比例。如何认识机构投资者长期持股对金融稳定的影响及其机制呢？基于此，本文以2012-2018年所有的股票型基金和混合型基金披露的每半年度股票资产组合为研究对象，考察机构投资者长期持股特征及其作用机制。研究发现：（1）机构投资者长期持股具有较低的业绩敏感性、较低的股价同步性且与未来盈余正相关。（2）在股市异常波动期间的下跌阶段，投资者持股期限与股票价格下跌成反比，即机构投资者持股时间越长（换手率越小），越能缓解股票价格的下跌。这说明机构投资者长期持股能够显著地稳定金融市场。而在反弹阶段，机构投资者持股期限与股票价格反弹成正比，机构投资者持股时间越长（换手率越小），越能促使股票价格的反弹，进而促进公司价值回归。（3）机构投资者长期持股稳定金融的机制在于有效地缓解了市场抛售压力。进一步研究发现，机构投资者长期持股能够降低金融市场波动；具有丰富投资经验的基金经理，有助于机构投资者采取长期持股行为，这对促进机构投资者长期持股具有一定的政策意义。

Using the Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021) algorithm, we identify a broad swath of marketable retail investor orders in the U.S. market during the pandemic. The marketable retail trading volumes rapidly rise from $325 billion in 2019 to $852 billion at mid-2020, and stay high for the next two years. The retail order flows positively predict cross-sectional returns over various horizons, and are associated with wider future effective spreads and higher future volatilities, as well as less market participations by high frequency traders and short-sellers. We find supportive evidence for informed and uninformed retail hypotheses.

We provide an easy method to identify purchases and sales initiated by retail investors using recent, widely available U.S. equity transactions data. Individual stocks with net buying by retail investors outperform stocks with negative imbalances by approximately 10 basis points over the following week. Less than half of the predictive power of marketable retail order imbalances is attributable to order flow persistence; contrarian trading (a proxy for liquidity provision) and public news sentiment explain little of the remaining predictability. There is suggestive (but only suggestive) evidence that retail marketable orders contain firm-level information that is not yet incorporated into prices.

Using multiple short sale measures, we examine the predictive power of short sales for future stock returns in 38 countries from July 2006 to December 2014. We find that the days-to-cover ratio and the utilization ratio measures have the most robust predictive power for future stock returns in the global capital market. Our results display significant cross-country and cross-firm differences in the predictive power of alternative short sale measures. The predictive power of shorts is stronger in countries with non-prohibitive short sale regulations and for stocks with relatively low liquidity, high shorting fees, and low price efficiency.

CEO与企业管理团队的非正式联结关系有助于强化团结协作，但亦可能催生监督妥协与缺位，弱化公司治理效率。本文以CEO任职以来董事高管人事变更的累积比率刻画CEO内部联盟，从企业金融化视角探讨该非正式联结关系在公司治理中扮演的角色及其内在机理。选取中国沪深A股2012-2021年上市公司为样本，本文研究发现：CEO内部联盟提高了企业配置金融资产的可能性，并显著加剧了企业“脱实向虚”程度，内部联盟强度每增加1个标准差，企业金融化程度约提高了6.37%。通过机制检验发现，CEO内部联盟弱化了董事会监督职能和内部控制有效性，CEO的绩效薪酬敏感性更低，且主要表现为绩效下滑时的薪酬粘性增加。异质性检验还发现，当产品市场竞争程度越强、企业跨行业套利空间越大、CEO薪酬更低以及外部薪酬差距更大时，CEO内部联盟对企业金融化的影响会更为明显。此外，当融资约束更弱时，企业金融化冲动受到CEO内部联盟的影响会更强。本文的研究表明，CEO内部联盟对公司治理的影响更多表现为监督妥协与缺位，会加剧企业金融套利的短视行为，这对于优化公司治理体系和防范企业“脱实向虚”都具有重要启示作用。

现有对导致公司过度投资的管理者代理与过度自信行为都是分开研究。本文在“现金流-成长 机会”框架下，通过直接度量管理者代理行为及管理者过度自信行为，对导致公司过度投资的理性与非理 性两类范式进行了区分检验，并进一步考察了产品市场竞争对管理者代理及过度自信引致过度投资的效果。 结果表明，我国企业过度投资问题，部分是由管理者滥用企业资源的行为所致，部分是由管理者过度自信 行为所致。产品市场竞争能够有效抑制两类行为导致的过度投资，且产品市场竞争通过抑制管理者代理行 为导致的过度投资的间接效应更显著。本研究为过度投资的管理者两类行为解释范式提供了新的证据；这 为今后公司投资效率提高、公司治理机制完善提供了新的参考。

Using a director-level dataset of board proposal voting by independent directors of public companies, we analyze the effects of career concerns and current reputation stock on independent directors in their voting behavior. Younger directors and directors in their second (and last) terms, who have stronger career concerns, are more likely to be aligned with investors rather than the managers. Their dissenting behavior is eventually rewarded in the market place in the form of more outside career opportunities. Directors with higher reputation stocks (measured by positive news media mentioning and the number of directorships) are also more likely to dissent. Finally, we find that career concerns are significantly stronger among directors who already enjoy higher reputation.

I show that issuing credit cards helps the bank compete for retail deposits in China. When credit card growth increases by 1%, retail deposit growth is expected to rise by 0.2% with regard to peers next year. This effect is stronger for small joint-stock banks compared with big state-owned banks. This is realized by introducing new credit card holders to visit the branch and open a savings account. DID test shows that after a shock that tightened new account opening, banks with higher credit card growth experienced a harsher decline in retail deposit growth. This paper highlights the customer introducing benefit of credit card promotion, which can provide an alternative explanation for the intensified competition in the credit card market in China. It also unveils the strategy that small banks can use to compete for the deposits of big state-owned banks, who intrinsically has more branches and retail customers.