Using unique survey data from the China Household Finance Survey, we estimate the extent of “narrow framing”, which is a widely documented behavioral bias, among Chinese households, using their portfolio choices. Conditional on stock market participation, we find that most Chinese households exhibit significant narrow framing. Based on the obtained estimates, we show that narrow framing positively predicts the extent of under diversification. Most importantly, we argue that narrow framing is an irreplaceable of understanding households’ portfolio choices, even after considering measurement error and a wide set of indicators of diversification

Using the Targeted Poverty Alleviation (TPA) disclosure policy in China as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper analyzes the impact of firm TPA disclosure on analyst forecast accuracy using a staggered difference-in-differences model. The results show a significant increase in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts after firm disclosure of TPA information, and this effect is more pronounced in firms with more greater information asymmetry and firms with less experienced analyst following. Our study provides theoretical and empirical evidence for regulators concerned with information environment of capital market.

The widespread replacement of gross receipt tax (GRT) with value-added tax (VAT) is an important phenomenon in the past half-century. Theory predicts that such tax reforms reduce vertical integration, increase production efficiency, and improve industrial structure. We exploit the tax reform that replaced GRT with VAT for service industries in China and find empirical evidence consistent with theoretical predictions. First, the tax reform increases the probability and intensity of outsourcing for both manufacturing and service firms. The increase is larger for industries more heavily reliant on treated intermediate industries for production and for firms with higher capital–labor intensity. Second, the reform increases total factor productivity and labor productivity. Third, the reform affects industry structure by boosting sales and promoting the employment of treated service industries.

Previous research finds that the greater geographic mobility of foreign than native-born workers following economic shocks helps to facilitate local labor market adjustment to shifting regional economic conditions. We examine the role that immigration may have played in enabling U.S. commuting zones to respond to manufacturing job loss caused by import competition from China. Although population headcounts of the foreign-born fell by more than those of the native-born in regions exposed to the China trade shock, the overall contribution of immigration to labor market adjustment in this episode was small. Because most U.S. immigrants arrived in the country after manufacturing regions were already mature, few took up jobs in industries that would later see increased import penetration from China. The foreign-born share of the working-age population in regions with high trade exposure was only three-fifths that in regions with low exposure. Immigration thus appears more likely to aid adjustment to cyclical shocks, in which job loss occurs in regions that had recent booms in hiring, rather than facilitating adjustment to secular regional decline, in which hiring booms occurred in the more distant past.

We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals treatments when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, experimentally adding “likes” and “shares” to social media appeals increases regulatory effort, suggesting visibility as an important mechanism. Third, treatment pollution reductions are not offset by control firm increases, based on randomly varying the proportion of treatment firms at the prefecture-level.

This paper provides new estimates of the housing stock, construction rates and price developments by city tier in China in order to understand where excess supply might be concentrated, and the implications of any significant contraction. We also update estimates of the size of China’s rapidly evolving real estate sector through 2021, allowing one to look at the initial impact of COVID-19, as well as extending the analysis to incorporate urban-expansion related infrastructure construction. We argue that China overall faces imbalances between supply and demand for housing stock, but the problem is significantly deeper in the generally smaller and lower income tier 3 cities, which nevertheless account for more than 60% of both China’s GDP and its housing stock.

We review theoretical and empirical work on the economic effects of the United States and China trade relations during the last decades. We first discuss the origins of the China shock, its measurement, and present methods used to study its economic effects on different outcomes. We then focus on the recent U.S.-China trade war. We discuss methods used to evaluate its effects, describe its economic effects, and analyze if this increase in trade protectionism reverted the effects of the China shock. The main lessons learned in this review are: (i) the aggregate gains from U.S.-China trade created winners and losers; (ii) China's trade expansion seems not to be the main cause of the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment during the same period; and (iii) the recent trade war generated welfare losses, had small employment effects, and was ineffective in reversing the distributional effects due to the China shock.

We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing the Renminbi by staggering the entry of different types of foreign investors into its domestic bond market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this strategy. Our framework rationalize China’s strategy as trying to build credibility as an international currency issuer while reducing the cost of capital flight. We provide a sufficient statistic to measure countries' reputation over time and show that it can be estimated using micro data on foreign investors' portfolios. We use our framework to explore how countries compete to become a reserve currency provider.

From 2013 to 2015, China lifted the ban on margin trading for designated stocks based on apublic ranking index. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits the threshold rules, I find that margin trading eligibility causes the stock share turnover and prices to increase. Moreover, firms react to this speculative pressure by manipulating earnings and reducing long-term investment. These effects are stronger for firms that are more prone to investor short-termism ex-ante. Consistent with managerial myopia, marginable firms later experience a decline in operating performance. My results suggest that margin traders, as short-term speculators, pressure the manager to focus on current earnings and take myopic actions.

We document the rise of China in offshore capital markets. Chinese firms use global tax havens to access foreign capital both in equity and bond markets. In the last twenty years, China's presence went from raising a negligible amount of capital in these markets to accounting for more than half of equity issuance and around a fifth of global corporate bonds outstanding in tax havens. Using rich micro data, we show that a range of Chinese firms, including both tech giants and SOEs, use these offshore centers. We conclude by discussing the macroeconomic and financial stability implications of these patterns.