This paper investigates the free cash flow productivity of SOEs compared with non-SOEs and examines its possible determinants. We find that SOEs have slightly weak free cash flow productivity but significantly stronger than non-SOEs. Similar performance exists among commercial class I and II SOEs and public-benefit SOEs. Further analyses suggest that firm size, age, sales growth, ownership concentration, government subsidies, and industry monopoly factors cannot explain this phenomenon. The common driver for all types of SOEs to generate stronger free cash flows than nonSOEs is their stronger expense control capability.

This paper researches into development of China’s shadow banking during 2020-2022, a special period marked by COVID-19 and strengthened global regulation on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation (NBFI). Research focus includes balance sheet evolvement, growth dynamics, and relation with macro-finance. Its business model surprisingly resembles western peers. They both fund underserved sectors and have similar exposure to balance sheet mismatch. Massive holding of bond investment (36.6% of total asset) is funded by uninsured interbank fund and wealth management product, which makes it more closely related with banks’ balance sheet and risk contagion from NBFI to traditional commercial banks more easily. This paper then re-summarizes growth dynamics of China’s shadow banking in a “Pull-Push” framework, and proposes concept of reintermediation in respective to disintermediation. Consecutive regulation on NBFI and real estate sector kept dragging on growth of shadow banking, and rendered it in liquidity surplus, which is invested into interbank market. This paper also provides empirical evidence on relation of China’s shadow banking with macro-finance, and notes several empirical breakdowns of pre- COVID relations among economic and financial indicators. Most important breakdown is the non-functionality of monetary policy transmission channel. Besides, it continued to twist de facto financial regulatory indicators, however with fading impact.

Research has argued that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should bear more social responsibility than other listed firms, because their own goals include maintaining social stability and promoting social welfare. In contrast with the privatization of SOEs observed in other countries, in China, some listed firms’ major shareholders have become SOEs in recent years. This transition offers a good opportunity to investigate the impact of ownership change on firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using the propensity score matching difference-in-differences method, we document that the CSR performance of these firms does not improve when their ownership structure changes, and it can even worsen. Our results remain robust to a series of tests. Further investigating the underlying economic mechanism, we uncover those political connections, bank financing, and government subsidies play critical roles in determining the negative effect of ownership structure change on public firms, which is consistent with the soft budget constraint framework. In an additional analysis, we find that CSR performance is poor for manufacturing industry firms after ownership structure change. After calculating the frequency of keywords appearing in the annual reports of such firms, we find them to be satisfied with their new SOE background after ownership structure change. Our paper provides a possible explanation for the phenomenon of SOEs becoming major shareholder of listed firms.

We track the fundamental informed traders' (FITs) behavior and show the fundamental momentum effect in the Chinese stock market. We train the deep learning model with a set of fundamental characteristics to extract fundamental implied component from realized returns. The fundamental part characterizes the price movement driven by FITs. Fundamental momentum differentiates from the fundamental trend and is not quality minus junk (QMJ) factor. Underreaction bias helps explain the strategy, as it generates stronger profit during periods of low investor sentiment and aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. Fundamental momentum is not sensitive to changing beta and robust in subsamples and machine learning models.

We examine the effects of China's 2009–2010 stimulus package for innovation differentials between state-owned firms (SOEs) and privately-owned firms (POEs). Using a unique dataset of Chinese manufacturing firms, we find that in the pre-stimulus period SOEs patent at a lower rate than POEs in the least inventive patent category, and at a comparable rate in the more inventive categories. Post-stimulus, SOEs patent at an even lower rate relative to POEs in the least inventive category, but significant, positive SOE-POE patent rate differentials emerge in more inventive patent categories. The stimulus disproportionately benefited SOEs with higher investment subsidies and lower finance costs—institutional support which we find mediates roughly 45 percent of all positive effects of state-ownership for innovation. Institutional support produces larger SOE-POE innovation differentials among firms in strategic sectors and located in high-marketization provinces, and for centrally controlled SOEs.

