This paper examines whether sell-side analysts struggle to cope with macroeconomic uncertainty. We find that analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts when facing higher economic policy uncertainty, which conflicts with the conclusions in the US. We provide a novel explanation for this finding and exclude the view that forecast accuracy improvement comes from analysts’ efforts to actively collect private information through site visits. Further evidence supports that heuristic cognitive bias and emotional framing effect hold back analysts’ tendency to optimism in China, resulting in higher forecast accuracy. As to why Chinese analysts do not work harder but issue more accurate forecasts, we suggest that it is mainly due to the different market regimes faced by analysts in the two countries. Our study sheds light on how macroeconomic uncertainty affects analysts’ unethical behavior and explains the cognitive processes involved.

This study is the first to examine China’s crude oil options market. Using high-frequency data and three different price discovery measures, we conduct a rigorous analysis and find that after its first 8 months of operation, China’s crude oil options market has already played an important role in price discovery. Factors such as volume, volatility, and speculation can impact its price discovery ability. We also find a unique phenomenon in China’s crude oil derivatives market, namely that speculative activity mainly occurs in the futures market and adds to the price discovery of the futures market rather than to the options

How to shape a firm’s stock price resilience in the increasingly uncertain environment has become an important topic. This paper investigates the effect of important market participantsfinancial analysts-on stock price resilience. Based on data from 3,444 listed firms from China, we find that firms with higher analyst coverage are more resilient during the Covid-19 induced crisis, which is manifested by a lower pandemic-induced decline in stock price, shorter duration of decline period, higher recovery probability, and shorter duration of the recovery period after the shock. This positive relationship is more prominent for small firms but does not depend on ownership type, and the ratio of star analyst coverage. Further channel tests show that analysts could help in attracting attention from media and institutional investors, improving corporate governance, and reducing financial constraints, which in turn enhance the ability of stock prices to absorb pandemic shocks.

Access to state-controlled resources can be a major source of firm-level competitive advantage. However, we know little regarding which firms are most likely positioned to capture the state and access resources beyond what their rule-complying merits command. This is partially due to the challenge in identifying irregular state funding that violates official resource-allocation rules. We study a leading innovation grant program in China, and we leverage unique access to the focal grant agency’s administrative data to trace its grant allocation process. We observe occurrences of rule-violating funding and show that firms vary in capability to influence the agency’s funding decision, depending on geographic proximity, as well as other institutional variables. The observed irregular awards are most likely associated with crony capitalism rather than bureaucratic heroism.

Using unique survey data from the China Household Finance Survey, we estimate the extent of “narrow framing”, which is a widely documented behavioral bias, among Chinese households, using their portfolio choices. Conditional on stock market participation, we find that most Chinese households exhibit significant narrow framing. Based on the obtained estimates, we show that narrow framing positively predicts the extent of under diversification. Most importantly, we argue that narrow framing is an irreplaceable of understanding households’ portfolio choices, even after considering measurement error and a wide set of indicators of diversification

Using the Targeted Poverty Alleviation (TPA) disclosure policy in China as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper analyzes the impact of firm TPA disclosure on analyst forecast accuracy using a staggered difference-in-differences model. The results show a significant increase in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts after firm disclosure of TPA information, and this effect is more pronounced in firms with more greater information asymmetry and firms with less experienced analyst following. Our study provides theoretical and empirical evidence for regulators concerned with information environment of capital market.

The widespread replacement of gross receipt tax (GRT) with value-added tax (VAT) is an important phenomenon in the past half-century. Theory predicts that such tax reforms reduce vertical integration, increase production efficiency, and improve industrial structure. We exploit the tax reform that replaced GRT with VAT for service industries in China and find empirical evidence consistent with theoretical predictions. First, the tax reform increases the probability and intensity of outsourcing for both manufacturing and service firms. The increase is larger for industries more heavily reliant on treated intermediate industries for production and for firms with higher capital–labor intensity. Second, the reform increases total factor productivity and labor productivity. Third, the reform affects industry structure by boosting sales and promoting the employment of treated service industries.

Previous research finds that the greater geographic mobility of foreign than native-born workers following economic shocks helps to facilitate local labor market adjustment to shifting regional economic conditions. We examine the role that immigration may have played in enabling U.S. commuting zones to respond to manufacturing job loss caused by import competition from China. Although population headcounts of the foreign-born fell by more than those of the native-born in regions exposed to the China trade shock, the overall contribution of immigration to labor market adjustment in this episode was small. Because most U.S. immigrants arrived in the country after manufacturing regions were already mature, few took up jobs in industries that would later see increased import penetration from China. The foreign-born share of the working-age population in regions with high trade exposure was only three-fifths that in regions with low exposure. Immigration thus appears more likely to aid adjustment to cyclical shocks, in which job loss occurs in regions that had recent booms in hiring, rather than facilitating adjustment to secular regional decline, in which hiring booms occurred in the more distant past.

We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals treatments when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, experimentally adding “likes” and “shares” to social media appeals increases regulatory effort, suggesting visibility as an important mechanism. Third, treatment pollution reductions are not offset by control firm increases, based on randomly varying the proportion of treatment firms at the prefecture-level.

This paper provides new estimates of the housing stock, construction rates and price developments by city tier in China in order to understand where excess supply might be concentrated, and the implications of any significant contraction. We also update estimates of the size of China’s rapidly evolving real estate sector through 2021, allowing one to look at the initial impact of COVID-19, as well as extending the analysis to incorporate urban-expansion related infrastructure construction. We argue that China overall faces imbalances between supply and demand for housing stock, but the problem is significantly deeper in the generally smaller and lower income tier 3 cities, which nevertheless account for more than 60% of both China’s GDP and its housing stock.