We examine the roles of bank ownership and CEO political faction membership in facilitating or hindering the implementation of central bank policy in China. Specifically, we examine the response of China’s commercial banks to People’s Bank of China (PBC) guidelines intended to decrease mortgage lending and to slow down the rise in residential property prices. We find that both bank ownership and faction membership matter. Central government-owned banks whose CEOs are members of the specialist finance faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) respond most strongly to PBC guidance, whereas provincial or city government-owned banks whose CEOs are members of a generalist faction respond least strongly. The implementation of PBC policy has real effects: in those cities where central government-owned banks with specialist CEOs constitute a larger percentage of total bank branches, house prices grew more slowly, as did the number of residential real estate transactions and the number of new listings. Where in contrast provincial and city government-owned banks with generalist CEOs dominate, the number of transactions grew faster; the rate of house price appreciation and the number of listings were however unaffected. We conclude that China’s different levels of government and the CCP’s different factions enjoy some discretion in responding to PBC guidance and that they exploit the discretion they are afforded to vary the strength of their response.

This paper explores the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and timeliness of goodwill impairment. Goodwill is the premium that is paid when a business is acquired. If the value of the business declines, goodwill impairment occurs. Deliberately delaying goodwill impairment (timeliness) is a widespread ethical issue. Based on all the mergers of Chinese listed companies during 2010–2019, we study the motivation of corporate charitable donations when facing the risk of goodwill impairment. Our results suggest that long-term (consistent) charitable donations reflect more altruist social responsibility than short-term (suddenly increased) donations. In particular, firms that make more long-term donations tend to report goodwill impairment timely, while firms making excessive short-term donations are more likely to delay goodwill impairment. Furthermore, we find that short-term donation is motivated not only to cover up the goodwill impairment delay, but also to provide insurance-like protection when delayed impairment is announced. Our results also suggest that moral licensing plays a role in inducing such opportunistic behaviors. To address the endogeneity problem, we use the number of provincial charitable funds and the number of provincial deaths due to natural disasters as instrumental variables for short-term excessive donations.

We study the potential negative externalities of mandatory environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Our analysis exploits a unique regulatory change in China that requires a subset of firms to report their contributions to poverty alleviation—on top of reporting general ESG issues—using a difference-in-differences design. We find that treated firms significantly increase their anti-poverty spending, but also increase their pollution, after the regulatory change came into force. The negative environmental externality is more concentrated in firms that are more financially constrained, as well as firms that are facing fiercer market competition. We further show that this effect is driven by a firm’s incentive to strategically cater to politicians’ agenda in order to obtain preferential treatment. These findings suggest that mandating ESG disclosure in selected areas may induce firms to trade off different ESG goals by prioritizing more conspicuous ESG issues at the cost of trivializing other, longer-term, issues.

Using both the onset of the US-China trade war in 2018 and the most recent Russia-Ukraine conflict and associated trade tensions, we show that government-linked firms increase their importing activity by roughly 33% (t=4.01) following the shock, while non-government linked firms trading to the same countries do the opposite, decreasing activity. These increases appear targeted, in that we see no increase for government-linked supplier firms generally to other countries (even countries in the same regions) at the same time, nor of these same firms in these regions at other times of no tension. In terms of mechanism, government supplier-linked firms are nearly twice as likely to receive tariff exemptions as equivalent firms doing trade in the region who are not also government suppliers. More broadly, these effects are increasing in level of government connection. For example, firms that are geographically closer to the agencies to which they supply increase their imports more acutely. Using micro-level data, we find that government supplying firms that recruit more employees with past government work experience also increase their importing activity more – particularly when the past employee worked in a contracting role. Lastly, we find evidence that this results in sizable accrued benefits in terms of firm-level profitability, market share gains, and outsized stock returns.

We decompose the difference between a firm’s market and book values into two components: intangible assets that can be created by competing firms through SG&A/R&D expenditures, and the residual denoted as franchise value (FV). The estimated parameters in the model for creating intangible assets by capitalizing R&D/SG&A expenditures vary significantly across industries. Consistent with FV being a measure of economic rents and quasi-rents, ceteris paribus, higher FV firms face fewer product market threats, have higher markups, and their investments are less sensitive to their total Tobin’s Q. In contrast, firms with higher capitalized intangible assets, face higher product market threats.

Using a unique list of 528 fake state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exposed in China, we examine whether and how investors react to the government’s property rights protection actions. Our results show that real SOEs with more subsidiaries, pyramid layers, and popularity are more likely to be targeted by wrongdoers. We find that when fake SOEs were exposed, it caused a significant increase in the stock prices of listed central SOEs controlled by the State Council. Further analysis shows that the stock price rise is driven by both the cash flow and risk effects. We also find that the value impact of the crackdown is more pronounced for listed central SOEs with less media coverage, located in weaker legal protection regions, and facing more competition. Overall, our findings provide empirical support for the effectiveness of exposure, as a non-litigation channel of property rights protection, in enhancing firm value.

We have developed two novel salience factors — PMOR and PMOV based on the stock’s salient return and salient trading volume (as proposed by Cosemans and Frehen, 2021, and Sun et al., 2023). Notably, these factors cannot be accounted for by existing factor models in China. When we integrate the salience trading volume factor — PMOV into Liu et al. (2019)’s Chinese three-factor model, the resulting four-factor model outperforms other models including the Chinese four-factor model in explaining 33 significant anomalies in China.

Deep learning technology is rapidly adopted in financial market settings. Using a large data set from the Chinese stock market, we propose a return-risk trade-off strategy via a new transformer model. The empirical findings show that these updates, such as the self-attention mechanism in technology, can improve the use of time-series information related to returns and volatility, increase predictability, and capture more economic gains than other nonlinear models, such as LSTM. Our model employs Shapley additive explanations (SHAP) to measure the “economic feature importance” and tabulates the different important features in the prediction process. Finally, we document several economic explanations for the TF model. This paper sheds light on the burgeoning field on asset allocation in the age of big data.

Using land transaction data in China, we investigate whether and how political connections penetrate through headquarter-subsidiary relationships. The results show that even though the headquarters of politically connected listed firms pay comparable land prices as other firms, their subsidiaries pay 12.1-13.2% less. The price discount, driven by corruption, is exacerbated when the land is for commercial or residential use and is disposed of through informationally opaque supply methods. The anti-corruption campaign has successfully mitigated such price distortions. Our findings also show that better legal protection and private sector development are crucial for fair markets.

This paper examines the effect of political favoritism on economic inequality in the short run and political polarization in the long run. We exploit the sudden death of an authoritarian leader – President Chiang Ching-Kuo of Taiwan – in 1988 to generate plausibly exogenous variation in partiality. We find that Chiang’s nationalist regime conducted political favoritism broadly toward political immigrants via cronyism (allocating public sector positions) and also differentially toward specific subgroups of political immigrants via wage discrimination (offering higher wages to these subgroups within the public sector). Favoritism led to a 7.2 percent immigrant wage premium, which accounted for nearly three quarters of the immigrant-native wage gap at the time. This in turn propelled overall income inequality by 4.5 percent. Moreover, political favoritism breeds political polarization in the long run by pulling apart the political views of immigrants and natives. Compared with natives, immigrants who were exposed to favoritism tend to adopt political positions that are aligned with the nationalist party today: they are more likely to support unification with China, and are more inclined to trust the mainland Chinese government and its citizens. Exposed immigrant (native) swing voters are also more (less) likely to vote for the nationalist party today.