This paper employs a new empirical approach to estimate the impact of subsidies on growth and productivity. Our key innovation is to use local political leader geographic rotation as a source of exogenous variation. By using Chinese Industrial Census data from 1999 to 2013, we find that more subsidies have a positive effect on growth but not on productivity. Further firm-level results suggest that the size expansion of firms to win subsidies might be the mechanism, a new spillover channel, in explaining our main finding.

We examine the impact of political connections on the investment decisions of Chinese mutual funds. We identify a direct link between mutual funds’ political connections and stocks held from the same political network using hand-collected information on the professional backgrounds of Chinese mutual fund managers and fund management company (FMC) shareholders. While mutual funds tend to allocate more investments to stocks based on their political connections, this effect alleviates somewhat after the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. Our findings suggest that anti-corruption campaigns can help to reduce the political effects of government-related agencies on fund holdings and contribute to better market fairness.

This paper comprehensively examines how subjective well-being (SWB) is influenced by various aspects of housing — tenure, living conditions, and housing values — based on an individual panel from the China Household Finance Survey. We employ a two-way fixed effects model to reduce the endogeneity problems of housing choices. Our findings suggest that housing plays a comparable role to income and wealth in SWB and that housing inequality and living experience both matter a great deal. Moreover, the positive impacts of home ownership on SWB reported by prior research are likely quality of life effects masked in home ownership. Results are robust to ordered logistic estimation with individual fixed effects. What we document carries important implications for housing policies, and these are generalizable to other countries.

Family responsibility is a fundamental social concept that has a profound and long-lasting impact on people’s behavior, especially in China. Using the Chinese premarital check-up rate of the CEO’s birthplace as a proxy variable for the CEO’s sense of family responsibility, we examine its impact on firm environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Our results show that the CEO’s sense of family responsibility can significantly improve firm ESG performance. We identify three possible channels behind this effect: curbing corporate violations, promoting green transformation and increasing charitable investments. Further analysis shows that the effect is more pronounced for firms with a strong Confucian cultural atmosphere. However, the promotion effect becomes weaker when the CEO has overseas experience. Moreover, the improvement in ESG performance driven by family responsibility may help firms to increase total factor productivity. Overall, our study provides evidence on the impact of CEO’s family responsibility, an informal institution, on firm ESG performance.

Mainland China traditionally maintained the one-share-one-vote (OSOV) principle. Since 2019, however, Chinese authorities have introduced rules supporting the dual-class equity structure (DCES) for “innovative enterprises.” Due to concerns about investor-protection issues, China’s DCES currently operates as a “stringent permit system,” and as of the end of June 2023, only eight corporations have achieved listings with DCES adopted. This article provides a broad and profound policy analysis of the Chinese DCES system, including empirical analyses on the eight existing DCES cases. Also, this article explores the legal and economic aspects of investor-protection issues with respect to the China’s DCES. Regarding DCES rules in the context of investor protection, this article examines “three sets of investor safeguard measures”: (1) “three numerically speciffed rules” (this article calls the three rules the “10% equity rule,” the “10-time voting-right rule,” and the “2/3 voting-right rule”); (2) “sunset provisions” (such as event-driven sunset and time-based sunset); and (3) “rules converting special-voting shares (shares with higher voting rights) into shares with one vote” (such as conversion in mergers and a conversion in an amendment of the charter). Due to the concerns about the prevailing practice of tunneling in China, this article argues in favor of the “DCES with enhanced investor protection.” To foment founders’ entrepreneurship and allow more corporations with the DCES, however, this article recommends that the Chinese authorities gradually relax the implementation of the current DCES system of de facto stringent permit system. The future relaxation of the stringent permit system will also be beneffcial for China because, as a result of the escalated tension with the U.S., China has already lost a substantial portion of its reliable DCES-IPO markets in the U.S. Also, DCES-IPO markets in Hong Kong is still inactive. Thus, the establishment of viable DCES-IPO markets will soon be necessary in Mainland China.